A Moral Movement
In January of this year, horrified by the events unfolding in Gaza, and in response to an article defending Israel's actions written by a Messianic Jew and posted on the Facebook profile of a friend of mine, I wrote three articles with the intention of correcting common misconceptions about the situation, whilst generating support for the Palestinians' cause. The articles received four comments, essentially thanking me for taking the trouble to research and write these pieces.
The comments were from old school friends of mine. I welcomed these comments, but nevertheless was perturbed by something: the authors of these comments shared one thing in common, they were all Muslim. As far as I know, these friends were not more politically active or politically aware than my other friends; it seemed to me that the reason they responded to my article was simply because, for obvious reasons, they had a connection with, and felt a loyalty to, Palestine. Around the same time I saw that a good friend of mine, a Jewish girl who I have known for some years, had posted on her Facebook profile that she was attending the protests taking place outside the Israeli embassy in London; she was attending to assert "Israel's right to defend itself"—she works as an Israeli lobbyist after all. On reading her post, I wrote to her saying that I was to be at the very same protest, but on the other side of the barrier protesting against Israel's actions. I asked her if we could discuss her reasons for supporting Israel at this time. I never heard anything back.
So why was I perturbed? I couldn't help but feel that the source of the familial, religious or cultural loyalty that motivated my friends to comment on my articles was the same source that motivated the aforementioned Messianic Jew to write her article defending Israel's murderous actions and the same force that spurred my good friend to stand in solidarity with Israel. The confluence of these events set me thinking. I began to run some brief thought experiments through my mind.
I imagined going back in time to the point of my Jewish friend's birth and the point of one of my Muslim friends' births. Suppose (putting to one side for a moment any ethical considerations) I was able to swap these two new-born babies so that each family would take the other family's child to be their own. Now, jumping back to the present day, would anyone expect any other result than the Jewish-born baby to now be protesting against the actions of the Israeli government, while the Muslim-born baby stood in solidarity with them? It certainly is not an inevitable result, but most would agree that the odds would be quite appealing. And yet this result is extremely disturbing. To have one's opinions formed in such an arbitrary way about such serious matters is, it seems to me, the source of much unnecessary conflict. And yet it is, I suspect, something that almost all of us are guilty of to varying degrees.
This train of thought led me to make the following distinction between (1) fighting for the rights of an oppressed group primarily because we deem ourselves to be part of that group, and (2) fighting for rights simply because it seems to serve the cause of justice. A stable movement, one that has a chance of achieving welcome and lasting societal change, will have to be, in my view, comprised of people taking up the second type of struggle. The first type of struggle, though often extremely important and powerful, is not necessarily a moral struggle.
In advocating this view I must challenge another predominant view that is incompatible with my own. This view holds that the struggle of an oppressed group must be fought wholly, or at least primarily, by that group. So gay rights must be fought for by gay people, disability rights by disabled people, black rights by black people, women's rights by women, Sikh rights by Sikhs, Buddhist rights by Buddhists, and so on. This view has been articulated in various forms by, among others, Gandhi and Malcolm X. There is a powerful logic to it: to overcome the psychological dependancy, or sense of inferiority, an oppressed group has suffered, they must fight and win their own battles. This is a compelling point, but I believe the argument is nevertheless flawed.
The flaw, it seems to me, is to adopt as one's defining attribute that which has been used by the oppressor as the basis of one's oppression. We can classify people in any number of ways: height, musical taste, eye colour, class, skin colour, abilities, disabilities, gender, religious background, sexual orientation, name, weight, interests, and so on. To conduct a struggle in which to qualify to take part you must exhibit the attribute singled out by the oppressor is, I suspect, to already have lost a significant part of the battle. The point of such struggles is surely to break down rigid, uniform, and divisive forms of essentialising; to recognise that every individual possesses countless attributes and deserves to live in a society that doesn't simply define him or her by just one of them.
To neglect to cultivate movements and struggles that are as diverse as possible, to permit and deny people the right to participate on grounds essentially determined by the oppressor, is to reinforce the very forms of racism, sexism and classism that we claim to abhor. A strong movement will be a moral movement, not one comprising many factions each attempting to defend or secure a narrow set of rights. A moral movement will fight for principles, not for particular interests wrapped up in particular identities.
My sister, Francesca Martinez, a stand-up comedian with a disability (cerebral palsy) was asked in 2008 to carry the Olympic Torch through London as part of the international torch relay. Without giving it much thought, she agreed. As the date of this relay approached, however, news of China's human rights abuses in Tibet began to surface. I heard about the news before she did, so informed her of the distressing events unfolding in Tibet. Learning of these events she was unsure what to do. Part of her felt that appearing in the relay as a disabled woman was worthwhile as people with disabilities are so underrepresented in the media, but another part was concerned to highlight the abuses in Tibet, and prevent China simply using the Olympics as an international advertising campaign. The media began contacting some of the torch-bearers, asking for a response to the events in Tibet. My sister agreed to speak about these events live on Channel Four News, one of the three largest news broadcasters in Britain. Live on air she decided that to be consistent she would have to pull out of the Torch relay—she was the first torch-bearer to do so. That evening she received over a hundred emails from people around the world congratulating her for her decision. In my view, she did more for disability rights by defying societal expectations and categories, and standing up for people on the other side of the world, than she could have done by approaching the issue directly.
If it is human rights that concern us, then our humanity ought to qualify us to fight on their behalf wherever they may be threatened. Such an approach works on two levels. It supports those in need when they need it, and it undermines the divisive labels that help to perpetuate so much suffering and render us vulnerable to various forms of sectarianism and manipulation.
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morality, strategy, self-emancipation
By D'Arcy, Steve at Jul 26, 2009 07:51 AM
The author writes: "This train of thought led me to make the following distinction between (1) fighting for the rights of an oppressed group primarily because we deem ourselves to be part of that group, and (2) fighting for rights simply because it seems to serve the cause of justice. A stable movement, one that has a chance of achieving welcome and lasting societal change, will have to be, in my view, comprised of people taking up the second type of struggle. The first type of struggle, though often extremely important and powerful, is not necessarily a moral struggle."
I agree that the distinction between (1) and (2) is important, but I would draw very, very different conclusions. For one thing, it seems highly questionable to say that when people oppose being subjected to injustice, on the grounds that it is unfair to them (i.e., that their interests are not being given due weight), that this is "not necessarily a moral struggle." Why ever not? A struggle against injustice is a moral struggle, even if I participate in it because I am opposed to the fact that I am a victim of it.Insisting on one's own rights is still a case of insisting on rights. Self-respect (the insistence that one deserves to be treated with resepct by others) is both a self-interested and a moral motive.
That's the moral-philosophical point where I disagree.
But, even more strongly, I disagree on strategic grounds. Essentially, you are re-visiting the debate between "utopian socialists" like Robert Owen (especially in his earlier years), who saw social change as being a moral issue, and proposed a strategy of getting morally motivated people to bring change on behalf of others, and "social-scientific socialists" like Karl Marx, who offered sociological explanations of social change in terms of social conflict between oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and exploited, and proposed a strategy of "self-emancipation" by the exploited and oppressed. I would argue that, strategically, self-emancipation strategies (which do not exclude solidarity from allies, but place it in a context of support for self-led struggles by workers, women, colonized or racialized peoples, etc.) are far more likely to succeed than paternalistic (that is, on-behalf-of-others) strategies, for several reaosns. (1) One reason is that an oppressed or exploited group is a better judge of what its needs and interests are; (2) a second reason is that an oppressed or exploited group has a stronger basis for solidarity in struggle than a group united by a moral principle only; (3) a third reason is that a movement for the emancipation of (say) women or workers or Palestinians that is actually led by (respectively) men or bosses or Israelis would reinforce and extend into the Left itself the hierarchies and inequalities that we are supposed to be opposing; and (4) a fourth reason is that, ultimately, there is a conflict of interest among people who are advantaged by a hierarchy but who oppose it morally, and emancipation movements have to be protected from the potentially damaging influence that conflicts of interest are known to produce, regardless of good intentions. There are other reasons as well, but these are some of the key ones.
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Re: morality, strategy, self-emancipation
By Martinez, Raoul at Jul 29, 2009 04:13 AM
Hi Steve,
Thanks for your comments. I think this is an important issue and so will do my best to address the points you've raised.
MORALITY:
You wrote:
“For one thing, it seems highly questionable to say that when people oppose being subjected to injustice, on the grounds that it is unfair to them (i.e., that their interests are not being given due weight), that this is "not necessarily a moral struggle." Why ever not?”
One's opinion on this question will ultimately be determined by one's conception of morality. I think, however, that my characterisation is in keeping with traditional and intuitive notions of morality, and so is worth upholding.
A very simple definition of moral action might be: an action motivated by the desire to do what is right. If such a definition is accepted than it becomes clear that the motivation, not simply the consequence, of an action bears heavily on the question of whether it can be judged a moral action. To be clear that an action is a moral one, motivated by what is judged to be right rather than motivated by the desire to improve one's situation, one must have the option of not acting morally without incurring any great costs to one's self.
As almost every organism exhibits in certain circumstances the impulse to defend itself I am inclined not to consider self-defence, in itself, a form of moral action—unless, that is, we are to extend the capacity to act morally to every creature under the sun. Therefore to struggle against your own oppression is not “necessarily” a moral struggle. Both a sadist and a saint, if thrown in a river would attempt to swim to safety. Their actions would be morally indistinguishable: they simply would both attempt to survive. Contrast this with the actions of a sadist and a saint standing by a river when someone else is pushed in.
You also write:
“A struggle against injustice is a moral struggle, even if I participate in it because I am opposed to the fact that I am a victim of it. Insisting on one's own rights is still a case of insisting on rights.”
If your primary motivation for struggling against an injustice is that you are “a victim of it”, it is not, it seems to me, a moral struggle. Experience shows that often this will be a person's primary motivation for taking part in a struggle. I have known many people who are quite happy to insist on their own rights with no thought of anyone else's. There is absolutely no correlation between insisting on one's own rights and wanting to do what is right. I think this fact ought to be reflected in the moral language we use. This does not mean that it is impossible for someone to be a victim of oppression and be motivated by a strong moral impulse when struggling against it. I only mean to say that such a person would be motivated to fight injustice wherever it was found, and would feel, in some way, bonded to the struggles of other oppressed groups. My point is that significant change depends on people being able to feel and act on such an impulse, on behalf of others.
STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENTS
You write:
“Essentially, you are re-visiting the debate between "utopian socialists" like Robert Owen (especially in his earlier years), who saw social change as being a moral issue, and proposed a strategy of getting morally motivated people to bring change on behalf of others, and "social-scientific socialists" like Karl Marx, who offered sociological explanations of social change in terms of social conflict between oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and exploited, and proposed a strategy of "self-emancipation" by the exploited and oppressed.”
If the struggle for emancipation is not fundamentally a moral one there is nothing to prevent the oppressed becoming the oppressors. History is a testament to the ubiquity of this dynamic. The goal of “self-emancipation” alone, is not, I maintain, a moral one. To qualify as a moral struggle it must be a fight for “societal-emancipation”.
Would a world without racism, sexism, and other arbitrary forms of discrimination, necessarily be better, from a utilitarian perspective, than today's world? I think the answer must be no. For one can imagine a society exhibiting the same forms of hierarchy, poverty, inequality of opportunity, exploitation, violence and hypocrisy as our own in which each strata of society comprises the perfect balance of men to women, black people to white people, etcetera, but also exhibit the very same amount of suffering, and the very same imbalances of power. What can we learn from this? Simply that the moral struggle is the one that aims, ultimately, to equalise, as much as possible, the distribution of power among all people.
You write:
“I would argue that, strategically, self-emancipation strategies (which do not exclude solidarity from allies, but place it in a context of support for self-led struggles by workers, women, colonized or racialized peoples, etc.) are far more likely to succeed than paternalistic (that is, on-behalf-of-others) strategies, for several reasons.”
Perhaps our disagreement simply turns on our conception of what constitutes “solidarity from allies”. I think I place more importance on this aspect of the struggle than you do. It seems to me that without such solidarity, movements will be fairly narrow and self-serving and not provide the foundations for the consolidation of a larger, longer-lasting, struggle for fundamental societal change. There are other points worth mentioning however.
It is highly problematic to talk of “self-emancipation” as if there exist easily identifiable groups of people with largely convergent interests. As I took care to point out in my original article, every individual has countless attributes and interests, and so people can be grouped in countless ways. Fundamentally all worthwhile human struggles are for the same thing. Not for the rights of women, minorities, black people, disabled people or religious people, but simply for the rights of people. Fractured movements with narrow goals are weakened movements, geared only for the short-term and—often justifiably—self-interest.
A study of history shows that such fractures—such group identities—serve, and are cultivated by, the ruling class. It is an effective way to "divide-and-rule". Strategically, therefore, it is of the upmost importance to heal such fractures, and transcend such group identities. Such transcendence depends on common moral vision.
You write:
“ (1)...an oppressed or exploited group is a better judge of what its needs and interests are. 2)... an oppressed or exploited group has a stronger basis for solidarity in struggle than a group united by a moral principle only.”
There is certainly a lot of truth to this. And yet the implications of this principle are wider, I think, than you have allowed. The idea of a “self-led” movement is not obviously coherent. For what constitutes the “self”? The only unit worthy of that term, it seems to me, is the individual. An oppressed group is united, ultimately, by the attribute selected by the oppressor. The unifying interest, then, is to break free from the classification imposed by the oppressor and reclaim the power, on an individual basis, to define one's own identity, and have the power over decisions impacting on one's own life. It is dangerous for people outside an oppressed group to impose goals and strategies on that group. However, it is no less dangerous for people within an oppressed group to impose on each other goals and strategies. The fight, surely, is to win autonomy, not for a group (especially a group defined by the oppressor), but for individuals. And, it turns out, this is the goal of a participatory society. For this reason, it seems to me a strategic necessity to cultivate a movement comprised of individuals driven by the desire to realise such a society. Furthermore, the motivation to create such a society is best described, in my view, as moral in character—thus my call for a “moral movement”.
A group united by a temporary confluence of interests is not stable. Circumstances change, and with a change in circumstance, interests change. A common vision founded on a basic morality is more durable in the long term, in my view, for it is not dependent on circumstance.
You write:
“(3) a third reason is that a movement for the emancipation of (say) women or workers or Palestinians that is actually led by (respectively) men or bosses or Israelis would reinforce and extend into the Left itself the hierarchies and inequalities that we are supposed to be opposing”
I agree. I have suggested nothing to the contrary.
Finally, you write:
“(4) a fourth reason is that, ultimately, there is a conflict of interest among people who are advantaged by a hierarchy but who oppose it morally, and emancipation movements have to be protected from the potentially damaging influence that conflicts of interest are known to produce, regardless of good intentions.”
Transcending this “conflict of interest” is precisely what is necessary to create a better world—it is this very principle that renders a movement moral. Without this kind of moral foundation, what distinguishes this thing we call the “Left” from the other side of the political spectrum? If the aspirations of the Left are not ultimately moral, what are they?
Gandhi, I recall, spoke disparagingly of “dreaming of systems so perfect that no-one will need to be good”. He was referring to economic systems I think, and yet I think the same may apply to systems of resistance.
Perhaps there is some common ground worth emphasising. Namely, that each struggle, to be strategically effective, must keep in mind how it can contribute to the longer term aim of developing a wider movement for social change as well as focusing on achieving immediate goals.
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Re: Re: morality, strategy, self-emancipation
By D'Arcy, Steve at Jul 29, 2009 15:36 PM
Hi Raoul,
Suppose I'm good at addition, but bad at multiplication, because multiplication is more difficult. Then I say, "2 2=4, and 2x2=10." The first judgment is true, the second false.
This is like me saying, "when people disrespect me, that's wrong, and when I disrespect so-and-so, that's OK." The first judgment is correct, and the second is incorrect. But that's to be expected, because -- just like addition is easier than multiplication -- moral insights about disrespect toward oneself are easier to grasp than moral insights about the mistreatment of others, especially people with whom one doesn't identify. Nevertheless, those easy-to-grasp insights about one's own rights are still moral insights. The fact that they come easily to us does not mean that they are not insights (any more than calculations involving addition are untrue simply because they are easier to make than calculations involving multiplication). The insistence that one's rights be respected is a moral insight, and to be motivated by that insight is to be morally motivated.
Some of your arguments in the strategy part of your reply presuppose your judgment in the morality part that people struggling against their own oppresssion, because they do not approve of the fact that they are being mistreated (such as in the women's movement, the Civil Rights movement, the LGBTQ liberation movement, the labour movement, etc.), are not engaged in a moral struggle, and I've already tried to explain why I dont' accept that reasoning.
But i want to revisit the issue of "conflict of interest." You say that morality, by its very nature, involves transcending conflicts of interest. But I think you're using the term differently from me, or at least thinking of it in a different way. I am talking about people (like anti-sexist men, anti-racist white people, anti-capitalist employers, etc.), who on the one hand have a desire to oppose a certain hierarchy, and on the other hand can obtain or protect benefits and advantages by maintaining that hierarchy. Such people can be allies in the struggle against a hierarchy, but there needs to be a kind of autonomy of these movements from such people. This is true for the same reason that judges should "recuse themselves" from cases in which they may have a financial interest or a personal relationship with one of the parties involved in the case. This is necessary to prevent their conflict of interest, which (as we know from experience) can cloud people's judgment in spite of their good intentions, from affecting the outcome of the case.
I understand that you think that morality involves viewing matters from an impartial standpoint, but as you also admit, it is more difficult to do that when doing so means sacrificing benefits to which one has become accustomed (as always, in spite of good intentions). In light of that, it makes good sense to insulate movements from the damage that can be done to them if, for instance, we let well-intentioned employers vote at union meetings, or well-intentioned men have an equal say on how to run a feminist organization, and so on. You seem to feel that those movements will do better if they let those people participate equally, as long as they are well-intentioned. But surely that's not true: that would undermine rather than strengthen those movements. After all, don't we know that about judges participating in deciding cases in which they have financial interest etc.? (True, women have an interest in the fate of sexist institutions, just like men do, but whereas women have an interest in ending injustice, men have an interest in maintaining it. And that, clearly, makes a huge difference.)
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Re: Re: Re: morality, strategy, self-emancipation
By Martinez, Raoul at Jul 29, 2009 16:32 PM
Hi Steve,
Thanks again for your thoughts; it helps to clarify my own.
Regarding the moral question, I took care to write that self-defense isn't "necessarily" a moral action, not that it never is. If you agree that it isn't always a moral action then there has been no disagreement. If you are implying, however, that it always is, I pose the following question: do you think that a rat is acting morally when it struggles against an oppressive trap? It seems clear that there are powerful motivating factors, quite independent of morality, that can explain a person or animal struggling against an unjust situation.
The rest of your response I feel I have dealt with, implicitly at least, already. Though you re-state your position i don't feel there is a new argument offered for your view or against mine.
I will only re-state one thing. You suggest that an oppressed group has an interest in ending injustice but, I would add, only the injustice it is subjected to. This is not foundation enough for building a movement capable of achieving fundamental societal change.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: morality, strategy, self-emancipation
By D'Arcy, Steve at Jul 29, 2009 17:04 PM
Hi Raoul,
You ask me, "do you think that a rat is acting morally when it struggles against an oppressive trap?"
I would say, No. But that's because the rat does not believe that it is being treated unjustly.
If, however, a rat struggled out of indignation due to the fact that it was being wronged, then yes, of course that would be morally motivated action, even if it were not particularly inclined to stick up for other rats or for squirrels.
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