Anarcho-Government
[Contribution to the Reimagining Society Project hosted by ZCommunications]
Over the years, I have intimated to many of my anarchist friends that even though I consider myself an anarchist, I don't have a high degree of confidence in the possibility of any society ever achieving a reliable order without some form of "government." At the very least, I am certain - despite my hostility toward nearly all forms of authority - that no revolution carried out in a society like the
I still believe in the anarchist ideal as an ultimate objective, if humans can demonstrate the capacity to self-organize free of any forms of authority. All else being equal, if we can achieve peace and order without ever resorting to authoritarian means or institutions, all the better. I certainly believe in striving to eliminate all unnecessary forms of authority wherever and whenever possible.
But if I could snap my fingers today and make government disappear entirely by tomorrow, I would not do so. And not just because that would deprive society of the necessary practical experience of self-organizing in preparation as an integral aspect of revolutionary change. Right now, government provides a key protection to huge numbers of vulnerable people from the worst exploits of capitalists, patriarchs, white supremacists, and adults. It doesn't fully protect the working poor, women and the LGBTQ community, people of color, children or the disabled from all or most oppression, or else we might just consider it a solution! And in each of these cases, government is often an indispensable tool of deprivation, invalidation, indoctrination, abuse, or coercion.
That said, other forces have aspirations toward still-worse forms of oppression, and in the absence of real social movements and institutions with the strength to protect society from these other violators, the government serves this purpose to at least an extent.
But what if you could erode the state's functions over time by building alternative institutions that can take over or render obsolete whatever positive roles government entities now play? For instance, you could argue, a participatory socialist economy would not need significant outside regulation, worker and consumer protections, and so forth; those would be built into the economic system itself. And as economically motivated crime ebbs, so will our need for laws, police or courts or a national military or even a nation. In a revolutionary society, all of our institutions - feminist, youth-empowering families; participatory democratic municipal forums; workers and consumers councils, and so forth - would deal with social conflict such that authoritarian measures will not be needed.
That is, in fact, a clearer vision than most contemporary anarchists are able to present when pressed for an actual vision of how their stateless society will work. And yet it is indeed that vision that I am saying is so unrealistic as to be inconceivable in an immediate post-insurrectionary phase. While a society consisting of such institutions sounds terrific, it won't be able to avert or solve all serious social problems. We cannot make believe that in the chaotic mess after an insurrection, the tendency won't be for people to turn to some form of authority, as they often do during crises.
If anarchists do not come up with proposals for the post-insurrectionary government - as strange as that proposition may seem - we leave the task open to authoritarians. It's really that simple. The alternative is relying on a collective leap of faith that is unfathomable. That is, just to prevent the establishment of a government with authoritarian powers after the overthrow of an existing government, a huge portion of all citizens will have to actively oppose it. They won't just have to be theoretical anarchists who believe in a stateless ideal, but they'll have to have faith that all of society is ready to live without any laws, police, courts or prisons, and they'll have to thwart the creation of any such institutions.
So unless we expect that a majority of the people will at an early revolutionary stage seek to extinguish any and all attempts at establishing new governing bodies, then anti-authoritarians must take part in the uncomfortable process of establishing sensible governing bodies.
We can certainly count on authoritarians of all stripes to be more than ready to coordinate revolutionary social change from the top down, and to establish a post-insurrectionary order that depends on strongly centralized, hierarchical institutions of control. Without a competing vision of social order - including political institutions with real authority and real power - only a pipe dreamer should expect a mass movement to get behind the stateless ideal in the immediate wake of a crumbling national government. If an existing Western government succumbs to leftist insurrection, it will be replaced by a new government, not a benign vacuum or a bunch of communities with no authoritarian institutions in sight. The only question for anarchists is whether we want to influence - maybe even define - the form that government takes, or leave it up to those who find the process much more palatable than we.
But this still sounds like a contradiction, right? Anarchists know as well as anybody that governments tend to self-perpetuate; they tend to accumulate and consolidate power. Even if we set up a largely libertarian, participatory government, it will be highly imperfect, and it will cause alternative political institutions to atrophy; people will "naturally" grow complacent; the institutions will grow more abusive and intrusive. And eventually the people will have to throw off this new government just like the last. So why bother?
Marxists and other authoritarians have sometimes insisted that an interim government is needed, and once we are done with it, we can shrug it off or it will dissolve. But anyone with a serious critique of authoritarian institutions knows better. Power, once consolidated, has a tendency to resist such shrugs, never mind the notion of it just "withering away," as Marxists and even Leninists like to offer.
But what if they're partly right? (Yeah, I know - but I said it anyway.) I've never heard a Marxist (or anyone else) propose the creation of a government that is structurally designed to "wither away," but I see no reason we cannot develop a set of social institutions the existence of which relies on constant, active consent of the governed, lest it lose legitimacy and automatically dissolve.
That is, we could build social capacities for legislation, law enforcement, definitive adjudication of disputes, protection from hostile offenders (criminals and invaders alike) - with all these functions carried out by institutions that bear a strong burden of consent without which the institution automatically loses authority. This, of course, would be in addition to such institutions being designed as directly democratic and minimally hierarchical or completely horizontal.
For instance, laws would be approved by directly democratic or delegated legislatures. But this body would depend on a high quorum of participation, and a supermajority of participants would have to approve any law in order for it to make it onto the books. This would ensure that only the worst offenses would become official crimes. And any law on the books would need to be repeatedly reapproved, on a schedule set by the size of the supermajority that passed the law. So maybe a piece of legislation that passes with a 99% majority (say, the set of laws defining and prohibiting homicide) stays on the books for 15 years, then comes up for reapproval. A law that gets only 75% approval, on the other hand, is revisited in 5 years. If next time it only earns 65% support, depending on the rules set forth in a new charter, maybe it fails. This way, society is only holding people legally responsible for behavior deemed unacceptable by a vast majority of the citizenry. This would encourage advocates of laws to limit strictness and penalties in order to achieve passage while retaining for society the ability to clearly and enforcibly ban certain egregious behaviors.
When it comes to the organizations that carry out various functions in society that depend on a degree of political authority, we can add even more safeguards, such as recall mechanisms, civilian oversight panels with real teeth, and so forth. But these are in addition to the default mechanism of consent dependency. Any such institution would have to obtain the active consent of the population ostensibly subject to its authority.
For example, laws would be enforced by some institution with a policing function. Of course, I envision this function, the institution which fulfills it, and the roles of those carrying it out to be drastically different in a revolutionary society than their current forms. But let's be honest: no matter how libertarian the society, people fulfilling the role of "police" will by definition maintain a disproportionate degree of power and authority. So the powers of the police department will be established by legislation that needs to be continually renewed. If the department fails in its mission, or if a preferable alternative forms at the grassroots, then the electorate could either trigger the dismantlement of the institution through petition and a dissolution vote, or simply discontinue its authorization by failing to vote confidence in the institution.
This consent-based government also depends on a quorum; probably 50% of qualified electorate has to participate in a vote for any proposed item to even be considered, and a supermajority of that quorum will have to authorize each item. This will theoretically foster a high level of participation, since a series of quorum failures would essentially trigger a true state of de facto anarchy - no insurrection required. Put differently: if people don't show up to vote, the governmental institutions reflexively lose their mandate.
A government that truly depends on the active consent of the governed cannot stray from operating in the public interest simply by encouraging apathy as governments do today. In fact, apathy would translate into a vote of no confidence and terminate the government's claim to legitimacy.
A keen critic will note that such dissolution-by-apathy, as it were, would not preclude some simple majority of those willing to participate in government from reestablishing a new, nonconsensual government and ruling over the apathetic. Which is to say, they would likely form a political dynamic like the civics-class ideal of any Western government, where an engaged electorate make decisions in the absence of those who choose not to or cannot vote, theoretically empowering a plurality to rule over the majority.
I personally suspect that even as a consent-bound government of the nature I propose might inspire truly systemic, healthy suspicion of authoritarian policies and institutions of all kinds, some institutions that require various authoritarian capacities - such as police, courts and even some kind of prisons - would remain supported for generations to come. This is simply because the citizenry will decide the social costs of being powerless or dependent on mob-rule in the face of, say, accused pathological criminals, would be higher than the costs born by society of having an extremely limited police organization functioning in its midst. This would mean having specially trained individuals to investigate crimes, others to detain suspects, others to try suspects, and in cases of conviction, institutions that see the consequences through, be they some form of reparations or restriction activity like house arrest, rehabilitation, or imprisonment.
I am equally certain that the default sunsetting of laws that do not get renewed would eventually whittle away at the list of official crimes in a society that has nonauthoritarian institutions that seek alternative ways to deal with social problems. Imagine a law like "disturbing the peace," or a similarly ambiguous statute, which might carry with it troubling applications and give police murky authority to manage gatherings of people or even individual speech that a community would just not be comfortable with. A community might just deem such a problem best dealt with outside the use of police at all. A system of governance like I am proposing incentivizes the implementation of alternatives that in turn lessen the need for authoritarian methods of maintaining social order.
To some, elements of my proposal may sound simply naïve. Can we truly expect power-possessing institutions to self-dissolve just because their technical authority is taken away? We can put on paper that an institution such as a police force is directly accountable to those subject to its authority, but what's to ensure the populace that if it ceases to support the police force at some point, the police force will willingly comply? After all, authority is not the same thing as power. Once the police have the technical, logistical, and physical capability to do their jobs, even when stripped of the authority to patrol the streets, they still have the power to do so. Sure, a police force of the future would be limited in size and strength in the first place, and thus it would be relatively easy to depose any kind of coup-like maneuver by a recalcitrant department or rogue element, but this possibility does challenge the idea of self-dissolving institutions of authority.
Indeed, if such a conflict were to come to pass, the active involvement of the citizenry might be required to ensure dismantlement of a rogue institution, when merely turning their collective backs on the offenders might not do the trick. The secret weapon of the community, in this example, is popular control of economic institutions that are kept independent from policing institutions. That is, even if the people cannot quash a recalcitrant police force through political means, the people directly control the department's access to material support. But, goes the argument, it would take some serious effort in such a case to actually depose the violators.
Still, I must ask, is this really the kind of potential problem with authority we're not willing to accept? Consider, for a moment, the forms of authoritarian institutions others would implement. Wouldn't you prefer the off chance that some communities would need to physically disarm a few rogue cops over the scene we'd face if Marxists or others get their way in the wake of a successful dismantlement of the old order? What are the chances authoritarian revolutionaries would even provide a way for communities to manage the size and power of their own police forces or remotely installed cadres loyal to the authorities in some remote capitol.?
The problem I have is that I am not sure I would side with anarchist fundamentalists, if it came down to it, the government had fallen, and the choice was between "anarchy" and some form of hierarchical government. And if I'm not sure, what are the chances that the majority of people wouldn't side with those advocating some form of authority? The basic functions of political institutions are so worthwhile to most people, that I suspect we would support them in one form or another. My primary goal is to not get saddled with the choice between no government and a government established by non-anarchists. Paradoxical as it may sound, I want the anarchist government.
If the fundamentalist anarchists are right, and there's really no place for institutions with political authority over public jurisdictions, then a consent-bound government renders that decision society's as a whole. And citizens' first layer of defense against a government growing out of control would be that government's reliance on consultation with the people, as well as its dependence on an economic system that is essentially autonomous from the polity and is itself democratically controlled by the people. Never offer a government the capacity to grow beyond the reach of its base polity, and you eliminate 90 percent of the reason to fear that government.
When considering preparations for the immediate post-insurrectionary period, even the most fundamentalist antiauthoritarian need not assume that the question of government is an all-or-nothing proposition. This should be a relief to anarchists; it means we don't have to pretend that the people will come to the collective conclusion that no government is better than a new government during what will certainly be highly tumultuous, uncertain times.
The tendency to turn to authority during crises need not automatically mean afflicting society with a new political cancer. The question really isn't whether the people will - in the absence of an orderly, deliberative forum that provides space for calm reflection and reasoned debate - decide between no authority and authority. Reasonable people will choose authority. So let's start discussing what kind of government provides the best, most peaceful path to the anarchist ideals without forcing the no-government philosophy down the throats of those feeling anxious and vulnerable in the face of great changes in all other spheres of social life.



Laws as criminal proscriptions, or laws as the manifestation of
By Agnostic, Justin at Dec 03, 2009 00:38 AM
Brian,
I could not help but notice how every 'law' you exampled were negative laws, i.e. criminal proscriptions. Do you intentionally use the term 'law' to mean negative laws, or is just what you happened to example? The reason I ask is because I think it is is a little dishonest to imagine a given social order, as I think you do (as you make reference to ParEcon, and a democratically controlled economy), but then at the same time argue that laws should have to be assented to by a super majority regularly to justify their continued existence.
If we are imagining a collective democratic economy, what is the difference between the rules of that system and laws. Take for example if we are imagining ParEcon, under what authority but law is the mechanism of horizantal planning through iterative plans enforced. What would be the response if some local community decided rather than conform to the ParEcon plan they would sieze the resources they felt were due to them. Would the rest of the presumably majority supporting ParEcon public respond with force to protect the ParEconish order. If the answer is yes, which I would have to assume it is given the ParEcon supporting public just won a civil war in its vision of social revolution, then is not the rules of ParEcon law.
I may be confussed on the use of your terms or I may have fundamental difference in world view. As I understand it a state is a polity that protects its norms with force, and law is the official declarations of that polity (I understand that Tom uses the term State and Government as distinct, but I would say both are states, one is just more or less libertarian). Do you understand these terms this way?
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Re: Laws as criminal proscriptions, or laws as the manifestation of
By Dominick, Brian at Apr 17, 2011 02:48 AM
But surely if 45% of society isn't actively behind aspects of parecon enough to even participate, I'm not sure where those institutions would derive their claim to legitimacy.
As for the government vs. state discussion, I couldn't have said it better myself.
Thanks for engaging!
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how does this change come about?
By Wetzel, Tom at Nov 24, 2009 00:37 AM
Brian, you write:
"I don't think we really disagree beyond that, in terms of the necessity of a government. I think your idea of that government sounds a little more classical/romantic than mine, but it's hard to to tell from such a minimalist sketch. I also have a less materialist approach to change, as I prefer stressing that it isn't just "workers" who are going to be building new governing structures. I see it as "people" wearing lots of hats -- workers, students, family members, community members, etc. "
I don't assume that only "workers" will be building new governing structures but nowhere in your piece do you say anything about how the old state is eliminated or how a new governance structure is brought about. I don't think it is at all sensible to be talking about ideas about new social structures without some conception of how this change is to come to pass. Also, nothing in your piece tells us what you think the nature of the state is or what differentiates an "anarcho-government" from a state.
Like Engels and many anarchists historically, such as Bakunin, Makno, Rocker and others, I believe the state is a bureaucratic apparatus that is not controllable by the mass of the people, and that this is necessary for it to be able to defend the interests of the dominating classes, and the existing system in its totality, including the various structures of inequality that the existing capitaliist society embodies. I would also assume that this state structure would be gotten rid of only by the same set of mass movements that also do away with the corporations and capitalist control over the economy. Now, it's true that since there are many fault lines where people are oppressed and many social movements that develop to fight in these areas, the corporate and state structure could only be gotten rid of, I would assume, through a very massive alliance of social movements.
However, part of this change is elimination of the class structure and this presupposes that workers take over and restructure the system of production. If we look at mass revollutionary situations over the past century, worker mass movements have always played an important role, and are likely to continue to do so because of the ability of workers to bring social production to a halt and to start it on a different basis. But no doubt it is true that people would be involved in a social transformation under a variety of "hats" as you say. Emphasizing the role of workers in the econonmic reconstruction, as I do, doesn't contradict that.
Historically the libertarian socialist left has emphasized two types of building blocks in the reconstruction of the governing structure of the society...(1) assemblies and elected councils in industry or workplaces, and (2) assemblies in neighborhoods and councils or congresses of delegates elected from them.
You seem to follow Shalom in assuming that a new governance structure would be based on (2). That may be true but I'm not certain about that. I also have problems with some of Shalom's assumptions. He assumes a highly indirect system of election where small assmblies of maybe 20 to 80 people elect delegates to a council of similar size, and then that councils elects delegates to a "higher level" or broader scope council and so on. I think indirect systems of election like that pose a serious danger of the higher level councils being not really controllable by the base.
You say that you are particularly concerned with the passing of laws that would have criminal penalties or criminalize behaviors. And you say this is why you want super-majorities. I think this is a quite dangerous idea in the immediate period of a revolutionary transformation. That's because in that period there will be a minority who will just have had their power and property taken away from them, probably against their will. Moreover these are people who would tend to have a highly developed sense of entitlement developed in the period when they did have power, and they would be likely to use every stratagem at their disposal to try to retain whatever power they can hold onto. This means that any super-majority proposal is dangerous because it would play into the hands of this defeated minority.
For similar reasons I'm also sort of leaning towards the idea of a bicameral legislature. This would consist of a congress of rank and file delegates elected from groups of neighborhood assemblies, maybe using proportional representation, and a workers congress that would consist of worker delegates elected from assemblies in the various industries. I think this may be necessary to protect the power workers have just seized from the dominating classes. The first congress would reflect broadly the political perspectives within the entire population but the second congress would exist to empower workers to protect themselves against proposals that would tend to lead back to some sort of class system. Just as we can expect that a variety of social movements would have been involved in bringing about this change, proportional representation in the citizen congresses might be needed to reflect that.
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Re: how does this change come about?
By Dominick, Brian at Sep 28, 2010 22:23 PM
If we can't get 60% of the voting polity to bestow the authority on some agency to enforce popular economic mandates, and renew it every year, then maybe we've done something terribly wrong.
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negative assumptions leading to unnecessary line of inquiry
By Evans, Mark at Nov 23, 2009 13:29 PM
Hi Brian - I was really identifying with your essay until I got to this part -
“Even if we set up a largely libertarian, participatory government, it will be highly imperfect, and it will cause alternative political institutions to atrophy; people will "naturally" grow complacent; the institutions will grow more abusive and intrusive. And eventually the people will have to throw off this new government just like the last. So why bother?”
Now Im not sure I follow your argument (Ive been working night shifts lately and they always screw my brain up) but this left me wondering the following -
Why does Brian assume that the new government will be “highly imperfect”?
Why does Brian assume that “the institutions will grow more abusive and intrusive”?
Why does Brian assume that “people will grow ... complacent”?
Take Steve Shalom’s vision of a participatory political system. He (I assume) assumes that there is no reason to believe that a participatory form of government would be highly imperfect, or that it would grow more abusive and intrusive, or that people would grow complacent. I also see no reason to believe the negative assumption that you make.
From this point of view the remainder of your essay seems to me to venture down an unnecessary line of inquiry.
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Re: negative assumptions leading to unnecessary line of inquiry
By Dominick, Brian at Nov 23, 2009 21:25 PM
Hey Mark. Always appreciate your input. Thanks for taking the time to read and respond.
I sympathize with fears harbored by some anarchists -- anchored by more than a century of anarchist political theory -- that any kind of unequal political authority will have a tendency to self-corrupt. So if we have institutions that have special power over ordinary citizens, some would argue, we need extraordinary safeguards against losing control of them, and insurance that if and when they have outlived their necessity, they will dissolve.
I'm not actually making that case -- as you noted. I don't feel so strongly about it that I would need at this stage to convince others (essentially non-anarchists ) that government as we have imagined and implemented it over the centuries -- and as even our most libertarian visionaries would have it -- poses grave risks of sliding down the slippery slope to tyranny.
Would I hope to design such institutions so well that they would never be at risk of accruing undue authority, etc? Of course. And I would also hope that the broader polity would have the will and wherewithall to affirmatively act to dissolve any such institution that had outlived its need.
I think if you disagree that there is a need for my essay, then that's fine -- clearly that means you were not the intended audience. My audience is hardline anarchists that oppose any form of government beyond romantic notions of citizens' assemblies, no matter how democratic, how horizontal, how restricted, etc. Indeed, I was making a clear case that an anarchist can be pro-government. Many anarchists take this for granted, I think, but a significant portion of the anarchist "movement" is fundamentalist in its rejection of institutions with extraordinary authority.
On the matter of Steve Shalom's vision, I think he would be the first to admit it is a very rudimentary proposal. Indeed, it lacks virtually any discussion of the issues I'm addressing, which mostly revolve around criminal management or "justice" and the institutions necessary for handling those functions. And I think Steve would also be among the first to admit that his proposal is for a "highly imperfect" form of government. I have somewhat different ideas in mind when I talk about future governance, but I would say even my best ideal would be highly imperfect. Hell, even if the institutions are "perfectly" formulated, humans still have to implement them, which means "highly imperfect" would be about as good as we could hope for. After all, we are not robots or a new species; so we should maintain humility when talking about vision and strategy. It's not going to be a smooth ride, and the eventual achievement -- even in a best-case scenario -- is not going to be Utopia.
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Re: Re: negative assumptions leading to unnecessary line of inqu
By Evans, Mark at Nov 24, 2009 14:41 PM
Hi again Brian - I think you are right when you say that I’m not the intended audience for your essay (so if you think the following is a distraction then please feel free to ignore it) but some of what you write seems to me to touch on important issues that a more broad audience will be interested in.
Like you Im not interested in organising for a perfect social system so we can put aside naive notions of utopianism and unrealistic ideas of human beings as angels.
So to reiterate you didn’t explain why you assume that the new government will be "highly imperfect". Or that "the institutions will grow more abusive and intrusive". Or that "people will grow ... complacent".
These negative assumptions seem to me to be the basis of the rest of your argument but I see no reason to believe in them.
In your reply to my comment you say “ On the matter of Steve Shalom's vision, I think he would be the first to admit it is a very rudimentary proposal.” I’m not sure I would say “rudimentary” but even in its incomplete development I think that if parpolity functioned as it is designed to (and again, I see no reason to believe that it couldn’t) then I don’t think it would be true to say, as you do, that “people will have to throw off this new government just like the last”.
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Re: Re: Re: negative assumptions leading to unnecessary line of
By Dominick, Brian at Nov 25, 2009 01:13 AM
Hey Mark. I'm happy to continue this. You're not the audience I'm arguing against, per se, but I value your insights and opinion, and you're right, the statements I'm making do have broader implications.
You question three assertions I made about the character of a revolutionary polity: that it will be "highly imperfect" -- by which I mean that it will "grow more abusive and intrusive" and that "people will grow... complacent." Let me take the latter first. I believe that a government that includes institutions with authority over a constituency will have a tendency to foster and insulate a specialized class and encourage relative apathy on the part of the people. Why would they not? Why would people whose job it is to be a delegate, a constable, a judge, a prosecutor, a jailer, want as much relative control over her or his job as possible? Why would such institutions not discourage active interest from the broader polity? Even if we were just talking about a single-tiered direct democracy assembly of 200 people, a political class would likely form that would find general apathy to its advantage. So we need safeguards against a political class encouraging the apathy of the broader public. I don't recall if Steve's proposal has a mechanism for this. I think it is utopian to believe that without institutional structures and/or policies to stave off apathy, it somehow magically will not develop, because out of the goodness of their hearts those with a particular inclination toward politics will want to include everybody else.
As for government growing more abusive and intrusive, I certainly have no scientific data to prove this is a general tendency of authority, but I dare say it stands strongly to reason that political authority tends to self-perpetuate. Can we really expect that if we empower delegates to represent constituencies, entrust police to arrest, authorize prosecutors to press charges, empower judges to adjudicate, and allow jailers to detain -- that these folks won't have an institutionalized tendency to retain, accumulate and even abuse their special authorities? Can you be so sure of their benevolence that you would oppose putting basic failsafes in place to ensure they don't stray?
As for whether Steve's "parpolity" vision is at risk of becoming highly imperfect, or worse, I'll say again, it doesn't really address most of the social problems -- or their institutional solutions -- that I think would raise the need for safeguards like those I'm suggesting in my essay. If Steve doesn't talk about how police forces will function or be structured, how can I answer whether there's reason to believe they'll have a tendency to self-aggrandize?
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Re: Re: Re: Re: negative assumptions leading to unnecessary line
By Evans, Mark at Nov 28, 2009 14:45 PM
Okay Brian - here are my answers to the questions you put to me.
“I believe that a government that includes institutions with authority over a constituency will have a tendency to foster and insulate a specialized class and encourage relative apathy on the part of the people. Why would they not?”
Well I would say that that depends on the structure of the institutions and the consciousness of the people within those institutions (or to use the complementary holist concepts, the “human centre” and the “institutional boundary”). So, for example, I think that you would be right to say that about democratic centralist institutions where people have no consciousness of the coordinator class. However, I don’t think it would be true of a participatory society because the institutions would be structurally different and the consciousness higher.
“I think it is utopian to believe that without institutional structures and/or policies to stave off apathy, it somehow magically will not develop, because out of the goodness of their hearts those with a particular inclination toward politics will want to include everybody else.” ... “Can we really expect that if we empower delegates to represent constituencies, entrust police to arrest, authorize prosecutors to press charges, empower judges to adjudicate, and allow jailers to detain -- that these folks won't have an institutionalized tendency to retain, accumulate and even abuse their special authorities? Can you be so sure of their benevolence that you would oppose putting basic failsafes in place to ensure they don't stray?”
I think here you put the problem the wrong way round - and maybe this is the crux of the matter. For me an “anarcho-government” or participatory polity would need to be popularly supported as a precondition for its success. If it did not have this as a precondition then, in my opinion, it is doomed to fail. Therefore I think that the issue of “apathy” needs to be addressed as part of our strategy and not our vision. The way in which we overcome this “apathy” is by building popular support for our vision, so that when we get to a point during the social transition, where we can implement our new system, popular participation is an already deeply embedded culture.
As you can see from this brief description there is no magic or other mystical processes at play. Also, it is the consciousness on which this participatory culture is based that acts as a defence against elitist tendencies. And it is this participatory consciousness that complements the participatory institutions that together generate a robust system.
“If Steve doesn't talk about how police forces will function or be structured, how can I answer whether there's reason to believe they'll have a tendency to self-aggrandize?”
Here I would point out (remind you) that parpolity has been designed to complement parecon and that together these two systems actually have quite a lot to say about “how police forces will function or be structured” (BJCs being one obvious example) that already seem to me to address your concerns.
That is my understanding anyway ...
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getting back, finally...
By Dominick, Brian at Sep 28, 2010 21:45 PM
"Well I would say that that depends on the structure of the institutions and the consciousness of the people within those institutions (or to use the complementary holist concepts, the “human centre” and the “institutional boundary”). So, for example, I think that you would be right to say that about democratic centralist institutions where people have no consciousness of the coordinator class. However, I don’t think it would be true of a participatory society because the institutions would be structurally different and the consciousness higher."
Okay, I guess I'm trying to define those institutions. I'm not sure what the problem is. You're making references to a "participatory society" and "structurally different institutions" -- and I'm saying, cool, let's start fleshing those out in a vision.
"I think here you put the problem the wrong way round - and maybe this is the crux of the matter. For me an “anarcho-government” or participatory polity would need to be popularly supported as a precondition for its success. If it did not have this as a precondition then, in my opinion, it is doomed to fail. Therefore I think that the issue of “apathy” needs to be addressed as part of our strategy and not our vision."
I think apathy is a concern all along. Sure, we have to overcome it now, but later on, it takes the form of complacency (whereas now it's caused more by a sense of powerlessness).
"As you can see from this brief description there is no magic or other mystical processes at play. Also, it is the consciousness on which this participatory culture is based that acts as a defence against elitist tendencies. And it is this participatory consciousness that complements the participatory institutions that together generate a robust system."
That actually sounds like magic to me. I need to see real institutional structures that militate toward autonomy and participation. Democratic culture is great, but you seem resistant to the suggestion that we should build in special structures.
"Here I would point out (remind you) that parpolity has been designed to complement parecon and that together these two systems actually have quite a lot to say about “how police forces will function or be structured” (BJCs being one obvious example) that already seem to me to address your concerns."
I believe I've read all the literature, and I haven't noticed anything significantly addressing what I'm raising. Saying there will be balanced job complexes does not really address how the policing function will be different, per se. I'd be happy to pursue a reference if you have something specific. I'm pretty sure we can still improve upon the existing literature, anyway. This is my attempt to do that.
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Re: getting back, finally...
By Evans, Mark at Oct 19, 2010 20:38 PM
Earlier you wrote "You're not the audience I'm arguing against, per se,". Okay, because I am having difficulty reconnecting with this how about you write something new - a blog maybe - that deals with the same issues as above but addressed to ParSoc advocates?
I suspect that would generate a more rewarding debate for us both and maybe others as well. But if you want me to respond here I will try my best.
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government versus state
By Wetzel, Tom at Nov 06, 2009 15:35 PM
I think what's missing here is the distinction between government, or governance institutions, and state. Most working class-oriented anarchists historically have agreed with the view of the state put forward by Engels. In this view, the state is a bureaucratic, top-down apparatus that is separated out from real control by the mass of the people. As Engels points out, this developed in the context of class society because direct self-governance by the people...for example through popular assemblies and popular militias...would not provide sufficient ability to defend the interests of dominating and exploiting classes. More generally, systemic oppression requires that it's ultimate enforcement mechanism not be under authentically democratic control by the mass of the people.
Despite occasionally inconsistent and misleading language, the main body of working class-oriented anarchism was not historically against the existence of government...tho they mighty prefer to call it "governance" (since "government" in ordinary usage is often confused with the state). Kropotkin himself points out it is necessary to distinguish government from state. At the high point of the Spanish revolution of 1936, the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist federation proposed replacing the Republican state with a workers government...this would have consisted of a defense council limited to military, police and judicial functions, elected by, and responsible to, regional and national congresses of delegates elected from base assemblies. This didn't happen at that time because the Left Marxists (leftwing of Socialist Party) who ran the socialist trade union federation rejected a "leap outside the Republican constitution" on the grounds it would destroy the "international legitimacy of the Republican government"...as if any capitalist government would ever support the proletarian revolution that had occurred in Spain. In taking that position they ran against Marx's view that in a proletarian revolution it would be necessary to break up and dismantle the old capitalist state.
I also think it is a mistake to say that anarchism is for the abolition of authority. If workers self-manage an industry, they exercize authority over it. What anarchism is for is the dismantling of hierarchies, which are structures that concentrate power in the hands of a few, through institutions such as ownership or concentration of decision-making authority and expertise needed for planning and management (as in corporate and state hierarchies that empower the coordinator class).
When the working class takes over the land and means of production in a mass strike situation...which is how I would envision a libertarian socialist economy coming about...they also will need to consolidate their power through construction of a new governance structure for the society, that is, a government that empowers the masses. The failure of the revolution in Spain was linked to the mass syndicalist movement not succeeding in their effort to dismantle the Republican state and replace it with a new government rooted in assemblies.
I think it's a mistake to require super-majorities in congresses of delegates. That means minority rule. The reason for simple majority rule is that it is the only rule that gives a unique decision without enabling minorities to block.
Requiring laws to constantly sunset would overload the congresses with useless work of deliberation on laws that are working fine. In fact any such requirement would not last as people would realize its inefficiency and get rid of it.
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Re: government versus state
By Ganchev, Philip at Nov 09, 2009 17:32 PM
Tom, I think Dominick's article is consistent with the idea that there must be a government (or "governance"). The question Dominick addressed was precisely What mechanisms (or "political institutions") would ensure that control ("authority") remains in the hands of the people?
It's interesting that you assume that laws will be deliberated by delegate assemblies. This may well be the only way to reduce the legislative work required of individual citizens; but it's not been debated in the context of the proposal, so I thought I'd mention it explicitly.
About super-majority voting: as I understand Dominick's proposal, super-majority is not required to pass laws, but the larger the majority, the more permanent the law. By contrast, decisions that are contentious need to be reviewed more often. This makes a lot of sense.
What I think needs to be modified in the proposed system is that everyone's vote has the same weight. Some people (or groups) are more affected by a decision, and some people have stronger preferences. I think it makes sense to give those people's preferences more weight. Of course, this means we must be able to agree who is affected to what extent. If the initial decision is contentious, so will this meta-decision likely be. And the new level of decision making adds a lot of work and time. But if the meta-decision is made by deliberation in delegate assemblies, this might be feasible.
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Re: government versus state
By Dominick, Brian at Nov 09, 2009 18:21 PM
Thanks for taking the time to reply, Tom. Always good to hear your opinion.
On traditional understandings of the issues I've addressed, I'm not really that concerned. I'm not much of a historian, and I'm still less of a theoretical historian. I can never really understand why we spend so much time arguing about definitions, or about what somebody wrote or meant 150 years ago. I'm not claiming that anyone meant anything a century ago or whenever. When I talk about "anarchist" ideas and programs I am thinking in contemporary terms and addressing modern conceptions. And if I had a dime for every time I've heard a contemporary anarchist say anarchism means "no government," I could buy a building to jump off of. So it's that concept that I'm addressing, not the traditional understanding. Marx and Kropotkin aren't my audience.
I don't think we really disagree beyond that, in terms of the necessity of a government. I think your idea of that government sounds a little more classical/romantic than mine, but it's hard to to tell from such a minimalist sketch. I also have a less materialist approach to change, as I prefer stressing that it isn't just "workers" who are going to be building new governing structures. I see it as "people" wearing lots of hats -- workers, students, family members, community members, etc.
I think you misunderstood my suggestion re supermajorities. I was talking specifically about the passing of laws. If you think that 50%+1 person should be able to criminalize an act and make it punishable, then I guess we'll have to agree to disagree. I personally want to live in a society where only those things that are widely considered egregious can lead to authoritarian consequences of any kind. I do want significant minorities to be able to overrule laws that violate their freedoms. Other social problems will have to be dealt with by nonauthoritaian institutions, including social organizing, propaganda, and so forth. Just because 50.001% of the people think something should be a crime, that's not good enough to make it so.
If we're talking about other issues, like policy matters, that's a different story. But then, that's not typically a situation where some government institution is being granted legitimate coercive authority over the citizenry.
To say that my sunsetting idea "would not last as people would realize its inefficiency and get rid of it" has to be one of the stranges arguments I've heard in a while. Why not just take it on based on its merits, rather than suggest that if it became institutionalized, it would later lose popularity? Isn't that the same argument as just saying you don't think it would be popular? It's kind of odd to be discussing what people in radically different circumstances will like or dislike. Let's talk about what might work or not work, instead.
My reasoning behind that provision is mostly that I think people should have a say in what laws they live by. And I think supermajorities should have to keep reaffirming coercive laws at least once a generation. I think the burden of proof should always be on those who wish to impose coercive rules on others. In the case of obvious crimes -- like murder, rape, assault, kidnapping, etc, etc -- there will never be a problem. Huge majorities will always back such laws. But as society progresses in a moral dimension, I suspect it will find it will want to shed coercive moral authority. It shouldn't be the responsibility of those who don't want laws to agitate for their dissolution. Those who DO want laws should have to make and garner support for their case, like I said, at least once a generation.
I have no idea how sound that aspect of my argument is. But I am afraid of authority's tendency to self-perpetuate, and I want to see safeguards a
And while I believe that delegate bodies would exist, I'm not sure delegates would be required for lawmaking. Maybe delegates would be involved in hashing out the language of such laws, but I see no reason that I as a citizen should not get a direct vote on the laws that I have to live under. And if our society has so many laws that they are "overloading" the "legislature" -- too many for the populace to occasionally reassess and reaffirm -- well, then perhaps that society has too many laws. Really how many do we need? And how complicated need they be? I don't think they would even resemble today's criminal codes.
If a future populace has antiauthoritarian characteristics, I'm trying to envision a set of political institutions that caters to that antiauthoritarian attitude. If they are not so antiauthoritarian, then obviously
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Re: Anarcho-Government
By Ganchev, Philip at Nov 03, 2009 22:26 PM
This is a very interesting idea. It makes a lot of sense, and I hope that more people think about it and develop it further.
I do have a couple of concerns though. Requiring a supermajority to pass a law makes it harder to pass new laws. This bears on the principle of self-management -- the principle that every person should have a say in each decision in proportion to how much that decision affects that person. In particular, always requiring a supermajority makes it even easier for a majority to disregard the concerns of a miniroty. If a group of indigenous people want to prohibit (or perpetuate the prohibition of) mountaintop removal in their area, then the larger the supermajority required to pass that law, the less likely that it will pass - and this situation is very similar to what we have now. On the other hand, hopefully there will be much more permanent laws about protection of the environment, or indigenous rights. Then those laws would have to be considered in deciding the proposed law. In other words, a proposed law must be considered in the context of other proposed laws and existing laws, not always by a supermajority.
So in its simple version, does such a system place a great burden on individuals to consider all the laws that are up for vote, their implications, mutual contradictions, hypothetical cases, etc? Does the system require everyone to work as a legislator and a judge all the time? This seems a difficult and time-consuming task, which sets up for low participation and therefore a society with very few laws and laws in permanent flux. It might be difficult to ascertain what the laws are this year.
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Re: Philip Ganchev
By Dominick, Brian at Nov 03, 2009 23:12 PM
Thanks for the feedback, Philip. I do believe that requiring a supermajority of a high quorum would place a high burden on the passing of laws. In fact, that's the intent. I believe one should not be punished for something that 49% of the population thinks is acceptable behavior. Only in extreme cases should institutions of authority be able to intervene in the activities of free people.
Which is not to say that minorities should not be protected. The best way to stop mountaintop removal mining, to take your example, is to build an economy that makes environmental destruction too costly to carry out. And of course there would need to be a constitution with strict legal protection of minorities. Just like today, if "lawmakers" (in this case, the people themselves) pass lws that violate the constitution, they can be overturned by judges.
What's more, I have a whole slew of ideas about how to give minorities input proportionate to the impact of decisions on them as such. But those I'll lay out in another essay.
As for how informed people in a participatory direct democracy would have to be... I do believe this would limit legislation in terms of quantity and scope. I see this as a good thing. I am an anarchist because I believe in minimizing government. It would serve very little purpose in a sane society with sound economic and kinship institutions. And sure, participation would be somewhat time consuming. I imagine like today many people would look to trusted sources to sift through the debates and settle on exemplary positions for like-minded folks to follow. At least, then, if I want a say in how my government works, I can have one, without running for office. Today, we're afforded no such influence other than to try to select our rulers -- and of course a lot of the time we lose, and then we get no representation whatsoever.
I don't think it would be any harder to ascertain what the laws are at any given time in my proposed scenario than it is today. Indeed, there would be fewer laws, and people would have voted yea or nay on them, so I imagine in this scenario common folks would be fundamentally more aware of what laws are than we all are today.
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i agree
By McGehee, Michael at Nov 03, 2009 10:32 AM
in bakunin's immorality of the state he provides a very clear and accurate description of "the supreme law of the state":
"The supreme law of the State is self-preservation at any cost. And since all States, ever since they came to exist upon the earth, have been condemned to perpetual struggle - a struggle against their own populations, whom they oppress and ruin, a struggle against all foreign States, every one of which can be strong only if the others are weak - and since the States cannot hold their own in this struggle unless they constantly keep on augmenting their power against their own subjects as well as against the neighborhood States - it follows that the supreme law of the State is the augmentation of its power to the detriment of internal liberty and external justice."
And you are right that as bad as it is it provides protection. Chomsky quotes the Brazilian workers metaphor of expanding the floor of the cage, and decades ago Rocker said something similar on anarcho-syndicalism and politics:
"Anarcho-Syndicalists pursue the same tactics in their fight against that political power which finds its expression in the state. They recognise that the modern state is just the consequence of capitalist economic monopoly, and the class divisions which this has set up in society, and merely serves the purpose of maintaining this status by every oppressive instrument of political power. But, while they are convinced that along with the system of exploitation its political protective device, the state, will also disappear, to give place to the administration of public affairs on the basis of free agreement, they do not all overlook that the efforts of the worker within the existing political order must always be directed toward defending all achieved political and social rights against every attack of reaction, constantly widening the scope of these rights wherever the opportunity for this presents itself."
And youre right again that power consolidated will not easily relinquish itself. "Those who eat of the pope die of it."
but i would think any pre-revolutionary society would have developed some revolutionary organization that spurred the revolution in the first place. so its not as if we would start from scratch on the "day after" the revolution. and thats why some like myself propose building new revolutionary institutions today that incorporate some of the practices we want to see post-revolution like participatory democracy and balanced job complexes and various councils (ie workers, consumers, community, cultural, etc) and federated into larger ones. i think the most important construction will go on now, before any possible revolution. we need to develop vision now so that we can incorporate it into struggles today and as we go along, before and after the revolution, and as circumstances allow we can adapt new forms that expand human, social and ecological freedom, liberty and justice.
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Re: i agree
By Dominick, Brian at Nov 03, 2009 12:39 PM
Hi Michael. Thanks for the feedback. I certainly agree that building revolutionary infrastructure needs to start now. I've written and lectured a good deal on dual power strategy. (I just noticed I've made it into the Wikipedia entry, even! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_power)
And I think our present-day institutions do indeed need to reflect these values in terms of their structure and policy implications before an insurrection phase. My only arguments here are against (1) authoritarians who don't believe we need serious safeguards to prevent what Bakunin is criticizing in your quote, and (2) fundie anarchists who think the insurrection phase is just lopping the head off the state so we can watch it crumble and be replaced by no institutions with authority over the public in any form.
That said, the thrust of my impact only has relevance on post-insurrectionary institutions. Activist projects already have this conesent-dependency feature built in. If people stop coming to meetings or actions, the group dissolves. But governmental institutions need to have that explicitly stated, as they have real power beyond their authority. It's like how they construct buildings nowadays with the ability to be demolished easier when the time comes. We can do that to our government, too.
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