Bush Preparing for War on Two Fronts?

A nation of some 22 million, North Korea has long posed as something of a mystery to Western commentators. Closed and insular, the communist North is finally being driven to engage with the broader international community, as well as its southern neighbor. The threat of famine, and the problem of diplomatic and economic isolation following the collapse of the Soviet Union, have acted to motivate the North in its attempts at building dialogue with the South. In 2001, the North’s Committee for Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland proposed, “that dialogue between North and South Korea reopen as soon as possible to open a wider road to reconciliation, unity and national unification.”

As opposed to the previous tendency towards tension and confrontation, the “Sunshine Policy,” embraced by South Korea, is based on the ideal of rapproachment and reconciliation, facilitated through the provision of economic aid, the development of trade ties, family reunion, and ongoing dialogue. Expectations have grown steadily, especially in South Korea, that this process of engagement would lead eventually to a negotiated reunification. The Sunshine Policy has developed with the clear renunciation of any suggestion the South might “absorb” the North.

The recent election of pro-reconciliation presidential candidate Roh Moo-hyun has promised to breathe new life into this policy, despite the looming confrontation between P’yongyang and Washington.

Moves towards greater engagement were dealt a serious blow in October 2002 as the North confirmed that it had reinitiated its nuclear weapons program. The North’s admission thus effectively ended the 1994 Agreed Framework under which it was to receive “light -water nuclear technology” in exchange for a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

This fateful course had been preceded by North Korean allegations that the U.S. had violated the Agreed Framework, having failed to deliver “heavy fuel oil according to schedule and by not moving forward as planned with the light-water reactors.”

Apart from the North’s claims, we can only speculate on what further motives lay behind its move, but arguably the North felt compelled to act in the face of a hawkish U.S. administration eager to extinguish all remaining outposts against its global hegemony. It is within the realm of legitimate speculation, also, to suppose that the North Koreans are hoping to establish a nuclear deterrent in order to be able to afford some relaxation of their military budget which, at 20 percent to 25 percent of GDP, is a crippling drain on the North Korean economy. According to the Power and Interest News Report, North Korea has the fourth largest military in the world with over 1.2 million armed personnel.

The North Korean army, while huge, however, does not have the capacity to win an offensive war against the South. While North Korea’s massive military commitment is seen as a necessary deterrent, the North would likely embrace limited disarmament for the sake of economic growth and prosperity, were it seen to be a viable option.

Meanwhile, constant references in the Western media to the regime being “irrational,” “unstable,” have been made with the effect of building up the fear and apprehension necessary to rationalize possible military intervention—or at least diplomatic and economic sanctions certain to worsen the lot of the nation’s already starving people. Under such circumstances, with some 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and some 100,000 in the broader region, the prospects of mutual disarmament between North and South Korea seem slim.

Earlier in 2002, George Bush identified North Korea, provocatively and threateningly, as part of a so-called Axis of Evil. Thereafter, he suggested his possible willingness to take “pre-emptive action” to “take out weapons of mass destruction” in so-called rogue states. The new Bush doctrine even seemed to suggest the possibility of a nuclear first strike. Suddenly, the prospect of the U.S fighting wars on two fronts: against P’yongyang and Baghdad—an idea long entertained by strategists at the Pentagon—may find real and terrible application.

As tensions have spiraled between P’yongyang and the U.S., anti-American sentiment has exploded in South Korea. The deaths of two South Korean schoolgirls in a road accident involving a U.S. serviceperson acted as the catalyst for an unprecedented display of anger and frustration. As many as 300,000 South Koreans mobilized demanding greater control over U.S. forces stationed in their country. Many demonstrators demanded the total withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

Behind this massive popular mobilization simmered resentment over the perceived preference of the Bush administration for containment, or even confrontation, over the Sunshine Policy.

South Korean resentment has reached an all-time high, following the Bush’s inclusion of North Korea in his Axis of Evil. While the American president has become ever more strident in his aggressive posturing against those states he views as hostile to U.S. interests and hegemony, South Koreans are increasingly nervous at the damage such rhetoric has caused to their careful and sincere process of engagement and reconciliation.

The term rogue state, it appears, is being used indiscriminately to describe all states that do not form part of the support structure of the global U.S. hegemony in the post Soviet world order. In such a way, the U.S. is poised to rationalize the removal of all resistance to its global hegemony—either through direct application of military force or through covert action or diplomatic pressure, including sanctions and/or the withdrawal of vital humanitarian aid. It is very convenient for the U.S.—in this period of its unchallenged economic, political, military dominance—that it has been able to construct this ideology that legitimizes its role as “world cop” for a world order it is constructing in its own image. North Korean trade and production has collapsed since the fall of the USSR. The country has few significant trading partners and few means of securing hard currency except from arms exports. Clearly it is in the country’s interests to pursue a policy of engagement and rapproachment—as opposed to one of confrontation.

Since the fall of the USSR, North Korea has faced the task of adapting. It has faced the difficult task of building diplomatic and trade ties and of engaging with the global market economy. In the short term, due to the ongoing threat of famine, the provision of food aid remains essential.

What the Korean peninsula needs now is a negotiated settlement—whereby a new nation might be built including elements of the old political systems (i.e., representative and economic democracy, the constitutional guarantee of social rights and civil liberties, as well as a mixed economy including a significant socialized sector). This means economic, political, and diplomatic engagement. It does not mean stirring up talk of war or the indirect inference of possible nuclear first strikes. Despite popular wisdom, the regime is not irrational. It is, however, increasingly desperate. The present nuclear gambit is evidence of this desperation to deepen economic and political engagement, lest the North face possible humanitarian catastrophe and probable collapse.

The North’s willingness—indeed, desperation—to adapt, was further evidenced by the decision, in September, to establish a free- trade zone in its northwest border with China, and to solicit foreign investment. Now is not the time for warlike rhetoric. We ought be critical of attempts to soften public opinion to the prospect of confrontation with North Korea, with the possible final consequence of war and human tragedy.

Despite the deficiencies of the communist regime, it ought be remembered that, from its current position of weakness, it may well be willing to give concessions— most notably in the crucial field of human rights. Indeed, further engagement and nurturing of the crucial Sunshine Policy may yet, one day, lead to a negotiated reunification to end decades of tension and confrontation.

Should the U.S. continue to eschew compromise and engagement, however, the mood on the South Korean street will likely grow more resentful of a U.S. military presence. Many South Koreans, noting their modern and impressive armed forces, already question the need for the continued presence of U.S forces.

In the current war of nerves, it is the Korean people who, as always, stand to suffer most. For the interests of all Koreans, it is time to press on with engagement and compromise. It is time to press on with negotiations aimed at ending the current nuclear tensions, fostering conditions conducive to mutual disarmament, and of further political, cultural, and economic engagement. The world has had enough of the winner-take-all approach of the Bush administration. It is time to give peace a chance.

Tristan Ewans lives in Melbourne, Australia. He is a writer and long-time member of the Socialist left grouping of the Australian Labor Party.