HI...

> I think that, although it is understandable that someone who puts a great deal of energy into elaborating a vision of a post-capitalist economic model would find it frustrating to have one's work dismissed in such an offhand way, I also think that it is (psychologically) understandable that other people would be resistant to taking parecon seriously because they can see "no imaginable roadmap from here to there."

It isn't other people - it was a particular person. A serious radical. A person whose radio show I was actually on, talking about parecon, some time back, unless I am misremembering that badly - with him offering no such commentary. The point in any case isn't that he can't be dismissive -  I encounter that often, and I have no reply other than to try to address its causes, of course, though it helps if they are offered.

The point in this instance is that you don't shoot off a shotgun rejection as a throw away sidebar comment in a written document. But, okay, if you do that - it is not a catastrophe not a major sin of course - but then at least when asked, you explain what you meant.

Finally, the fact that he can't see a transition to classlessness, or to parecon, even, should cause him to think harder on the topic... or hope that others will see such a path - it seems to me - not to pronounce that it simply doesn't exist. I think he was implying instead that  there simply is no path because he had determined - by what means I have no idea - that parecon itself is utopian - that is, unreachable. There is no path to a world in which people fly by flapping their arms and live forever - because the condition is utopian, meaning it is contrary to reality.

Saying something is an off the shelf utopia, however, actually has pretty specific meaning, if we take the utterance seriously.  It says it is familiar - off the shelf, not original or new in any sense - and that it is simply impossible.

If the claim is true, well then I am devoting a large portion of my life to nonsense - like someone worried about martians on the back side of the moon. That was his implication. It cold be the case. Lots of people get caught up in fool's errands. Well, okay, but in that case perhaps he should have said it when I was on his show so we could have discussed it. Or perhaps he should offer some reasons, if for no other purpose than to save me from wasting my life. But of course another possibility is that he hasn't got a serious reason - that he just knows, at some level, that he doesn't like it and doesn't want it addressed - so dismisses it. I don't know, what the explanation is. That's why I asked him.

> Don't get me wrong. I'm not saying that people have no good reason to take parecon seriously. On the contrary: I myself take it very seriously and want other to do so as well.

Not taking it seriously, even thinking it is irrelevant, or whatever - is of course fine. It is one possible reaction. In fact, given people's prior beliefs and assumptions it is a very natural and logical reaction. But that's not Doug, in fact not someone replying to the Nation article, and I don't think someone as informed as Doug is displaying a lot of insight having such a view, if he even does, but okay, if he does, and if he is going to offer the view publicly, in print, then at least when asked explain its meaning, he ought to do so, rather than behave as he did.

> But we are living in a historical period when the forces of the Left are frighteningly weak, and when the organizations and poltiical projects aiming to overturn capitalism and construct an alternative seem to have either disappeared completely or become far more marginal than they have been for the past 150 to 200 years. These facts lead, as we all know, to a certain amount of pessimism and despair among left-wing people (who might otherwise be inclined to embrace parecon).

I don't agree. In fact, right at this moment Latin American progress is incredibly inspiring and hopeful. More, it ought to be obvious to anyone who looks, and Doug is a person who presumably looks, that the Venezuelans and Bolivians, among others, are confronting precisely the kinds of issues parecon bears upon. See my most recent blog post including the new submission to the exchange.

Also, however, even in the U.S. we are confronting those issues, though not as dramatically, I suppose one might say. As but one immense indicator, having a movement that doesn't appeal to working people very effectively - here is a stance that explains that. Maybe the stance is wrong - it is certainly not irrelevant.

> So, as parecon advocates, we also have to accept that as part of our uphill battle. People are going to look at parecon and say, "That sounds great, but how on earth can we get from here to there?" (I have had dozens of people say that to me. I can only imagine the Michael Albert has had thousands of people say it to him.)

And so you might also conclude that I must be viewing Doug rather differently than such people. The countless people who say such things do so not in context of a discussion of reimagining socialism. And they do not offer the opinions definitively as a strong belief, but rather from a position of relative ignorance of such matters - hopefully hoping to be wrong. That Doug thinks it can't be attained is not the problem, again. He is entitled to think that or anything else, of course. That he decides that that means it can't be attained - period - is a bit much. That he delivers that assessment like a fact, and then he doesn't feel any need to provide a single reason - that is irksome.

> If someone looks at the situation and says, "I just don't see the use of designing a post-capitalist economy unless I can see a way to actually bring it into existence," I don't think that this would be a crazy thing to say. It is an understandable kind of pessimism, isn't it? Even if we reject it, we understand it, I think.

It is an understandable kind of pessimism - yes - though quite ignorant since not knowing, as yet, how to get there, doesn't mean we never will now how to get there - and much more, we can't even ask how to get someplace if we don't describe it - isn't that rather obvious? Isn't it clear that of course when still trying to conceptualize a goal, we won't yet have a compelling path drawn of how to reach it?

In fact, I work hard on vision and have for a long time, not so much on strategy - though I am moving toward that - precisely because without some shared vision, tested and about which we can be rather confident - trying to talk much about strategy makes barely more sense than trying to talk about strategy without knowing the conditions from which you are working. You need both ends of the path - beginning and destination... at least to a pretty good degree, to talk about a path getting from one to the other.

And more, not knowing how we get there, as yet, doesn't mean we can't now learn critically important things from a vision that bear on what we do now - nor does it mean that others aren't in very different circumstances gaining more from a vision, nor that we can't begin to work out how to get there.

Still, yes, someone could think that it is a fruitless pursuit, sure - due to so many people saying it so often without really thinking about it - but one ought to have reasons, ought to be modest about the claim unless those reasons are very strong, etc.

Perhaps I am wrong...but that is how I felt about it. So I said so. I don''t think it merits more time, though ... It just is what it is -

I think your broader point, not about Doug but about the logic of doubting the value of vision - is what merits the time - so I am giving some to the broader issue.

> The response, ideally, from our side, as parecon advocates, should be to say: "True, the strategic obstacles faced by the anti-capitalist Left are huge. But there are openings for moving the Left forward; there are hopeful projects and movements underway today that have real potential to advance an anti-capitalist political project; and capitalism is not so strong, and the potential power of working-class resistance is not so weak, that we have to think of capitalism as invincible. Here are some of the strategic directions we can try to pursue...."

Doug knows all that, believes all that. What he was saying is that parecon is utopian - meaning, pejoratively, simply impossible.

Of course honest doubts should be addressed with evidence, logic, etc.

> Again, I understand the frustration, and the doubling of the frustration when a sincere request for a more serious discussion is, again, dismissed in an even-more dismissive way.

It isn't frustration. It is anger at how ridiculously leftists routinely treat other leftists, both in general, and also when they have real issues with one another. Really, the context is reimagining socialism...

> But, even so, there is something more to this resistance to engage with parecon than one author's dismissive attitude.

I am sorry, but coming from him, it is precisely his attitude - and that is quite different than it would be coming from someone with no related background...
the reasons you offered earlier, which you offered as having more merit, I tried to comment on.

> It is a real sociological phenomenon: lowered expectations and waning optimism about the viability of constructing a post-capitalist egalitarian economic democracy, brought on by the decline of the Left's institutional strength and ideological influence.

I do not think that is what is going on. On the one hand, this is a moment of heightened hope and imagination - that is the whole point of the discussion. On the other hand, I don't think an individual doesn't reply due to a sociological phenomenon...

> (By the way, these are just some comments. I don't need to get a reply.)

No, but you are entitled to one... and I felt a need to respond to some of the points. Sadly, I take all this stuff so seriously that when someone comments on something I write, I pretty much will reply.

I think, as you say, we are making progress... though, again, I don't really think this is the best venue for it...

You note: "Illuminating as it might be to claim Mozart wouldn't go for mill work just because it pays more... isn't there the possibility that he wrote music that was more "popular" because he wanted to get paid?"

In a parecon he would also write music wanting, among other things, to receive an income for his labors. There is a material incentive effect, to be sure. He would have a balanced job complex. And he would have composing in it, because he is wonderful at composing and will see his efforts celebrated, etc. as well as being able to fulfill his capacities, and earn an income that way.

> Many artists and scientists are noble—and do want to help educate and advance humanity—but many more (the one's you rarely hear about)—are self-indulgent and idiosyncratic. 

Well, let's leave this matter of people's motives for some other time - they are not, in any event, ingrained, overwhelmingly, but instead matched to the system they find themselves in - except to say, even if one if entirely one way or the other - in a market economy one will likely wind up driving toward an an anti social kind of accumulation whereas in a parecon one will either do art or science or not - but whatever one does, one will not be anti social about it.

> I do think that many engineers might rather work on their ideal "hot-rod" than fuel-efficient automobiles. 

They may enjoy it more, but I doubt many would opt to do it as their main work rather than socially valued work on fuel efficiency, etc., in a worthy economy like parecon. But let's say you are right. The individual who wants to putter in his backyard all the time, will still work on the fuel efficiency project in a parecon because he or she can get an income for that, but not for his or her hobby. Interestingly, however, in a market system, if I invent a fuel efficient technique and manage to control the rights (getting remunerated roughly in accord with its value due to the bargaining power those rights convey to me) I may well opt to play in my backyard or at the beach the rest of my life, producing nothing - because I don't need to work for inome, because I am already incredibly rich.

We are now discussing the incentive side of the issue. The incentives of remunerating duration, intensity, and onerousness - throughout the economy - come out right too. They eicit work for time, intensely, and even when need be at less than ideal conditions - in addition to being moral. In contrast, remunerating in proportion to the value of output is not only not moral - at least in my view - it also provides poor incentives that reward that which cannot be affected by thew worker such as genetic endowment and other forms of luck, and that provide so much wealth as to actually reduce or even eliminate material incentive to work.

> And I don't think evaluating the social value of a person's work, and the possible remuneration for such social value (and Parecon does evaluate social value, when determining whether to remunerate a labor endeavor at all) need necessarily be tied to markets.

That is quite true. For example, one could imagine a centrally planned economy that more or less does it - sort of like market systems more or less do it. What they both really do is remunerate bargaining power but talents or monopolizing empowering circumstances, skills, knowledge, etc., do typically convey bargaining power in a market system and so do most often enhance income.

The reason parecon remunerates only socially valuable labor is precisely an incentive argument. Society won't benefit, for example, from my saying I want to play violin, or do brian surgery, or play baseball for viewers, etc., or sing, as part of my balanced job complex in a parecon. The reason is what I would be producing wouldn't be a socially valuable application of my abilities given society's needs, potentials, etc. So I can't get remunerated for that.

I can get remunerated for, however, as part of my balanced job complex, let's say journalism. So I am in part, in parecon, let's say a journalist - or let's be magnanimous to me and say I would have been a physicist. Then I would get remunerated for the associated work, at the usual rate, like everyone else, because it was valued. I would do it, because I would seek work at which I would be most fulfilled, within the constraint of doing a balanced job complex and being socially productive. There is no place else I can earn at a higher rate. No place I can better meet my personal needs and fulfill my personal disposition. No place I can do a better job, etc. Or, roughly so.

> Maybe, and this is may be my conclusion here, the social value of someone's work in Parecon is settled when councils decide to actually fund an endeavor.

This is correct in a deep sense. That is, what determines that some form of work is socially valuable is that the planning process, overall, is willing to incrporate it, which includes providing the inputs it needs, distributing the outputs, and remunerating the involved workers. It is partly systemic, partly local.

So, society might be prepared to have a certain amount of violin music composition. It doesn't mean everyone agres it is valuable, just that overall, it fills some needs, etc. sufficient for the plan to incorporate it. Then the violin musicians council, or perhaps overall musicians councils, or whatever turns out to be approrpirate, will hire people to be violin music composers and to receive remuneration for composing.

I may want that job but not get it - I just don't play well enough. I probably won't be happy about that but I become, instead, say, a music teacher or something else, entirely. I feel like I would have been happier composing as a part of my work responsibility...I may do it, even, in my spare time, to try to become good enough - and so on.

It is also possible I am great at violin, but don't like it. I can do it, really well, but I don't like hearing it, and I don't think it is admirable, etc. Here is where your concern actually arises. If society would award me some really high income, it is true that I might compose despite my antipathy to it. The high income might be enough to override my distaste. Is this a good inventive outcome?

Well the question requires that we think about more than the specific isolated case - to be comprehensive abotu it, we have to think about society as a whole. Does the pareconish approach yield less, as much, or more quality violin overall? Does it yield fewer, as many, or mroe people doing work they desire to do? Does it yield class division or classlessness, exploitation or equity, and so on?

Let me offer one more example - and it shows the same point. Suppose someone says about parecon, having balanced job complexes is ridiculous. Joe is a surgeon. In a market system he will do 40 hours at his profession, surgery. The same holds, let's say, for all other current surgeons. However, in a parecon, even if pareconists are correct that all these surgeons will still do surgery, now as part of a balanced job complex, and now for much less income (remunerated sensibly for time training, etc., but by the same norms as everyone else), says this critic, Joe will be doing, we can guess, only 20 hours of surgery and cleaning bed pans, and so on, as well. We will lose half our surgery. People will die for wnat of surgery. That will be horrible.

Well, the person is actually correct as far as he or she looked, up to the conclusion, that is. It is true that Joe and every other current surgeon, in a switch over to pareconish relations, will contribute less surgeries to society - so that the total will drop, let's say in half. However, of course, the answer to this reduction from this set of people is simply that more people will do surgery - coming from the pool of people previously smashed and constrained by class hostility and by biased structures to do only rote and repetitive labor. So we get more surgery - which matches the fact that we need more - in total, and we also get classlessness.

For your case of incentives, it is similar. There may be some folks, say, who are now surgeons and once surgery is remunerated properly will not want to be one, not liking doing it, despite approrpriate remuneration, and admiration, and a sense of contribution, etc. etc. So the person might opt for some other line of work, not having been bribed into ignoring his or her personal preferences by an exhorbitant wage.

Does this mean the incentives don't work and we don't have enough people developing their surgical skills? Not at all. Because there will simply be others, who do want to do surgery as part of their work - who will therefore be better surgeons for that fact - and who will more make up the gap, which I suspect would be quite small. So we get people who want to be surgeons, being surgeons, in more than sufficient number.

What is happening here is I am getting pushed into offering steadily more complete descriptions of parecon - in just a comment - by more points being raised. I can't just leave them, when you raise them, because I feel a responsibility to take all points seriously. The thing is, I think it would be a much better use of time, all around, as noted a few times, to look closely at the full and very carefully produced longer descriptions, develop questions based on those, or critiques, or whatever, and post those in an essay - and then perhaps engage about them.

At any rate, we have made a lot of headway, I think...as we finally close out our exhange, at least under this essay....

One big problem we have in this exchange is that you can assert something quickly - which is fine - but then I have to use a whole lot words to very clearly reply - 

> Sorry—I missed your comment before replying to Mr. McGehee.  I think we may have to agree to disagree, but let me briefly say why.

 When you say to me that my approach might underpay someone - I wonder if you realize that what you call underpay, I call appropriate pay. What you call right pay, I call incredibly extreme overpayment. We are not confused about the amount of payment that occurs in a parecon, nor differing about it. We see what is good, or bad, differently.

 > I agree that "duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valuable labor" should be key in determining remuneration—especially "brawny" labor.

That suggests that you don't think we should reward someone for being strong, or fast, or having good reflexes - but that we should reward someone for having a great voice?, or for playing a great guitar?, or for doing math well? I don't see why you would distinguish in this way between one set of talents and another, and I don't. I think you might want to try, for yourself, to explore what you think is the difference...

> But I think "brainy" labor might get short-changed—and that for reasons of fairness and incentive, those with "talent" ought to be encouraged to DEVELOP it, and ORIENT it towards what is socially valuable (as determined by artistic popularity, or scientific utility, etc.).
 
Short changed is only relative to some norm. It is not something absolute.

By your norm the amount that parecon remunerates highly productive labor is certainly way too low. By my norm, however, the amount you think it should be remunerated is way too high. It turns out also, because you would give a too large portion of the social product to some, that others would get too little by the norm I favor...

It is absolutely correct, however, that society benefits from people utilizing their talents. But hat parecon notices and highlights is that paying people with talents for the value of their output, and thus giving them too much and short changing others is not necessary to have that desirable incentive effect.

This is rather easy to see, thought it does entail getting beyond the usual rhetoric about the matter. Is someone who is really good at something,  and who in doing it well will feel good about the social contribution that is accruing from it, and will fulfill their talents, and will be admired for it, going to often choose, instead, to do something else that they are not good at?

Ask some student, getting ready for med school, whether he or she would switch to being a short order cook if the salary for being a doctor was drastically reduced and you could earn say, somewhat more for standing at a hot grill all day instead. And those are the only options...

If we don't pay pro basketball players in parecon for the value of their product (which arises from the joy of watching them) but for their time spent, intensity, etc., and similarly for fine singers, or mathematicians, or writers, or bricklayers, or engineers, or doctors, etc., is it really the case that people who are really talented at those jobs will opt to avoid those pursuits? Of course not. Both our knowledge of people, and a look at history, where talented people routinely work at their preferred pursuits even for nothing into the wee hours of the night, when it is the only way they can - demonstrate this - even in horrible societies, much less in a parecon.

And notice also that if we did pay people who do highly valuable labor for their output - in just a few hours a week they could earn a massive income - and avoid any labor the rest of the time. There is, in other words, actually a minuscule or at most quite modest material incentive for someone who is very highly productive to do more than a rather modest amount of what they are productive at - the reason they do way more, in our society, is different. On the one hand society is often structured so they can't cut back to a reasonable level - it is all or nothing. And, on the other hand, it is who they are, how they fulfill themselves. And so on. All this is developed much more fully in the books.

You read Parecon - but in that book all this stuff is very carefully discussed, including incentive effects, etc. Even if you have forgotten, which is fair enough - I have told you it is there, so I am wondering why wouldn't you take a look at it again, at this point, if you want to pursue it further - and assess it, and then, if you have a critique, by all means write it up. That really is the next step.

> Just because "two" values conflict doesn't mean we should completely ignore "one," imo.

In this case, however, it does, though not until after thinking it through, of course.

One value for remuneration - rewarding the value of output - yields one set of outcomes. The other value for remuneration - rewarding duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor - yields a completely different set of outcomes. I prefer the latter approach because I feel it is morally right but that is  a value and we cannot argue about that fruitfully in the same way we can argue about some claim about social relations implications - but also that it is incentive sensible as well, in all cases, not merely some.

Now as to whether remunerating for duration, intensity, and onerousness of work  provides desirable incentives both for output and innovation - that issue is dealt with extensively in many  places, and briefly above. You haven't commented on any of those arguments though those are real substantive issues about implications, not just about what we like, and so, yes, if you explore the arguments and find a problem them, it would be good to write that up.

> There will be, no doubt, conflicts in determining remuneration in Parecon as it has been developed so far.  Why not throw in "social value" in the mix for remuneration, not just as a standard of what to remunerate at all?  Of course, I agree that current economic systems haven't got it right, too.

It is hard for me to understand how you can read Parecon, have these discussions, read what I have said, and then ask me why I don't just throw it in? Apparently I have been unclear.

I don't throw it in because I don't like it and I believe it would subvert the overall logic and aims of the system, violating its values.

In other words, the reason I don't just throw it in the mix, is the same as the reason I don't just throw into the mix, say, elite power over decisions along with self management, or anti socialiity, say, along with solidarity - or, more related, remunerating property, along with what I call equitable remuneration.

In my view, and in the logic and development of parecon as well, the idea of remunerating people in proportion to the value of their output has no place. I understand that most people are so used to the idea (even though in fact it is just rhetoric and instead in our society it is overwhelmingly power and property that is rewarded not value of output) that people take it for granted. Since I know people hold the view through habit more than attachment to the associated hierarchies of wealth, I would typically say that in parecon it is considered to be immoral to remunerate folks for genetic endowment, luck of position, and luck regarding some some other variables as well.

Now you might say, instead, that you think it is morally sound to reward people who are quicker, faster, better at math or at some other talent that is valuable - or who happen to be producing something of greater value, etc., Okay, that's fair enough. But then we just disagree. There is nothing really, more, to say about that. It is no different than if I said I value self management and you said you instead value, as most do, decisions made by each with identical say all the time, a majority deciding - democracy - or perhaps, decisions made by consensus all the time, as a guiding value - or as some prefer, decision made with each person having as much say as they have years of schooling, or other credentials, or some other skill, say. All these, too, would be a disagreement over values. What we like.

On the other hand, again so we can conclude with full clarity, when you say remunerating output wouldn't have desirable incentive effects from the point of view of people utilizing their talents, or working hard - that is a claim about outcomes in certain situations, and one people can certainly debate that point trying to marshall evidence and logic to prove the case one way or the other. But for one thing - we are way off track here in doing that, and for another, you actually aren't debating that point, you just say it isn't so - which is fine, if that is your guess or intuition, but then check the argumenbts.

Once you do that, for example, to then actually make an argument about incentives, you would have to say something like, if we remunerate for duration, intensity, and onerousness, for some reason which you would need to indicate, that will give people a disincentive to work long or hard. Or you might say, if we reward that way, a person with special abilities will be disinclined to utilize them - which is also false, though not as obviously so, but also what you would have to claim.

I think it is fair at this point to say if you want to keep discussing the relative merits of the two norms of remuneration because you are not convinced but do feel it is important to pursue, that;s great and you should take a look at a full discussion and then make an argument about incentives, supposing that you still feel that you have one at that point. Though I think you should not waste the effort by putting such an argument here, as a mere comment, but if you have an actual rebuttal of the arguments for parecon's norm of remuneration and an argument for your own, instead, by all means write it in a full essay. The matter is way more than important enough.
 

Henwood upset at World Socialist Party folks for taking similar attitude to him that he took to Albert:

http://doughenwood.wordpress.com/2009/04/02/the-transitional-program-of-the-marxoid-groupuscles/

>Did you really read the full exchange between me and Albert? 

Unfortunately, yes.

>Or just the last copy of the exchange where Albert cut out what I had to say, in order to address just the issues he felt like answering? 

The whole thing.

>Did you read my "Red Text" version? 

Yes

>All my "ranting" was a line by line response to Albert's line by line response to what was a brief outline of four issues I have with Parecon as I understand it. 

Okay?

>Do you really think I have to have as perfect understanding of Parecon as Albert does, in order to question it? 

At least the basics would be good!  Parecon is not so complex that you have to be the creator to comprehend it.  That is what is so suspect about much of your comments.

> Do you understand Parecon well enough to differ with it, or have your own worked out political vision? 

Parecon is not a political vision.  But assuming you meant to write an economic vision: Yes, I do.  But I agree with it so strongly that I dont differ.  I agree that an economy is defined by the basics: ownership, allocation, planning, remuneration, division of labor.  I agree that how those features are structred and what values we desire to be upheld will either uphold or not uphold those values. So if we want remunerative justice based on a fair ethical practice then rewarding economic output would not be it.  And so on.

> Did you see my "synopsis" of Parecon (in the "Red Text" version, that mentions "No Owners," "No Bosses," "Fair Work & Wages," etc.)?—what did I fail to understand there?

I read it.  Apparently the significance of remunerative justice.

>I did not claim to have a "firm" grasp of what I was criticizing—I was at pains to point this out, with phrases like "what I do feel I understand about it"—but I believe I have an adequate familiarity— enough to surmise that Parecon conflicts with some of my values and knowledge. I did read the book closely, although some time ago, and I have been returning to the book lately, to help sharpen my understanding of it—which is also my purpose of engaging with Parecon experts (maybe like you?)

Not to get into semantics here, but dont you think closely and firm in the context we are speaking of are synonymous? 

Once again, there is really no debate about the "facts" here - rather about values. The value, or aim, that an economy should remunerate duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valuable labor without any doubt whatsoever is not only different from - but also yields very different outcomes than - tthe value hat one should remunerate for the contribution to output. This is not in question, it is the point. Insofar as there is a criticism or doubt here, it can't be that parecon overlooks this confict - parecon couldn't be any more set upon the importance of noticing and acting on this conflict.

That is, parecon very self consciously chooses the one, former, norm, over the other, latter norn precisely because and in light of the fact that they are at odds.

That said, it is consequential to note that markets, contrary to their self description, do not function, even in the absense of private property much less in its presense, according to the second norm. Rather, they have a combination of variables at work, but, mainly, remuneration for bargaining power - you get what you can take.

Back to the choice between remunerating duration, intensity, and onserousenss, and remunerating personal contribution to output, parecon prefers the former for two kinds of reasons - one moral, the other "economic."

The moral reason - and this is a matter of values, what we like or dislike - is briefly that parecon doesn't wish to remunerate people for having been born with genetic endowments that are highly productive, or for the luck of having good tools to work with, or for happening to be producing something that is more valuable per hour of average labor, etc. etc. The idea that one should get lucky in the genetic lottery, or in the technology access lottery, etc., and then on top of that pleasurable happenstance be remunerated more than others on that basis, generating an ever diverging advantage, is rejected. Instead the idea is to reward people for what is actually within their purview of control and creation, not luck. Of course this is all presented in far fuller context and detail, in the longer descriptions.

The economic aspect is also pretty simple. Remuneration as incentive makes sense regarding duration, intensity, and onerousness - that is, providing more return for duration, intensity, or putting up with harch conditions generates a willingness to deliver more - the pain of that being offset by the benefit of the larger income. Remuneration for talent - has no such implication. There is no pain it offsets, rather it just piles bounty on top of bounty. Incentivewise, no matter how much I am offered, I cannot alter my genetic endowment. Yes, I could search for a job with better tools - but there are other ways, in parecon, to incentivise improving technology that benefit all of society rather than pitting actors against one another. Again, these points, and many more, are developed in full in longer discussions. I do hope people are interested, but that way to pursue understanding beyond the limited level that a quick synopsis can convey is probably to take a look at those longer discussions...and then there is the online class, etc. etc.