FROM INGSOC AND NEWSPEAK TO AMCAP, AMERIGOOD, AND MARKETSPEAK

 

FROM INGSOC AND NEWSPEAK TO AMCAP, AMERIGOOD, AND MARKETSPEAK

 

Edward S. Herman

 

 

  Although 1984 was a Cold War document that dramatized the threat

of the Soviet enemy, and has always been used mainly to serve Cold

War political ends, it also contained the germs of a powerful

critique of U.S. and Western practice. Orwell himself suggested

such applications in his essay on "Politics and the English

Language" and even more explicitly in a neglected Preface to Animal

Farm. [1] But doublespeak and thought control are far more

important in the West than Orwell indicated, often in subtle forms

but sometimes as crudely as in 1984, and virtually every 1984

illustration of Ingsoc, Newspeak and Doublethink have numerous

counterparts in what we may call Amcap, Amerigood, and Marketspeak.

The Doublethink formulas "War Is Peace" and a "Ministry of Peace"

were highlights of Newspeak. But even before Orwell published 1984,

the U.S. "Department of War" had been renamed the "Department of

Defense," reflecting the Amcap-Amerigood view that our military

actions and war preparations are always defensive, reasonable

responses to somebody else's provocations, and ultimately in the

interest of peace.

 

   Furthermore, Americans have been much more effective dispensers

of propaganda, doublespeak, and disinformation than the managers of

Ingsoc, in either 1984 or in the real world Soviet Union. The power

of information control in this country was displayed during World

War I in the work of the Creel commission, and in its aftermath the

United States pioneered in the development of public relations and

advertising. Both of these industries have long been mobilized in

the service of politics. During the 1994 election campaign in the

United States, the Republican "Contract With America" was formed

with the aid of a consultant who first polled the public to find

out which words resonated with them, and then incorporated those

words into the Contract without regard to the Contract's substance.

This yielded, for example, a "Job Creation and Wage Enhancement"

title for proposed actions that would reduce the capital gains tax.

 

   Consider also the fact that in this country, as the element of

rehabilitation of imprisoned criminals has diminished, the name of

their places of incarceration has been changed from "jails" and

"prisons" to "corrections facilities." Or that civilians killed by

U.S. missiles or bombs in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, or earlier

in Indochina, are always unintended "collateral damage," and are

therefore morally acceptable, although there is always an official

disinterest in such numbers, and sometimes even an effort made to

keep this toll under wraps. Or that the 2002 war in Afghanistan was

briefly called "Infinite Justice," altered to "Enduring Freedom"

after complaints that only God offers infinite justice. Amcap

represents a significant advance over Ingsoc.

 

    

The Role and Mechanisms of Thought Control

 

   In fact, a good case can be made that propaganda is a more

important means of social control in open societies like the United

States than in closed societies like the late Soviet Union. In the

former, the protection of inequalities of wealth and power, which

frequently exceed those in totalitarian societies, cannot rest on

the use of force, and as political scientist Harold Lasswell

explained back in 1935, this compels the dominant elite to manage

the ignorant multitude "largely through propaganda." [2] Similarly,

in his 1922 classic, Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann argued that

"the common interests [sometimes called the "national interest"]

very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only

by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the

locality," "responsible" men who must "manufacture consent" among

the thoughtless masses. [3]

 

    The claim that such collective action is impossible in a free

society, and that it implies some form of conspiracy, is mistaken.

This claim is refuted both by the record of collective action,

discussed and illustrated briefly below, as well as by an

examination of how Amcap is implemented. Amcap works in part

because it is the responsible men (and women) who own and run

newspapers, TV stations and networks, and the other power centers

in society. They manage national affairs, and "crises in democracy"

are identified by the fact that, as in the infamous 1960s,

important sectors of the usually apathetic general population

organize and press hard for recognition of their needs. The power

of this responsible elite is also reflected in society's

ideological assumptions and ways of thinking about issues, as this

elite manages the flow of advertising and the work of public

relations firms and thinktanks, as well as controlling access to

the mass media. It takes only a small extension of Beckerian

analysis--which insists on economic motives explaining virtually

anything--to understand how a powerful demand for particular lines

of economic and political thought might well elicit an appropriate

supply response, which will be a "responsible" economics and

politics that serves the "national interest."

 

  This system of thought control is not centrally managed, although

sometimes the government orchestrates a particular propaganda

campaign. It operates mainly by individual and market choices, with

the frequent collective service to the national interest arising

from common interests and internalized beliefs. The responsible men

(and women) often disagree on tactics, but not on premises, ends,

and the core ideology of a free market system. What gives this

system of thought control its power and advantage over Ingsoc is

that its members truly believe in Amcap, and their passion in its

exposition and defense is sincere. In their patriotic ardor they

put forth, accept, and internalize untruths and doublethink as

impressive as anything portrayed in 1984. But at the same time they

allow controversy to rage freely, although within bounds, so that

there is the appearance of fully open debate when it is in fact

sharply constrained. And if the responsibles agree that the

"national interest" calls for a military budget of $400 billion,

this is not even subject to any debate whatever, even though

studies of public opinion have regularly shown that the "Proles"

would like that budget sharply cut. [4]

 

  Occasionally the powerful do use the police and armed forces, and

sometimes covert programs of disinformation and disruption--as in

the CIA's Operation Chaos and the FBI's Cointelpro programs--to

keep oppositional movements under control. [5]  More often still

are propaganda campaigns to sell policy to the general population.

In 1983--only one year before 1984--the Reagan administration

organized a so-called Office of Public Diplomacy to sell its war

against Nicaragua to the media and general public. Run by a CIA

specialist in psychological warfare, it was explicitly designed to

demonize the leftwing Sandinista government of Nicaragua by tactics

that included the spread of disinformation. An office to engage in

covert "public diplomacy" with the American people, its specific

program titled "Operation Truth," sounds like something straight

out of 1984. But it was successful, as the media rarely if ever

mentioned or criticized the OPD or Operation Truth, and they

accommodated to its program. [6]

 

    One manifestation of this accommodation provides us with an

almost perfect illustration of doublethink in action. The Reagan

administration wanted to build public support for the government of

El Salvador, so it sponsored elections there in 1982 and 1984, in

which it featured the high voter turnout and long lines of smiling

voters, and played down the legal requirement to vote, the

destruction of the two independent newspapers, the ongoing state

terror, and the inability of the left to enter candidates. In the

very same time frame, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua held

an election, but here the Reagan administration wished to deny that

government legitimacy, so it used a different set of criteria to

judge that election. Here it ignored the high turnout and smiling

voters (and the absence of a legal requirement to vote) and focused

on the harassment of La Prensa and the voluntary refusal to

participate by one oppositional candidate (who was on the CIA

payroll). In a miracle of doublethink, forgetting a set of

electoral criteria "and then, when it becomes necessary again, to

draw it back from oblivion" (1984, 163), [7] the New York Times and

its confreres followed the Reagan agenda and called the Nicaraguan

election a "sham" on the basis of criteria they had completely

ignored in finding the Salvadoran elections heart-warming moves

toward democracy. [8]

 

 

Amcap and Amerigood and Their Problematics

 

  There are two dominant strands of thought in Amcap. One is that

America is a  global paterfamilias that does good and pursues

benevolent and democratic ends. This has a Newspeak corollary that

we may call Amerigood.

 

  The second strand of Amcap thought and ideology is the belief in

the "miracle of the market" and the view that the market can do it

all. In this system of thought, and in its Newspeak counterpart,

Marketspeak, the market is virtually a sacred totem, "reform" means

a move toward a freer market irrespective of conditions or effects,

and accolades to and proofs of the market's efficiency crowd the

intellectual marketplace. This system corresponds closely to

Orwell's "goodthink," a body of orthodox thought immune to

evidence, and it approximates Orwell's view of the outlook of "the

ancient Hebrew who knew, without knowing much else, that all

nations other than his worshipped 'false gods'" (232).

 

   There has been a major conflict between Amerigood and

Marketspeak, however, in that market openings and a prized

"favorable climate of investment" have often been expedited by

military leaders willing to destroy trade unions, kill social

democrats and radicals, and ruthlessly terminate democracy itself.

The United States has very frequently supported those serving the

market at the expense of human rights and democracy. [9] But

Amerigood and Marketspeak have met this challenge brilliantly, with

much greater efficiency than Ingsoc and Newspeak ever met the needs

of the Soviet Union.

  

   Resolution by definition. One mode of handling the problem in

Amerigood is by an internalized belief system in which words with

negative connotations simply cannot be applied to us. Thus this

country is never an aggressor, terrorist, or sponsor of terrorism,

by definition, whatever the correspondence of facts to standard

definitions. Back in May 1983, for five successive days the Soviet

radio broadcaster Vladimir Danchev castigated the Soviet assault on

Afghanistan, calling it an "invasion" and urging the Afghans to

resist. He was lauded as a hero in the U.S. media, and his

temporary removal from the air was bitterly criticized. But in many

years of study of the U.S. media performance during the Vietnam War

I have never found a single mainstream journalistic reference to a

U.S. "invasion" of Vietnam or U.S. "aggression" there, although the

United States was invited in, like the Soviets in Afghanistan, by

its own puppet government lacking minimal legitimacy. There was no

Danchev in the U.S. media. Here, as in Ingsoc,  where "Big Brother

is ungood" was "a self-evident absurdity" (235), the notion of the

United States committing "aggression" was outside the pale of

comprehensible thought. 

 

   Resolution by forgetting and remembering according to need. The

intellectual mechanism of forgetting and remembering according to

momentary need is also urgently important, because in Amerigood

this country favors and actively promotes democracy abroad, whereas

in real world practice it supports democracy only very selectively.

The pro-democracy stance can be emphasized when the United States

attacks Cuba and passes a "Cuban Democracy Act," but the media do

not discuss and reflect on the absence of a "Saudi Democracy Act"

(and the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia to protect that

authoritarian regime) in the same or nearby articles. In the case

of the steadfast 32 year U.S. support of Suharto's military regime,

or its support of Marcos's dictatorship in the Philippines, it was

necessary to forget that the United States was devoted to

democracy, as long as these tyrants delivered a "favorable climate

of investment." But once they ceased to be viable rulers, suddenly

the U.S. concern for democracy moved front and center, and this

could be done without the mainstream media dwelling on the long

positive support of autocracy, or looking closely at any

compromising elements in the shift (such as continued support for

the Indonesian army). In both cases, also, the media suddenly

discovered that Suharto and Marcos had looted their countries (and

U.S. aid) on a large scale, a point that had somehow escaped their

attention while the looters were still serving the U.S. "national

interest." This is a virtual media law, and displays their

dependable service in forgetting and remembering.

 

    Resolution by a resort to the "long run".   Some "realists" and

Marketspeak philosophers who believe that "what's good for America

is good for the world" have a different way of reconciling U.S.

support of dictators and state terrorists with the U.S. devotion to

democracy. They argue that the support for a Castillo Branco in

Brazil or Pinochet in Chile is pro-democracy because the freer

markets they introduce will serve democracy in the long run. In

Marketspeak there is in fact a strong tendency to make "freedom"

synomymous with freedom of markets rather than political (or any

other kind of) freedom. This tendency, plus the complaisance and

even enthusiasm at the termination of democracy in the short run,

suggests that elite interest in a "favorable climate of investment"

may be stronger than any devotion to democracy. The realists' case

also suffers from its use of an argument long projected on to Big

Brother: namely, that ugly means are justified by a supposedly

benign end and do not themselves contaminate and even contradict

that end.

 

     Resolution by "disappearing" people. In the world of Ingsoc

individuals become "unpeople" and simply disappear. In Amcap we

have a comparable phenomenon whereby entire populations become

expendable for political reasons, effectively "disappear" from the

mainstream media, and can be massacred or starved without political

cost. When the United States fights abroad, U.S. deaths are

politically costly and must be avoided. From the Vietnam War era

onward this has resulted in the increased use of capital intensive

warfare, that reduces U.S. casualties but increases those of enemy

soldiers and their civilian populations. But those casualties have

no domestic political cost, and official and media reporting of

such losses is exceedingly sparse if not absent altogether. This

permits large scale killing of target forces and civilians who have

been rendered "unpeople."

 

   It also permits entire populations to be held hostage and

starved to achieve some political objective. When back in 1996

former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright replied to a question

on the costs and benefits of the estimated death of half a million

Iraqi children as a result of sanctions by saying that this "was

worth it," [10] her calculus rested in part on the fact that with

the help of the mainstream media the Iraqi children were "unpeople"

whose deaths involved no political costs to U.S. leaders.

 

   This process of dehumanization is also evident in the treatment

of client state terror and mass killings. When Pol Pot killed large

numbers in Cambodia between 1975 and 1978, official and media

attention and indignation were great. When in the same years

Indonesia invaded East Timor, killing an even larger fraction of

the population than did Pol Pot, media attention was minimal and

fell to zero in the New York Times as Indonesian terror reached its

peak in 1977 and 1978. Indonesia was a U.S. client state providing

a favorable climate of investment, and the mainstream media

treatment of the East Timorese as an unpeople was closely

coordinated with U.S. policy. [11]

 

   Even more dramatic, when the priest Jerzy Popieluszko was

murdered by the police of Communist Poland in 1984, U.S. official

and media attention and indignation were intense. In fact, media

coverage of the Popieluszko murder was greater than its coverage of

the murder of 100 religious victims in Latin America in the 1970s

and 1980s taken together, even though eight of these victims were

U.S. citizens. [12] Popieluszko was a "worthy" victim, as he was

killed by an enemy state and propaganda points could be scored

against the enemy; the 100 religious in Latin America were killed

in U.S. client states, and were therefore "unworthy" because

attention to their victimization would have been inconvenient to

U.S. policy ends. This channeling of benevolence toward Polish

victims (and victims of Pol Pot) and away from victims in our own

backyard (and in East Timor) made it possible for the leaders of

the National Security States (and Indonesia) to kill large numbers

with quiet support from the United States, and without disturbing

the ideology of Amerigood.

    

   No agreements with demons possible. As one other illustration of

an Ingsoc analogue in Amcap, in Ingsoc, "any past or future

agreement with him [the demonized enemy] was impossible....The

Party said that Oceania had never been in alliance with Eurasia.

He, Winston Smith, knew that Oceania had been in alliance with

Eurasia so short a time as four years ago." (29) In Amcap things

are done more subtly. We simply pretend that our high moral stance

in fighting the demon represents continuous policy, and the

mainstream media cooperate by not discussing the subject.

 

   After Pol Pot was overthrown by the Vietnamese in December 1978,

the United States quietly supported him for more than a decade,

giving him aid directly and indirectly, approving his retention of

Cambodia's seat in the UN, and even bargaining to include him in

the election process of the 1990s. The U.S. media kept this support

for the demon under the rug. The U.S. invaded Panama and captured

Noriega in 1989, allegedly because of his involvement in the drug

trade, but actually because he failed to meet U.S. demands for

support in the war aginst Nicaragua. Noriega had been involved in

the drug trade for more than a decade previously without causing

any withdrawal of U.S. support. The mainstream media did not

discuss the earlier agreement with the demon.

 

   Saddam Hussein became "another Hitler" on August 2, 1990, when

he invaded Kuwait. All through the prior decade he had been given

steady U.S. support in his war against Iran and after. He had

received billions in loans, access to weapons, intelligence

information on Iranian military deployments, and he was not

ostracized because of his use of chemical weapons against Iran and

his own Kurds. Following August 2, 1990, when he became an enemy,

it would be difficult to find in the mainstream media any reference

to the fact that this demon "had been in alliance with the U.S. as

short a time ago as" August 1, 1990.

 

  The Taliban government in Afghanistan moved beyond the pale in

1998, following the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa by

cadres affiliated with Osama Bin Laden, who made his headquarters

in Afghanistan. Then, following the deadly World Trade Center and

Pentagon bombings on September 11, 2001, by terrorists allegedly

linked to Bin Laden, the Bush administration issued an ultimatum to

the Taliban to deliver Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda cadres to this

country or suffer the consequences. The Taliban not complying, U.S.

forces attacked Afghanistan, deposed the Taliban, and installed a

replacement government. Following 9/11, the Taliban government was

declared to be monstrous and intolerable, even apart from its

sheltering Bin Laden, and this was the general view in the

mainstream media. But here again, it would be hard to find

mainstream news reports or commentary recounting the fact that the

Taliban and Al-Qaeda had been organized and supported by the United

States and its allies Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the 1980s to

fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and that the United States had

backed the Taliban's assumption of power in 1996 because it brought

"stability" and might make possible the construction of an oil

pipeline through Afghanistan. [13]

 

 

Marketspeak

 

  As in the case of Ingsoc, Marketspeak serves to consolidate the

power of the dominant elite. In Ingsoc, the claim that Big Brother

could do it all served Party domination, Party economic advantage,

and helped contain the incomes of the Proles. Marketspeak does the

same for the dominant elite in America. Ingsoc helped assure "that

economic inequality has been made permanent" (157), and Marketspeak

has done the same here, even facilitating its substantial increase

in recent decades.

 

  In fact, in an interesting turnabout, the supposedly permanent

condition of the victims of Ingsoc has proven to be impermanent

(i.e., the Soviet Union was dissolved and its component parts have

been struggling since 1989 to enter the world of Amcap and

Marketspeak), whereas the victims of Amcap and Marketspeak in both

the former Soviet Union and the West have been placed in the

condition where, as Mrs. Thatcher so happily pronounced, "there is

no alternative." The power of capital and finance to dominate

elections, to limit policy options by the threat of their enhanced

mobility, and their domination of the means of communication, has

seemingly ended challenges to the policy dictates of capital. Under

the regime of Ingsoc "there is no way in which discontent can

become articulate" (158). Under the regime of Amcap and Marketspeak

as well there is no way discontent can materialize in meaningful

political choices or programs; rather, they will be channeled into

bursts of anger and scapegoating of "government" and other

convenient targets.

 

   Under the regime of Ingsoc, the Proles were kept down by "heavy

physical work, the care of home and children, petty quarrels with

neighbors, films, football, beer, and above all gambling." (56)

Orwell mentioned television as a valuable diversionary instrument

for keeping the Proles in line. The transformation of U.S.

commercial broadcasting into an essentially entertainment vehicle,

with a heavy emphasis on films, football, and other sports, and its

virtual annihilation of any public service and public sphere role,

is Amcap's and Marketspeak's clear improvement over the primitive

workings of Ingsoc. The growth of lotteries and casinos, partly

driven by capital's pressure on governments to seek funding outside

of taxes, also improves on Ingsoc's methods of providing Prole

diversion and depoliticization.

 

   Under the regime of Amcap and Marketspeak, the Proles are kept

down not only by physical work and diversions, but also by

insecurity. In 1995, Fed Chairman Allan Greenspan explained to

congress that the inflation threat was minimal because of a

generalized worker insecurity, which he presented as a bonanza,

although such insecurity would seem to be in itself a serious

welfare detriment, on the assumption that the condition of the

Proles was an important policy goal. His instrumental view of the

Proles can also be seen in economic theory, where the "natural rate

of unemployment" ties inflation (the bad) very closely too

excessive wage demands on the part of the Proles.

 

   This view of Prole wage increases as a threat to the national

interest is a throwback to mercantilist attitudes and doctrine,

where high wages were deemed bad "because they would reduce

England's competing power by raising production costs," in the

words of the historian of mercantilism, Edgar S. Furniss. [14] He

notes that in this class-biased view of the national interest "the

dominant class...attempt[ed] to bind the burdens upon the shoulders

of those groups whose political power is too slight to defend them

from exploitation and will find justification for its policies in

the plea of national necessity."  In this mercantilist and

Marketspeak view of the Proles, as a cost and instrument rather

than a group whose well-being is the policy objective, the Proles,

like citizens of an enemy state, become "unpersons."

 

  The accommodation of economic science to the demands of Amcap and

Marketspeak have been extensive, and in many of these cases the

intellectual abuses and somersaults carried out to salvage

Marketspeak are similar to those used to defend Ingsoc. As one

example, during each merger wave from 1897-1903 onward, Marketspeak

economists have found the movement to be based on efficiency

considerations, and downgraded the importance of other bases of

merger activity and any negative effects on competition. They have

struggled valiantly to prove that the market works well in

providing net public benefits here as elswhere.

 

  In recent years Marketspeak economists have done this by

measuring the efficiency of mergers on the basis of stock price

movements before and at the time of the merger, not post-merger

results, although stock price measures suffer from problems of

timing, contamination by influences other than efficiency, and are

at best indirect. In one classic of this genre, Michael Jensen and

Robert Ruback, as an afterthought, did look at post-merger

financial results, which turned out to show "systematic reductions

in the stock price of bidding firms following the event." [15] They

concluded that such results "are unsettling because they are

inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that changes in

stock prices during takeovers overestimte the future efficiency

gains from mergers." But as Marketspeak says that free market

behavior enhances efficiency, the authors did not allow those

"systematic" findings to alter their conclusions.

 

 

Conclusion: A Promising Amcap Future 

 

   Ingsoc has given way to a potent replacement in Amcap, and Amcap

has actually taken on more vitality with the death of Ingsoc. The

ideologists of Amcap have proclaimed an "end of history," with

freedom and liberal democracy triumphant and doublethink and

thought control presumably ended with the close of the system of

tyranny. But such claims have little basis in reality. History has

not "ended," and since the death of the Soviet Union, wars,

political and economic instability, ethnic cleansing, the global

polarization of incomes, and environmental distress and threats,

seem to have increased in frequency and/or intensity. Freedom and

liberal democracy are increasingly constrained by national and

global power structures that sharply limit any actions helpful to

the Proles.

 

   In the increasingly inegalitarian system that prevails, Amcap,

Amerigood and Marketspeak are flourishing and have a more important

role to play than ever. They have been doing their job--"largely

the defense of the indefensible" as Orwell put it--with a

sophistication and effectiveness that Ingsoc could never command.

Their innovations in language are continuous, filling all emerging

propaganda gaps. At home, a law encroaching on civil liberties is

called a "Patriot Act;" laws that free the weak and poor from their

"entitlements" by pushing them into the labor market are referred

to as "reform" and "empowerment," and is said to reflect "tough

love" of the suffering Proles. In military and foreign policy,  a

government agency openly designed to disseminate disinformation is

entitled "Office of Strategic Influence;" [16] missiles are

"Peacekeepers," and military alliances are "Partnerships for

Peace." The appeasement of amenable state terrorists (Mobutu,

Suharto, the governments of apartheid South Africa) is called

"constructive engagement"; civilian deaths from the "humanitarian

bombing" of "rogue states" is "collateral damage."

 

  The progress and prospects of Amcap are impressive. This

immensely powerful system of thought control should get the credit

and recognition that it deserves.

 

 

 

-- Endnotes --

 

[1] The "50th Anniversary Edition" of Animal Farm (New York:

Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1995), includes this Preface as

Appendix 1.

 

[2] Harold Lasswell, "Propaganda," in Encyclopedia of the Social

Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1933).

 

[3] Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and

Company, 1922), pp. 31-32, 248, 310.

 

[4] See Steven Kull, "Americans on Defense Spending: A Study of

Public Attitudes," Report on Findings, Program on International

Policy Attitudes, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland,

June 19, 1996.

 

[5] Nelson Blackstock, Cointelpro: The FBI's Secret War on Political

Freedom (New York: Vintage, 1975); Frank Donner, The Age of

Surveillance (New York: Vintage, 1981)

 

[6] For an account of OPD and Operation Truth, see Peter Kornbluh,

Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Institute

for Policy Studies, 1987), chapter 4.

 

[7] Otherwise unattributed page numbers in the text are to George

Orwell, 1984 (New York: Signet Book, 1950).

 

[8] For details, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing

Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York:

Pantheon Books, 1988 and 2002), chapter 3.

 

[9] For details, Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network (Boston:

South End Press, 1982), esp. chapter 3; Herman. "The United States

Versus Human Rights in the Third World," Harvard Human Rights

Journal, Spring 1991; William Blum, Rogue State (Monroe, Me.:

Common Courage Press, 2000).

 

[10] Albright's statement was made in answer to a question by Leslie

Stahl on the CBS program 60 Minutes, May 12, 1996.

 

[11] For details, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Washington

Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979),

chapter 3; Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, "How The New York

Times Protects Indonesian Terror In East Timor," Z Magazine,

July/August, 1999.

 

[12] For a full account, Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent,

chapter 2.

 

[13] Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism

in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

 

[14] Edgar S. Furniss, The Position of the Laborer in a System of

Nationalism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920). pp. 201, 203.

 

[15] Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback, "The Market For Corporate

Control: The Scientific Evidence," Journal of Financial Economics,

vol. 5, 1983, p. 30.

 

[16] This organization was quickly closed down after receiving

considerable negative publicity. However, the contract for services

to be carried out on behalf of the Office of Strategic Influence

was not cancelled.