Happy Anniversary, Partial Test Ban Treaty!

      On September 24, 1963,  the U.S. Senate ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty.  The fortieth anniversary of this event should have been a cause for celebration, as this treaty was the first internationally-negotiated nuclear arms control agreement.

      But, on September 24, 2003, there were no celebrations in the Bush administration, which has shown no interest in nuclear arms controls.  Indeed, in line with his militarist agenda, President George Bush has opposed ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, withdrawn from the ABM treaty, and promoted plans for developing new nuclear weapons.

      Yet it may be premature to mourn the death of nuclear constraints.

      When the Eisenhower administration took office in 1953, it had no plans whatsoever for nuclear arms controls.  Instead, it was committed to what it called "massive retaliation," as well as to integrating nuclear weapons into conventional war.  Nuclear weapons, the President announced, should "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else."  According to the record of a 1954 meeting of top U.S. national security officials, they agreed that the U.S. government "would not be drawn into any negotiations" for "the control or abolition of nuclear weapons."

      But the escalation of the nuclear arms race -- and particularly H-bomb tests, spewing nuclear fallout around the globe -- triggered an upsurge of protest.  World-renowned intellectuals such as Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, and Linus Pauling issued hard-hitting, widely-publicized critiques.  "Ban-the-Bomb" groups sprang up in numerous countries, including the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and Women Strike for Peace in the United States.  Opinion polls revealed overwhelming popular distaste for nuclear war, support for abolishing nuclear weapons, and desire for an end to nuclear testing.

      Consequently, U.S. officials were forced to retreat.  As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conceded, there had developed "a popular and diplomatic pressure for limitation of armament that cannot be resisted by the United States without our forfeiting the good will of our allies and the support of a large part of our own people."

      In September 1956, Eisenhower ordered a study of a test ban, citing "the rising concern of people everywhere over the effect of radiation from tests, . . . their reaction each time a test was reported, and their extreme nervousness over the prospective consequences of any nuclear war."  In 1957, after government weapons scientists made a sales pitch for continued nuclear testing, the President retorted that "we are . . . up against an extremely difficult world opinion situation," and the U.S. government could not "permit itself to be `crucified on a cross of atoms.'"  When, in March 1958, the Soviet government unilaterally halted nuclear testing, the U.S. government was on the spot.  Testing was "not evil," Eisenhower remarked in frustration, but "people have been brought to believe that it is."  The result was a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and the opening of test ban negotiations by the U.S., British, and Soviet governments.

      The negotiations went badly and, when the Soviet government resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in the fall of 1961, most members of the Kennedy administration were ready to follow its example.

      But President Kennedy was rattled by revived antinuclear agitation, and stalled for eight months before proceeding with atmospheric testing.  He also went to unprecedented lengths to secure a test ban treaty.  In November 1962, Kennedy met with Norman Cousins, the founder and co-chair of SANE, and implored him to assure Nikita Khrushchev of his commitment to such a measure.  Cousins shuttled between the two world leaders and, in the spring of 1963, convinced Kennedy to deliver a speech that would signal "a breathtaking new approach" toward the Soviet Union.  Delivered that June, this American University address -- partially written by Cousins -- emphasized the administration's desire to ban nuclear testing and announced new test ban talks.  In July, U.S., British, and Soviet officials signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

      Policymakers have conceded that this first nuclear arms control measure was a direct response to popular protest.  According to Glenn Seaborg, the AEC chair during the 1960s, the treaty resulted from "persistent pressure . . . on the nuclear powers by influential leaders and movements throughout the world."  Recalling his years as Kennedy's White House science advisor, Jerome Wiesner gave the major credit for pushing the President toward the treaty to SANE, Women Strike for Peace, and Linus Pauling.

      If comparable public pressure were mobilized today, would this country return to the path of nuclear arms controls?  A pessimist would be inclined to say no, and point to the fact that popular protest did not halt the Bush administration's drive for war with Iraq.

      Nevertheless, there are important signs that, when it comes to nuclear weapons, the Bush administration is in a difficult political situation.  The White House is clearly reeling from its failed venture in Iraq, and has gained a well-deserved and damaging reputation for reckless military adventurism.  In this context, anything that highlights the administration's abandonment of nuclear arms controls and its embrace of nuclear weapons is bound to heighten popular unease.

      Furthermore, time after time the American public has expressed dismay at building more nuclear weapons.  Certainly, it has never liked the idea of waging nuclear war!  Politicians who have talked lightly of using nuclear weapons have either suffered ignominious defeat (e.g. Barry Goldwater) or quickly reversed themselves (e.g. Ronald Reagan).  Even the Republican-dominated Congress -- doubtless recognizing the massive unpopularity of getting ready for nuclear war -- has failed to give a green light to the administration's nuclear plans.

      Thus, if there were heightened popular pressure on the nuclear issue, the Bush administration might well be confronted with the choice of abandoning its nuclear buildup or suffering another damaging blow to its re-election prospects.  Peace activists should seize upon this welcome opportunity and, along the way, celebrate their path-breaking achievement of forty years ago:  the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

Lawrence S. Wittner is Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, and the author of the recently-published book, Toward Nuclear Abolition (Stanford University Press).