How To Win A Long-Term Strike

Machinist local 1546, which represented the vast majority of the striking workers, is small, down from a peak of around 6,000 to 1,600 currently. The union’s resources are very limited, but it was able to sustain a small picket line on a daily basis. Understandably, the union leadership and the striking workers assumed that losing the strike was the most likely outcome. Winning a long-term strike was a most unusual event for a local—or for unions generally. 

What reversed the tide was a highly successful labor and community coalition that created a partnership between community activists, strikers, and the union leadership. This approach, which hopefully the labor movement will adopt in these very difficult times, appreciably increased the chances of winning. The community organized a boycott, which reduced Berkeley Honda’s service and repair business by about 70 percent and also impacted on used and new car sales. Although many cars that came to Berkeley Honda were turned away by picketers, a much larger number of Honda owners stayed away from the dealership due to the well publicized boycott. Because of the broad support for the boycott, the mayor was persuaded to intervene on the striker’s behalf. The major owners of the dealership were land developers, who preferred not to offend the mayor. Also, the City Council, responding to the demands of the campaign, voted unanimously to support the boycott. 

How did the Berkeley community get involved in the strike and sustain its activities for so long? It was a grassroots effort from the beginning. Community organizers spoke with the strikers, who invited their participation. Although the union leadership had not attempted to enlist the assistance of the community, it was responsive to the interests and preferences of the striking workers. A few of the key activists were members of the East Bay Labor Committee for Peace and Justice, which was the first organization to sponsor the campaign, provide financial aid, publicity, and activist participation. 

To build a broad organizational and activist base, community activists set up their own organization called the Berkeley Honda Labor and Community Coalition. From its inception the campaign was seen as an opportunity to build an organization of labor activists that would eventually become involved in other labor issues as well. 

To alert the Berkeley and neighboring communities about the strike, the new organization adopted a wide range of tactics that included distributing thousands of leaflets and bumper stickers urging the public to boycott Berkeley Honda. The coalition educated the public about the labor dispute. In front of the dealership a 15-foot inflatable rat supplied by the union was set up, which caught the daily attention of thousands of drivers passing by. Also, the local progressive independent newspaper, the Planet , printed letters and wrote favorable articles about the strike. It did not take long to reach the vast majority of the community. 

The rallies attracted tremendous attention. Drivers passing by would honk their horns, which reminded the dealership of the support the strikers were receiving. Rally participants distributed leaflets, bumper stickers, and picketed at other times. Participating organizations were asked to sponsor one of the rallies. ILWU Local 6 went one step further by conducting their hiring hall once a week in front of the dealership. The United Food and Commercial Workers Local 870 rallied every week for the duration of the strike. Organizational sponsorship, including faith-based groups, environmental organizations, and political parties, mobilized their membership to attend the rallies. 

A sense of community was created by the street rallies. Snacks and non-alcoholic beverages were served to create a warm and welcoming climate. Some of the coalition leaders, including the strikers, made it a point to speak with every person at each of the rallies. They were thanked for attending, their ideas were solicited, and conversations explored how else they could participate. The rule, however, was to never pressure participants. People enjoyed coming to the rallies to talk with old and new friends. 

The Berkeley Honda management began to realize that the community, strikers, and the union leadership were not going away. The decertification petition was withdrawn and serious negotiations finally began. Although the negotiated contract is not perfect, the most important demands were won. All the workers will be offered their jobs back, but to sustain their jobs business must pick up. A campaign by the coalition is now being conducted to bring back old customers and to encourage new ones. The workers retained a defined benefit pension plan as well as decent health coverage. Berkeley Honda remains a union shop. 

More important than this particular victory is the potential impact on union organizing activities at other establishments. The organizers of the labor action at Berkeley Honda have developed a model of an active labor-community coalition that has the potential of subduing even the most virulent anti-union employers. Most unions are not in the habit of working with community activists. But that’s beginning to change, as many of these unions are realizing the tremendous advantages of forming such alliances in order to reduce the risk of contracting and perhaps even disappearing.