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Blog PostsIran, the IAEA, and American Power III
By David Peterson at May 01, 2006 |
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In the by-now-legendary, you-can't-disprove-a-negative phraseology of the International Atomic Energy Agency when it deals with an Official Enemy of one of the Principals of World Order (see Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2006/27), April 28, 2006, specifically par. 33):
[T]he Agency is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
Or to phrase this exact same point a little differently: The Agency is unable “to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities” (par. 35). Nor can the Agency “make a judgment about, or reach of conclusion on, future compliance or intentions” (par. 36).
Verily, this must be what The Guardian's editors meant by Saturday's headline about the "Scathing nuclear report as US brands Iran enemy No 1" (April 29). A "defiant" Iran failed to prove that it isn't hiding any nuclear material or engaged in any nuclear activities some place that the Agency hasn't discovered.
Just imagine the permutations that are possible along this line. I mean, what is the real difference between the Agency's discovering actual nuclear material and activities within Iran, on the one hand, and the Agency's declaration that it was unable to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, on the other? If the Agency's inspectors cannot confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities within Iran, then what can Iran possibly do to resolve the Agency's lack of confirmation?
Grow a pair of wings and fly away to another planet?
I have another solution. From hereon, all questions related to the proclaimed “gaps” in the Agency's knowledge about the Iranian nuclear program, as well as all questions about its “remaining outstanding issues,” ought to be addressed to Vienna instead of Tehran. Or, better yet, to Washington.
The peace and security of the world very well may be at risk after all. But this is only because the highly politicized and anything-but impartial International Atomic Energy Agency refuses to accept the absence of evidence of undeclared nuclear material and activities within Iran for the evidence of absence of the same.
Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Homepage)
Islamic Republic News Agency (Homepage)
Iranian Students News Agency (Homepage)
FARS News Agency (Homepage)"Iran, the IAEA, and American Power I," ZNet
"Iran, the IAEA, and American Power II," ZNet
"Iran, the IAEA, and American Power III," ZNet
Update (May 30): For the complete text of a critical nine-paragraph document issued by the Non-Aligned Movement in support of Iran's rights under the NPT, and therefore a counter-weight to the NPT-violating demands of the Americans, see:
Statement on the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Issue (NAM/MM/COB/9), Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, Putrajaya, May 30, 2006
FYA ("For your archives"): Lifted directly from Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2006/27), here are the concluding five paragraphs of the report.
[Page 7]
…………
B. Current overall assessment14
33. All the nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency is accounted for. Apart from the small quantities previously reported to the Board, the Agency has found no other undeclared nuclear material in Iran. However, gaps remain in the Agency's knowledge with respect to the scope and content of Iran's centrifuge programme. Because of this, and other gaps in the Agency's knowledge, including the role of the military in Iran's nuclear programme, the Agency is unable to make progress
in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
34. After more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern. Any progress in that regard requires full transparency and active cooperation by Iran — transparency that goes beyond the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol — if the Agency is to be able to understand fully the twenty years of undeclared nuclear activities by Iran. Iran continues to facilitate the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and had, until February 2006, acted on a voluntary basis as if the Additional Protocol were in force. Until February 2006, Iran had also agreed to some transparency measures requested by the Agency, including access to certain military sites. Additional transparency measures, including access to documentation, dual use equipment and relevant individuals, are, however, still needed for the Agency to be able to verify the scope and nature
[Page 8]
of Iran's enrichment programme, the purpose and use of the dual use equipment and materials purchased by the PHRC, and the alleged studies which could have a military nuclear dimension.
35. Regrettably, these transparency measures are not yet forthcoming. With Iran's decision to cease implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol, and to confine Agency verification to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agency's ability to make progress in clarifying these issues, and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, will be further limited, and Agency access to activities not involving nuclear material (such as research into laser isotope separation and the production of sensitive components of the nuclear fuel cycle) will be restricted.15
36. While the results of Agency safeguards activities may influence the nature and scope of the confidence building measures that the Board requests Iran to take, it is important to note that safeguards obligations and confidence building measures are different, distinct and not interchangeable. The implementation of confidence building measures is no substitute for the full
implementation at all times of safeguards obligations. In this context, it is also important to note that the Agency's safeguards judgements and conclusions in the case of Iran, as in all other cases, are based on verifiable information available to the Agency, and are therefore, of necessity, limited to past and present nuclear activities. The Agency cannot make a judgement about, or reach a conclusion on, future compliance or intentions.
37. The Agency will pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran's nuclear activities, and the Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
_____________________________________
14. A detailed overall assessment of Iran's nuclear programme and the Agency's efforts to verify Iran's declarations with respect to that programme was most recently provided to the Board of Governors by the Director General in February 2006. See GOV/2006/15, paras 46–54.
15. In this context, it is important to recall that, in September 2005, the Director General informed the Board of Governors that certain aspects of Iran's declarations would be followed up as a routine safeguards implementation matter (particularly in connection with conversion activities, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and the heavy water research reactor programme) (GOV/2005/67, para. 43). Implicit in this statement was the understanding that the Agency would be able to follow up on these matters through the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. With the suspension of Iran's voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, the Agency's ability to do so will be restricted.
Nucs Will Stay Indeed
By Kissenger, Clark at May 28, 2006 10:53 AM
Indeed, America has no intention of reducing its nuclear arsenal. And it's very plain spoken about that. See the neocon's strategy paper, Re-Building America's Defenses, The Project for the New American Century. Virtually everything they advocated in 2000 is being accomplished - including 9/11, Paul...;-)- but we won't get into that.
The recently published Quadrennial Defense Report of the US Defense Department is further confirmation that the military plan is going forward. An interesting (and scary) quote from that document (and not yet widely caught on to) is how the strategy of the neocons is to bring the military more and more under the direct power of the President, who until Emperor Bushy has been simply Commander-in-Chief, the titular head of the Armed Forces. Now, the intent seems to be to bring the military under the direct day-to-day authority of the President, being flexibly reponsive to any current need he made have for their "services" anywhere in the world (including the US homeland). The quote from Page 1 of the Introduction:
"Just as U.S. forces are becoming more agile and capable of rapid action and are exploiting information advantages to increase operational effectiveness, headquarters organizations and processes that support them need to develop similar attributes. Changes should focus on meeting the needs of the President of the United States and joint warfi ghting forces, represented by the Combatant Commanders."
Among the objectives of the US Government will be Control of Outer Space and "Cyberspace". Yes, they intend to control the Net. And vastly increased intelligence collecting - the NSA has built the world's largest database contining call details of virtually all US-based calls. These data are apparently de-personalised (at least that is what is claimed), but how long will that last, if indeed it is true?
It is the stated intent of these folks to make the American Empire of the 21st Century official in every way. They feel it is their responsibility and America's to do so, to protect America's interests globally and the interests of democracy throughout the world, from all those enemies out there waiting to take away America's "freedoms".
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Nuclear-Weapon Fun and Games
By Kissenger, Clark at May 04, 2006 14:09 PM
Friends:
Notice that endnote 1 (p. 5/7) of the document to which Kelvin provided the hyperlink,
"U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe" (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, United Kingdom, October, 2005), itself provides a hyperlink to the Natural Resources Defense Council in the States (specifically the NRDC&undefined;s "Nuclear Weapons, Waste and Energy" webpage)---one pretty good source for data about nuclear weapons. Two other superb sources are the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (specifically, its "Nuclear Weapons Data" webpage---though don&undefined;t miss Cohen and Burr&undefined;s "Israel crosses the threshold") and the Federation of American Scientists&undefined; webpage, "Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century."
According to Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "As of January 2006, the U.S. stockpile contains almost 10,000 nuclear warheads. This includes 5,735 active or operational warheads: 5,235 strategic and 500 nonstrategic warheads. Approximately 4,225 additional warheads are held in the reserve or inactive stockpiles, some of which will be dismantled." ("U.S. nuclear forces," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February, 2006.)
Of course, Norris and Kristensen&undefined;s very last clause needs to be taken with great caution. The most heavily nuclear-weaponized power in world history isn&undefined;t about to live up to its Article VI obligations under the NPT to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
Much less find its "nuclear dossier" referred to the UN Security Council any time soon.
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Diplomatic brokerage and neutrality
By Kissenger, Clark at May 04, 2006 08:33 AM
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Reply to Victor
By Kissenger, Clark at May 02, 2006 23:53 PM
That is to say, ever since the IAEA began producing written reports for its Board of Directors on the matter of the so-called “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran” (see GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003), the IAEA has never failed to emphasize its own inability to verify and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities inside Iran. As long as the IAEA remains wedded to this deliberately provocative approach, there is nothing the Government of Iran can do about it.
Moreover, based on the content of the IAEA's 18 written reports (i.e., the overwhelming absence of any evidence of legitimately proscribed nuclear material and activities inside Iran), everything ought to be looking up for Iran these days. Instead, the IAEA keeps wringing its hands over its own inability to verify and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. And the liars and cheats in the U.S. Government, and the hysterics in the English-language news media, take this IAEA assertion about the absence of evidence as evidence of the grave nuclear threat that Iran poses to international peace and security.
So who's zooming whom?
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Reply to Victor
By Kissenger, Clark at May 02, 2006 17:24 PM
The very first statement you place in the mouth of the US/UN/IAEA strikes me as a far truer characterization of the UN&undefined;s and IAEA&undefined;s official position with respect to Iran today, than it ever did of their position with respect to Iraq: "We can&undefined;t prove you aren&undefined;t, so you must be."
That is to say, ever since the IAEA began producing written reports for its Board of Directors on the matter of the so-called “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran” (see GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003), the IAEA has never failed to emphasize its own inability to verify and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities inside Iran. As long as the IAEA remains wedded to this deliberately provocative approach, there is nothing the Government of Iran can do about it.
Moreover, based on the content of the IAEA's 18 written reports (i.e., the overwhelming absence of any evidence of legitimately proscribed nuclear material and activities inside Iran), everything ought to be looking up for Iran these days. Instead, the IAEA keeps wringing its hands over its own inability to verify and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. And the liars and cheats in the U.S. Government, and the hysterics in the English-language news media, take this IAEA assertion about the absence of evidence as evidence of the grave nuclear threat that Iran poses to international peace and security.
So who's zooming whom?
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Shades of Iraq
By Kissenger, Clark at May 02, 2006 14:43 PM
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