Iran, the United States, and the Security Council II
By David Peterson at Mar 27, 2007
Last Saturday's (March 24) presentation before the Security Council
by the acting U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Alejandro Wolff
was nothing short of insulting and slanderous towards Iran. It was thus
a perfectly fitting performance by an American on the world's stage. In
the very first sentence out of his mouth, Wolff expressed his pleasure
"that the Security Council has once again unanimously taken action against what is clearly a grave threat to international peace and security" (S/PV.5647, p. 8.2).
The Ambassador's comments only devolved from there.
As we plainly see attested by the photo at the top of this blog, the deployment to the waters near Iran of the nuclear-powered USS Eisenhower is proof positive that Iran (rather than the United States) is a Chapter VII-class threat to the peace.It is also worth nothing that Wolff read out in the Council's chamber from Par. 29 of the latest IAEA report on Iran (GOV/2007/8, February 22) a passage about the IAEA's inability "to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that program."
So the exact you-can't-disprove-a-negative kind of passage that the IAEA has been incorporating into each of its now more than 20 reports on Iran (since June 2003, I mean), clearly a sop to the U.S. Government, as the political nature of the condition that it imposes upon Iran is such that Iran will never be able to meet it, as long as Washington maintains that Iran has "failed to comply," was the passage that Wolff selected to highlight. -- Imagine that.
In his statement to the Council, Iran's Ambassador Manoucher Mottaki made this point (S/PV.5647, p. 15.2):
How can Iran's peaceful nuclear programme be considered in the Security Council while Iran has carried out all its obligations and cooperated to the fullest extent possible, far more than it is obliged to do in accordance with its treaty obligations, namely those under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Safeguards Agreement? Is it not simply because the IAEA could not find any diversion from lawful and peaceful purposes? How could one expect the IAEA to prove a negative fact?
The answer, of course, is that Iran can't. But then again, Iran isn't supposed to be able to prove with absolute certainty that its nuclear program is oriented toward the production of electricity. Much less to disprove -- Washington's assertions to the contrary -- that an undeclared nuclear weapons program really doesn't exist. That's why political conditions such as this were incorporated into the IAEA's reports in the first place. The Baghdad regime, free of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons capabilities and programs from late 1991 on, never was able to prove for all those years that it did not possess biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons capabilities and programs. -- Are we enlightened Westerners to expect anything better from the Mullahs?
Amazing days, I'm sure you'll agree. -- At every turn, the serial aggressor games the international system, either flatly rejecting the jurisdiction and the authority of the United Nations and its agencies or, if and when it suits its purposes, exploiting the United Nations to the hilt to help it impose its will upon other states.
And now with the capture by Iran of the 15 British military personnel off Iran's coast, the serial aggressor's partner in past crimes has been brought into this confrontation as well. Front and center.
"Tough Talk about Iran: How Far Will It Go?" Newsweek, January 22, 2007
"Radical Sunni Group Claims Responsibility for Bus Attack," AKI, February 14, 2007 (as posted to the Intelligence Summit blog)
"Report: Bomb Kills 18 Revolutionary Guardsmen in Iran," Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press, February 14, 2007 (as posted to the Washington Post)
"Bus bombed in southeast Iran, agency says 18 dead," Edmund Blair, Reuters, February 14, 2007 (as posted to the Star online)
"Iran parades suspect in Zahedan bombing," Agence France Presse, Febrary 17, 2007 (as posted to Dawn)
"Order restores after blast at girls school in Iran," CNN, February 17, 2007
"Report: Weapons used in attack in Zahedan, Iran come from U.S.," Xinhua, February 17, 2007
"Iran summons Pakistan envoy over bomb blasts," Agence France Presse, February 18, 2007 (as posted to the Iran Focus website)
"Gunfire over the Pakistan border rattles Iranian leaders," Ghulam Hasnain Kulao and Dean Nelson, Sunday Times, March 4, 2007
"Tehran Blames the West for Ethnic Unrest," Kimia Sanati, Inter Press Service, March 5, 2007 (as posted to the HighBeam Encyclopedia website)
"As the U.S. Mounts Pressure Musharraf Embarks on Iranian Containment," G. Parthasarathy, Business Line, March 8, 2007
"Stepping towards the precipice," Editorial, The Hindu, March 27, 2007
"Both Sides Must Stop This Mad Confrontation, Now," Craig Murray, March 29, 2007
"A Memo on Iran," Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, CounterPunch, March 30, 2007
"Hostages caught in Tehran-Washington crossfire," Simon Tisdall, The Guardian, March 31, 2007
"Iran accuses US jet fighters of violating airspace," Agence France Presse, April 1, 2007 (as posted to Channel NewsAsia)
"What law did Tehran break?" Matthew B. Stannard, San Francisco Chronicle, April 1, 2007
"Nuclear Program Hurting Iran's Economy, IMF Says," Warner Rose, U.S. Department of State, April 2, 2007
"The Secret War against Iran," Brian Ross and Christopher Isham, ABC - TV News, April 3, 2007
"The Long History of British and American Covert Provocation and Action in Iran," Steve Watson, Center on Research for Globalization, April 3, 2007
"Pakistani militants staging raids inside Iran--ABC," Reuters - AlertNet, April 3, 2007
"Brits Drive World War III Provocations in Gulf," Jeffrey Steinberg, Executive Intelligence Review, April 6, 2007
"The Coming Wars," Seymour M. Hersh, New Yorker, January 24/31, 2005
"The Iran Plans," Seymour M. Hersh, New Yorker, April 17, 2006
"The Next Act," Seymour M. Hersh, New Yorker, November 27, 2006
"The Redirection," Seymour M. Hersh, New Yorker, March 3, 2007
"Putting the Iran Crisis in Context," Noam Chomsky, TomDispatch, April 5, 2007
"The Fourth 'Supreme International Crime' in Seven Years is Already Underway," Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, ElectricPolitics.com, May 16, 2006
"Hegemony and Appeasement: Setting Up the Next Target for the 'Supreme International Crime'," Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, ElectricPolitics.com, January 29, 2007
"Beyond Munich: The UN Security Council Helps Disarm a Prospective Further Victim of U.S. Aggression," Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, ZNet, March 31, 2007
"Iran, the United States, and the Security Council I," ZNet, March 25, 2007
"Iran, the United States, and the Security Council II," ZNet, March 27, 2007
Update (June 14): After a three-week-and-one-day-long delay, the International Atomic Energy Agency has finally derestricted access to its most recent report on Iran's nuclear program:
Statement on "Non-proliferation" by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2006/15), March 29, 2006
UN Security Council Res. 1696 (S/RES/1696), July 31, 2006
UN Security Council Res. 1737 (S/RES/1737), December 23, 2006
UN Security Council Res. 1747 (S/RES/1747), March 24, 2007
It's very short: Only four pages long. -- Still. To save you some trouble:
1. "Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities" (20). Since the spring of 2003 (at least), this has been the primary U.S. demand -- now hyperinflated into the demand of the major Western powers (U.K., France, Germany), the IAEA's Board of Governors, and no less than the UN Security Council.
2. In the field of enrichment, "Iran has declared that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at [the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz]" (5).
3. "Since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing…" (6). "Iran has not agreed to any of the required transparency measures which are essential for the clarification of certain aspects of the scope and nature of its nuclear program" (17).
4. In Section G, "Summary," the IAEA reports:
18. Although the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, the Agency remains unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme….
19. As previously stated, unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues, and implements the Additional Protocol and the required transparency measures, the Agency will not be able to fully reconstruct the history of Iran's nuclear programme and provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme. It should be noted that because the Agency has not been receiving for over a year information that Iran used to provide, including under the Additional Protocol, the Agency's level of knowledge of certain aspects of Iran's nuclear related activities has deteriorated.
One question that needs to be answered is: Whose interests are better advanced by the fact that, "because the Agency has not been receiving for over a year information that Iran used to provide, including under the Additional Protocol, the Agency's level of knowledge of certain aspects of Iran's nuclear related activities has deteriorated" (19)?
Among the devious Iranians'? Or among those of their tormentors inWashington and the related uncivilized tribes?
Well. -- On the Iraq front, which provided more help to the Washington regime's war-effort: Having the weapons inspectors of UNSCOM (1991 through mid-December 1998) and UNMOVIC (November 27, 2002 through mid-March 2003) on the ground in Iraq? Or not?
Well. -- If weapons inspectors could at last positively verify that the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran really does mean that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, whose interests do you think this would advance?