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March 2005

Volume , Number 0


Activism

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Commentary

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Culture

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Features

Jobs
Keith Yearman


Hotel Satire
Lydia Sargent


Mercenaries
Tim Rogers


Health Care
Jack Rasmus


WTO News
Sheila Mcclear


Cabinet Members
Jason Leopold


Fog Watch
Edward Herman


Special Report
A.k. Gupta


Green Tide
Al Gedicks


Moral Outrage
David Smith-Ferri


Eyes Right
Pam Chamberlain


Pandemics
George j. Bryjak


Conservative Watch
Bill Berkowitz


Interview
David Barsamian


Reproductive Rights
Eleanor J. Bader


Labor
David Bacon


Society's Pliers
Michael Albert


Zaps

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NOTE: Z Magazine subscribers and sustainers have access to all Z Magazine articles here and in the archive. The latest Z Magazine articles available to everyone are listed in the Free Articles box at the top of the table of contents, and are starred in the list below. Questions? e-mail Z Magazine Online.

Mass Destruction by Any Other Name

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T he UN Oil-For-Food program—the humanitarian aid program established in 1995 in response to international outrage at the suffering and death in Iraq resulting from economic sanctions—has been dragged into the Congressional coliseum before a packed house, as an investigation proceeds into charges of systemic corruption. 

Noteworthy is the moral outrage expressed in Congress, as well as the concerted action being taken. “We’re trying to sort out this hornet’s nest of corruption, of evil,” said Senator Norm Coleman (R- MN), who heads one of six Con- gressional investigations. Along with a chorus of others, Coleman called for Kofi Annan’s resignation for presiding over the “greatest fraud and theft” in UN history. At a recent news conference, Rep- resentative Scott Garrett (R-NJ) took it one step further, saying the question isn’t whether Annan should keep his job, but “whether he should be in jail.” Senator John Ensign (R-NV) prepared a resolution urging the UN to strip Annan of his pension. 

Taking a step back from the spectacle, one might wonder: where was Congressional outrage 14 years ago in March 1991 when a mission led by UN Undersecretary General Martti Ahtisaari reported its findings from immediate post-war investigations in Iraq, concluding “…nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation which has now befallen the country. The recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology” (www.casi.org. uk). 

Where were the ripe and ready Congressional investigations when an 87-member interdisciplinary team of specialists (www.cesr.org), which carried out a fact-finding mission in Iraq’s 30 largest cities as well as in rural areas across the country, reported in October 1991 that child mortality in Iraq had increased 380 percent since the onset of sanctions, rising from 27.8 to 104 deaths/1,000 live births (a figure that would reach 131 deaths by the end of the decade)? 

Congress cannot claim ignorance. On February 26, 1991, Susan Epstein, a specialist working for the Congressional Research Service, briefed Congress, reporting, “U.S. Government sources currently are estimating that by March 1991 the daily Iraqi caloric intake could be less than half of what it was prior to the embargo” (www.casi.org.uk). That fact alone should have stopped hearts and yet it was another five years before the Oil-For-Food Program finally got up to speed in Iraq. In her briefing, Epstein explained certain pertinent facts quite clearly: “Prior to the embargo, about 75 percent of the total calories consumed in Iraq were imported.” This included “90 percent of its corn, about 82 percent of its wheat, 82 percent of its rice, 68 percent of its beef…” 

Epstein further explained, “Current food stocks are thought to be at record lows…. Additionally, allied bombing of refineries, fuel reserves, roads, and bridges (and, loss of electricity that supported flour mills and perishable food storage facilities) will seriously hamper food availability and distribution…. The May-June wheat and barley harvest in Iraq will be difficult with both a shortage of manpower [sic] due to the draft and a lack of fuel to power the farm machinery. Even if a plentiful crop is harvested, getting the food into a useable form and getting it to the population (traditionally by truck) will be seriously impaired.”

Surely, as the embargo dragged on for months into years, alarms should have gone off in Congressional minds. After all, Iraq was the 12th largest foreign market for U.S. agricultural exports in 1989, a fact that couldn’t have completely escaped Congress’s awareness since virtually all of these sales were under U.S. government programs. How was Iraq to make up even the U.S. portion of its imports (amounting to 32 percent and 26 percent respectively in 1988 and 1989) while the embargo persisted? 

Where was the outrage, where was the concerted response when UNICEF concluded in a 1999 report, “If the substantial reduction in the under-five mortality rate during the 1980s had continued through the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of children under five in the country as a whole during the eight-year period 1991 to 1998.” Even if the response in Congress had been disbelief, given the seriousness of the claims it might at least have investigated the matter. What if the correct number were “only” 200,000? What would that have meant? Apparently, this was too difficult or too painful a question to ask. Time wore on, the sanctions weighed down mightily, and Congress remained largely mute on the question of Iraqi suffering. 

In the most recent siege of Fallujah, one of the first actions by the U.S. military was to occupy the city’s main hospital. It justified this by claiming that it needed to control the accuracy of reports about civilian casualties. The hospital, it noted, had been a center for these reports in the first siege of Fallujah in April. The U.S., however, has made no effort to report civilian casualties in the aftermath of the siege, any more than it reported Iraqi casualties in the first Gulf War. Clearly, whether it is children dying from preventable diseases as a result of a cruel economic embargo or people killed in the siege of a city, civilian casualties do not count; for all practical purposes—the purposes of war and economic aggression—they don’t even exist.  


David Smith-Ferri is a member of Voices in the Wilderness (www.vitw.org), a campaign to nonviolently resist U.S. militarism at home and abroad. 
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