Morality's Avenging Angels
( * A version of this document originally was published as Chapter 10 in David Chandler, Ed., Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics (
MORALITY'S AVENGING ANGELS: THE NEW HUMANITARIAN CRUSADERS
IN THE KOSOVO WAR AND NEW WORLD ORDER
By Edward S. Herman an
Part I: Introduction
Operation Allied Force, NATO's 1999 war against
No state is a moral institution, particularly no Great Power in the execution of its foreign policy. On the contrary, states and their policies are largely shaped by economic and political interests and strategic considerations, not by humane values; and the greater the power of a state to bestride the world's stage, to plunder, butcher, and ravish in the lying name of avenging wrongs, the more this holds true (Gilpin, 1987; Amin, 1994; Kolko, 1994: 373-451). When certain hum
Among the New Hum
Over the course of the past decade and now into this one as well, the New Hum
The Yugoslav (i.e., "South Slav") solution to this region of Southeastern Europe's "national problem"—
This longstanding, ethnically fragile state of affairs is what provided the historical symbolism and vocabulary out of which each of the wars over the breakup of Yugoslavia emerged in the post-Tito period (May 1980-), after a serious, decade-long (now two decades long) economic depression and the constitutional crises of the 1989-1992 period (Cohen, 1995: 45-77; Woodward, 1995b: 339-392; Hayden, 1999a)—essentially, the de facto death of the Yugoslav Federation in four of the republics, coupled with the de jure survival of its institutions there and in the remainder of the rump Federation, with first Slovenia and Croatia declaring their independence from the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in June 1991, followed ten months later by the Muslim-led government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. And this same ethnically fragile, and indeed highly volatile, state of affairs was true not the least with regard to the causes of the 1998-1999 civil wars between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian forces over the fate of Kosovo.
Given the evidence, there is no doubt that the real effects of NATO's supposedly "hum
But more important for students of American power and ideology and the New Hum
The actual effects of the war also point to a non-human rights agenda. First, it cannot be denied that almost the entire refugee crisis of 1999 was generated during the bombing campaign, rather than prior to it. Moreover, although President Clinton said at the time that the primary aims of the war were to bring "stability" to the region and to end the "ethnic cleansing" of the Kosovo Albanians by Serbia, thus allowing the refugees (a disproportionate percentage of which were ethnic Serbs, it is worth noting) to return to their homes, and all of the people in Kosovo to live together in harmony based on "the principle of multi-ethnic, tolerant, inclusive democracy" and "against the idea that statehood must be based entirely on ethnicity" (Clinton, 1999b), in fact the war not only inflamed, it permanently entrenched, ethnic hatreds and the principle of monoethnic statehood (or a political unit modeled on the classical racist European notion of the nation-state (Hayden, 1992; Hayden, 1999; Hayden, 1999b)). These unnecessary catastrophes were then followed by a postwar pogrom and ethnic cleansing by KLA cadres, killing large numbers of the province's ethnic minorities (well over a thousand) and causing the flight of an estimated 330,000 ethnic non-Albanians (Dienstbier, 2000a: Par. 43; Dienstbier, 2000b). This post-war cleansing and minority flight took place under NATO's rule, but were contrary to both Clinton's and NATO's proclaimed goal as well as the commitment undertaken by the U.N. and NATO at the end of the bombing, under U.N. Resolution 1244, to demilitarize the KLA and to protect minorities (S/RES/1244, 1999). This NATO-protected ethnic cleansing of the province was more ecumenical and extensive than anything done by the Serbs in Kosovo before March 24, 1999 to supposedly justify NATO's resort to war, in what Jan Oberg, the director of the Swedish-based Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, has called "the largest ethnic cleansing in the Balkans [in percentage terms]" (Oberg, 2000).
Today, the province of Kosovo has become a peculiar form of quasi-independent non-state in transition to an unknown but unpromising destiny: Fear-ridden, lawless, with a high level of inter-ethnic conflict, and—on the model of Bosnia-Herzegovina—a de facto colony run by foreign powers (NATO, the European Union, and dozens of NGOs) in the name of "democracy"—or "democracy without consent," in Robert M. Hayden's telling phrase, an "artificially multi-ethnic" state-within-a-state complete with "sham elections" that cover over the absence of either local authority or real democratic institutions, and whose alleged multi-ethnic institutions exist only "on paper" but whose actual multi-ethnicity is shrinking steadily due to voluntary flight and ethnic cleansing, as
Finally, by supporting and providing a home base for—or by harboring—the KLA, NATO has allowed Kosovo to become a base for other incarnations of the KLA to launch serious insurgencies within Macedonia and southern Serbia, with other regions having an Albanian minority perhaps to follow.
In short, sticking to the evidence provided by the actual consequences of NATO's war provides overwhelming support for the conclusion that, from a genuine hum
Part 2: The New Hum
anitarians to the Barricades
Despite the sorry, and still incomplete, record of NATO's war over Kosovo, despite the New Hum
The defining characteristics of the New Hum
Among the New Hum
During the Bosnian crisis and, later, the crisis in Kosovo as well, the New Hum
The New Hum
Rieff lauds Ignatieff's "close relations with such important figures in the West's political and military leadership as Richard Holbrooke and Gen. Wesley Clark" (Rieff, 2000b); and in the Introduction to his book Virtual War, Ignatieff acknowledges his work's debt to Holbrooke, Clark, and former Hague chief prosecutor Louise Arbour, among others (Ignatieff, 2000a: 6). It is clear that the New Hum
Choosing sides, a simple-minded identification of one side as guilty of Evil, and a simple-minded identification with the victims of the evildoers—these constantly recurring themes in the work of the New Hum
Bernard Kouchner, who Michael Ignatieff once called a "reluctant imperialist" (Ignatieff, 2000e), and who was the first New Hum
Nor is Kouchner alone—far from it, in fact. Almost uniformly, the New Hum
A closely related effect of the New Hum
But what has driven the New Hum
We also sense that there may be an element of self-fulfillment for the New Hum
In these and other ways, the New Hum
Part III: The New Hum
As we have noted, the New Hum
This same channeled attention can be seen in the books written by these analysts: for example, in Aryeh Neier's study of War Crimes (Neier, 1998), there are some 200 index references to Yugoslav crimes, but zero references to East Timor, Indonesia, Colombia, Israel and the Palestinians, and only one for Turkey, but referring back to the Armenian genocide.
The selectivity of U.S. and NATO human rights policy flies in the face of the New Hum
What is even more interesting is the adaptation of the New Hum
When confronted with the fact that they seem to give little attention to U.S.- and NATO-protected human rights abuses, the New Hum
A second New Hum
Accepting War as a Hum
As noted, traditional hum
The idea that war can serve a hum
Commenting on the repeated U.S. bombing of their well-marked warehouses in Kabul, the international director of the Red Cross, David Alexander, stated that "One problem we've had in recent years is a bit of blurring between political and hum
Undeterred,. the New Hum
Accepting the Abrogation of the Rule of Law
The New Hum
They have dealt with this mainly by either ignoring the matter entirely or accepting that "human rights" and "morality" must sometimes be allowed to override the law. The memorable phrase of the International Commission—Falk, Goldstone, Kaldor, Ignatieff, and Minow are members—was that the NATO war was "illegal but legitimate" (IICK, 2000; 2001), as NATO was presumably righting wrongs outside the law as a global Robin Hood. Vaclav Havel claims that the NATO war took place "out of respect for the law, for a law that ranks higher than the law that protects the sovereignty of states" (Havel, 1999). In this same speech Havel also claims, falsely, that this was the first war ever waged "in the name of principles in values." He also believes that it was truly "waged for ethical reasons." Bernard Kouchner takes it for granted that morality overrides the law, and he even proposes "preemptive" intervention by the NATO powers, which implies intervention even before the immoral actions take place or reach serious dimensions (Kouchner, 1999a).
Apparently overwhelmed by their eagerness to support NATO's intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians, the New Hum
anitarians have seemed oblivious to the dangers of abandoning the rule of law. Richard Falk can warn as recently as 1995 that "Nothing expresses secular fundamentalism more stridently than recourse to war as policy" (Falk, 1995: 242); but with regard to NATO's Kosovo war he writes that "the hum anitarian benefits of this intervention were substantial, and could not have been otherwise achieved" (Falk, 2002); and now with regard to the U.S. war against Afghanistan (or what he hysterically calls "apocalyptic terrorism"), adds that it was not only "morally/legally justifiable," but that for the United States it was imperative to mount a "maximally effective response,…given its leadership in world society, as well as its linchpin role with respect to global security,…however flawed" (Falk, 2001). Along with their blasé treatment of the selectivity of human rights attention by the Great Powers, and of those Powers' actual support of serious human rights abuses in "friendly" states, this opening of the gates for the Great Powers to ignore the rule of law, represents a major human rights regression that bodes ill for the future. For as Simon Chesterman warns in his survey of alleged "hum anitarian" interventions throughout the 20th Century, "[U]nilateral enforcement is not a substitute for but the opposite of collective action; as unilateral assertions of hum anitarianism displace multilateral institutional legality, so the normative restraints on the recourse to force weaken. The resulting fragmentation and regionalization of the international security system thus makes it reliant, once again, on the eirenic munificence of the modern Great Power(s). And, as international law is deprivileged to become just one policy justification among others, so fade the hopes of mediating those Great Power relations through an international rule of law" (Chesterman, 2001: 236).
Acceptance of the NATO Powers as Hum
Along with their acceptance of the abandonment of the rule of law, the New Hum
Many of the New Hum
Acceptance of the Tribunal as Legitimate and Judicial
All of the New Hum
Geoffrey Robertson, who believes that Milosevic "bears a guilt of Göring-esque proportions for the entire tragedy [of Yugoslavia]," also believes that the legal basis of the Tribunal is unarguable. Quoting approvingly M. Cherif Bassiouni first report to the U.N. Security Council as the head of a commission of experts looking into possible violations of international law in Bosnia during the war, Robertson argues that The Hague Tribunal derives "its legitimacy from the fact that it constituted 'a measure to maintain or restore international peace and security';" and he himself adds pollyannishly that since the Tribunal's own analysis of international hum
Apart from expressing approval, neither Robertson, Ignatieff, nor their comrades discuss the Tribunal's indictment of Milosevic et al. on May 22, 1999, which gave NATO a public relations boost by a diversion of attention from NATO's escalating bombing of Serbian civilian infrastructures, and served to ratify NATO's decision to go to war on grounds that this band of Serbs really were "willing executioners." This remarkable politicization of a supposed judicial body did not bother the New Hum
In fact, the very politicization of the Tribunal served the New Hum
the Demon Theory of Balkan History
Almost uniformly, the New Hum
anitarians explain developments in the Balkans in terms of a demon theory of history, or what Lenard Cohen calls the "paradise lost/loathsome leaders perspective" that has characterized much of the literature on the breakup of Yugoslavia since 1989-1991 (Cohen, 201: 380ff). Milosevic, virtually single-handedly, pursuing his dream of a Greater Serbia, was responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, was the origiNATOr and predominant employer of ethnic cleansing in the region, and refused any peaceful avenues in favor of violence. Ash speaks of his "poisoned, but calculating mind" (Ash, 2000), and Rieff says that Milosevic "had quite correctly been described by U.S. officials...as the architect of the catastrophe" (Rieff, 1999b). The New Hum anitarians repeatedly refer to Milosevic's speeches of April 24-25, 1987, and June 28, 1989, as allegedly announcing his ethnic cleansing program. Tim Judah refers to Milosevic's responsibility for wars in "Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo: four wars since 1991 and the result of these terrible conflicts, which began with the slogan 'All Serbs in One State' is the cruelest irony" (Judah, 2000).
This is not serious history, but convenient mythology. The breakup of Yugoslavia was driven mainly by German, Austrian, and elite Croatian and Slovenian incentives to separation, and from 1991 and earlier the Serbs were designated the enemy and were on the defensive. There was no "war" in Slovenia—the Yugoslav army, which had a legal right to fight against a Slovenian secession, did not do so, but withdrew from the Republic after ten days of skirmishes. Much of the fighting and killing resulted from the insistence of the West on preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single entity under Muslim minority control, and the failure there and in Croatia to allow large ethnic minorities to shift from being parts of artificial Republics to less threatening associations (Woodward, 1995; Hayden, 1999; Chandler, 2000; Johnstone, 2002).
Milosevic supported many initiatives for resolving these problems, coming into regular conflict with the Bosnian Serb leadership as a result. His 1987 and 1989 speeches did not call for a Greater Serbia; instead, they promised to protect Serbians (i.e., inhabitants of Serbia, not merely ethnic Serbs) and called for ethnic toleration (Milosevic, 1987; 1989). Opportunistic, demagogic, ruthless, he might have been, but he failed to meet the demon role fixed by NATO, its media, and the New Hum
The New Hum
Misuse of Historical Evidence: (2) Genocide in Bosnia
The views of many of the New Hum
1) Repeated allegations of Serb genocide and repetition of the number 200,000 or 250,000 dead, provided by the Bosnian Muslim government as early as January 1993 and contradicted by all independent authorities and the CIA itself (Kenney, 1998; Johnstone, 2002).
2) Rape inflation based again on contaminated sources, with the added unsupported claim that Bosnia Serb rapes were "by army order" (Sontag, in Johnstone, 2002), "systematic" in nature, and an "integral part of ethnic cleansing, of eradicating entire areas of their historic Muslim populations through brutal intimidation, expulsion, and outright murder" (Post and Stiglmayer, 1993).
3) Repeated naming of towns in which Muslims or Croats were killed by Serbs—
Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Mostar, Tulza, Srebrenica—with a systematic failure to mention the prior large-scale Muslim and Croat slaughters of in-town or nearby Serb civilians (Rooper, 1997; Pumphrey, 1998; Bogdanich and Lettmayer, 2000).
4) A mythical representation of the Izetbegovic government as "actually committed to the rule of law" and multi-ethic tolerance—"it was in defense of the ideal of a multinational, multiconfessional Bosnia that the Bosnians shed their blood" (Rieff, 1995: 248-49, 260-61).
This ignores not only their acceptance of thousands of radical Muslims from Afghanistan and elsewhere, but also Izetbegovic's own explicit commitment to Muslim political domination; in his words, "There is neither peace nor coexistence between the 'Islamic religion' and non-Islamic social and political institutions....Having the right to govern its own world, Islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of putting a foreign ideology into practice on its territory" (quoted from his 1970 Islamic Declaration in Johnstone, 2002). These sentiments, never repudiated, are never cited by the New Hum
5) Rationalizing the refusal to negotiate a settlement along the line of the Vance-Owen and later Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans, which Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs accepted, on the ground that "the United States could not support a plan that 'rewarded' ethnic cleansing to such an extent" (Rieff, citing Madeleine Albright, 1995: 255).
6) That the mutual ethnic cleansing was a result of the NATO powers encouragement of the disintegration of the "multi-ethnic" Yugoslav state, and their refusal to allow threatened minorities to withdraw from artificial Republics that they distrusted, is outside the realm of New Hum
It is also interesting to note how benignly the New Hum
Misuse of Historical Evidence (3): Misrepresentations Regarding
"Ethnic Cleansing" in Kosovo
Some New Hum
anitarians, such as Denitch and Williams, contend that Serb ethnic cleansing in Kosovo prior to the bombing was massive, whereas others like Ash, Rieff, Hitchens, Judah and Ignatieff make the flight and expulsions during the bombing war the crucial mark of Serb ethnic cleansing and genocide. When all five of Milosevic's indictments, including his indictments for genocide in Croatia and Bosnia, were unified into one single indictment for his upcoming trial, Hague Tribunal spokesperson Florence Hartman stated, "We believed that he deserved one trial because it's the same joint criminal enterprise from the beginning to the end, and that the purpose of this criminal enterprise was the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs from large areas in Croatia and Bosnia and also in Kosovo" ( CNN, 2001). This sentiment is uniformly echoed by the New Humanitarians.
Several problems confront those claiming pre-bombing ethnic cleansing. One is that it is not supported by any official document, including those of the State Department, OSCE, British House of Commons Defense Review, or any of the three indictments of Milosevic. Indeed, prior to the bombing the German Foreign Office had even denied that the refugee flows constituted a case of ethnic cleansing, contending that "[The] actions of the security forces [were] not directed against the Kosovo-Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but against the military opponent and its actual and alleged supporters" (Canepa, 1999). Ash claims that "Serb forces started systematic cleansing as the Kosovo Verification Mission pulled out, just before the bombing started" (Ash, 2000), but he offers no evidence for this charge, nor does anybody else. Ash fails to mention that the mission was withdrawn only four days before the bombing began, with the Serbs fully aware that a bombing war was about to start. He also fails to note that the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission reported no serious incidents between January 15 and March 20, the day of their withdrawal.
Another problem for the New Hum
We may note first that for Ignatieff the KLA killing was only a "provocation," not a murderous act to be severely condemned. Note also that although there is serious evidence that the Racak incident was arranged into a "massacre" following a furious battle, and is therefore of questionable authenticity, Ignatieff takes it as unquestionably valid. On the certainty of the Serb reaction, provocations such as those carried out by the KLA produce similar responses in civil conflicts everywhere, so that Ignatieff's blaming it on Serb racism is nonsensical for that reason alone. But it also flies in the face of Serb tolerance of Albanians in Belgrade, along with Roma—in contrast with Kosovo Albanian intolerance of both in NATO-occupied Kosovo.
A problem for the New Hum
Another problem for New Hum
A third problem is that the postwar evidence on killings has not supported the inflated claims of NATO officials, which ran up to 500,000. The New Hum
Misuse of Historical Evidence (4): Misrepresenting Rambouillet
At Rambouillet the NATO powers presented Yugoslavia with an ultimatum: surrender or be bombed. Eventually, they assured the failure of the negotiations by inserting a proviso in the proposed agreement that would have required Yugoslavia to allow NATO to occupy not just Kosovo but all of Yugoslavia (Kenney, 1999).
This is awkward for the New Hum
David Rieff asks, "How eager is he [Milosevic] to allow NATO troops into a portion of his country's sovereign territory, as called for by the Rambouillet agreement?" (Rieff, 1999a). But Appendix B called for NATO troops to occupy all of Yugoslavia. Rieff's misrepresentation was never corrected by him or by the New York Times. Michael Ignatieff interpreted the failure as based the fact that Milosevic "thought that he could call NATO's bluff, could risk a bombing" because he could "withstand" maybe a week's bombing (Ignatieff, 2000b). Again, no mention of the "bar" because Serbia "needed to be bombed," but putting it all on the demon, and getting away with this on the PBS's NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. Tim Judah acknowledged Appendix B, but he made it into a "sort of military wish list," even if "more expansive than the norm" (Judah, 2000a: 210). He did not mention the State Department official's explanation that suggests a NATO intent to bomb, nor does he consider that this might point to the reason for insertion of the controversial clause.
anitarian Apologetics for NATO's War Crimes
The New Hum
Christopher Hitchens stated that "The NATO intervention repatriated all or most of the refugees and killed at least some of the cleansers. I find I have absolutely no problem with that" (Hitchens, 1999). As more than "cleansers" were killed by NATO, Hitchens failure to mention them, and his complete disinterest in the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Krajina or any need to repatriate them, displays a bias that can accommodate any NATO illegalities, if directed against the Serbs.
Ash describes a number of NATO killings of civilians as "errors," based on highly disputable claims by NATO itself. But he also acknowledges the "deliberate acceptance of civilian casualties" in the bombing of Serbian broadcasting facilities, and that the intentional destruction of Belgrade's electrical power grid not only damaged "the morale" of the population but also "meant that patients on life-support systems and babies in hospital incubators had their power cut off" (Ash, 2000). He displays no indignation here and uses no invidious language: this was only an "acceptance" of civilian casualties, not deliberate killing by any poisoned minds. And he never gives figures on casualties or destruction, nor does he ever point out that these NATO actions violate international legal prohibitions against targeting civilian facilities and therefore constitute war crimes.
Developments in NATO-Occupied Kosovo
As with NATO war crimes, the New Hum
anitarians have largely evaded addressing the inhumanitarian developments in NATO-occupied Kosovo. Like the mainstream media, they have failed to report and reflect on the massive ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Roma and others, which violates U.N. obligations under Security Council Resolution 1244, and also contradicts the alleged hum anitarian aim of the war. They were exceedingly indignant about the alleged ethnic cleansing in Kosovo before the bombing, which the German Foreign Office even denied being ethnic cleansing at all, and which the KLA (with U.S. connivance) was positively encouraging. But the real, ecumenical ethnic cleansing under NATO occupation doesn't upset them at all. Rieff says that "for the first time in the post-cold-war period ethnic cleansing was reversed" (Rieff, 1999d). Passionately indignant about ethnic cleansing and "genocide" in Bosnia and in Kosovo before the NATO occupation, Rieff is not bothered that ethnic cleansing was not only not ended, but has instead been turned against the remaining ethnic minorities. Instead, he apologizes for this as "the law of revenge," and says that "the Serbs are leaving, and there is very little the United Nations or KFOR can do to stem the exodus" (ibid.)
We may note that when the Serbs allegedly retaliated after six teenagers were slaughtered by the KLA, this reflected Serb racism, not a "law of revenge." Note also the benign language for the reverse ethnic cleansing—the Serbs "are leaving" in an "exodus," with no explicit mention of several thousand killed or disappeared as an exit inducement, whereas the wartime flight of the Kosovo Albanians was a monstrous and evil thing.
Rieff says that war permitted the return of the "Kosovars" (i.e., Kosovo Albanians), "a tremendous accomplishment." But the war was by his own admission the thing that drove them out. Also, that wartime flight created much hatred and a spirit of revenge, but Rieff and his fellow New Hum
Rieff even misleads with his "law of revenge," because, as Jiri Dienstbier points out, "What is happening in Kosovo is not some sort of revenge of ordinary ethnic Albanians" against the remaining Serbs—it is an highly organized, systematic policy of expulsion carried out by "Albanian extremists" (2000b) protected by NATO and implementing that minority's long drive for an ethnically pure Kosovo and Greater Albania.
Why 40,000 U.N. troops couldn't do anything about the reverse ethnic cleansing Rieff fails to explain. Ash also notes the reverse ethnic cleansing of Serbs "under the very noses of NATO troops," although failing to mention the ethnic cleansing of Roma, Turks, and others also (Garton Ash, 2000b). But while Serbia's alleged ethnic cleansing justified NATO bombing for Ash, he does not suggest that this severe case of "reverse" ethnic cleansing should be curbed perhaps by a bit of NATO bombing!
Ash, following the NATO party line claiming that the intervention was based not only on hum
Ash, at least, honestly recognizes that Kosovo under NATO is "an almighty mess," and that not only Serbs, but "Albanian women are afraid to go out at night in Pristina, for fear of being kidnapped into forced prostitution by the Albanian mafia, which has moved into the province with a vengeance" (Ash, 2000a). Rieff, on the other hand, like Hitchens, Ignatieff, and Williams, a more committed and unrestrained propagandist, says "There is something magical and heartening about walking through the streets of Pristina...and seeing young people who grew up fearful in a Serb police state finally getting to behave like normal teenagers" (Rieff, 2000b).
The New Hum
The New Hum
In the New World Order, with an unchallenged superpower pursuing global interests, there has been a strong tendency for the United States and its allies to use force to achieve their geopolitical ends. There is not the slightest reason to believe that this use of force will be directed toward advancing human rights, although that will surely be part of the cover as it has been in the past. This is new order imperialism, even if not characterized by direct imperial rule. By helping sustain that moral cover, and sanctioning the abandonment of the rule of law in the purported interest of human rights, the New Hum
For those among us who renounce the faith that we are living in a "Grotian moment," a "time of deep transition from the statist framework of Westphalia to some differently constituted, emergent, and normatively enhanced world order" following the "end of the Cold war" and the "stability, bipolar geopolitical discipline, and conflictual behavior associated with Cold War practices" (Falk, 1998: 5-6), and yet who still want to avoid living in a world dominated by the Great Powers, one anarchical, and reminiscent of Hobbes's "natural condition of mankind," in which "every man is an enemy to every man," "nothing can be unjust" because nothing can be just, and "notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place," except when the Great Powers say they do—we are not living in auspicious times.
---- Endnotes ----
1. On the media's crucial role in promoting the war, see Ali (ed.) (2000); and Hammond and Herman (eds.) (2000).
2. On NATO's real but less than hum
3. See Chesterman (2001: 220-225). A survey of the history of alleged "hum
4. Of course, Robertson neglects to mention that NATO's was clearly an aggressive war, and therefore in direct contravention of the laws of war.
5. The nature and "logic" of the constitutional crisis that led to Yugoslavia's violent breakup is best exemplified by the oft-quoted, oft-misrepresented, and perhaps apocryphal quip attributed to a Macedonian political figure: "Why should I be a minority in your State, when you can be a minority in mine?" Or in Dobrica Cosic's wonderful phrase, "the reasons for [Yugoslavia's] birth [in 1918] were the same as those for its death."
6. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 1863.
7. "Counterrevolutionary" in this context was a Titoist term for any nationalist act that undermined the "Yugoslav" ideal. Though grotesquely misrepresented by the bulk of the literature on Yugoslavia's breakup, often to the point of inversion, Slobodan Milosevic devoted the bulk of both his infamous April 24, 1987, and his even more infamous June 28, 1989, speeches at Kosovo Polje to the threat that ethnic nationalism posed to the integrity ("brotherhood and unity") of the Yugoslav state. See Milosevic (1987); and Milosevic (1989).
8. Yugoslavia officially recognized six distinct "nations" (i.e., Serb, Croat, Slovene, Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Muslim), and another 18 different "nationalities" (i.e., minority groups smaller than the six recognized "nations").
9. Unfortunately, we lack the space here to adequately review the interrelationships between each of these decisive factors. But amid the avalanche of misleading, and we believe simply biased, literature to be have been written about the breakup of Yugoslavia from the onset of the constitutional crisis through the war over Kosovo and its aftermath, we find the following works (among others) stand out from the rest for the quality and depth of their presentations: Cohen (1995); Woodward (1995a); Burg and Shoup (1999); Chandler (1999); Hayden (1999a); Cohen (2001); and Johnstone (2002).
10. Note that we say "civil wars" rather than civil war in order to distinguish between the bona fide civil war of 1998, which was largely ended by the October 1998 agreement the Milosevic government and the Contact Group (though note that the KLA was neither a signatory to this agreement nor did they at any time cease their hostilities towards Serbian forces and civilians), and the much graver fighting and destruction that took place during NATO's springtime war of 1999.
11. Within Yugoslavia, the two areas that saw the greatest changes in their ethnic composition between the end of the Second World War and the outbreak of armed hostilities in 1991 were the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian province of Kosovo. According to the 1961 census data, the ethnic breakdown of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 42.8 % Serb, 25.6 % Muslim, 21.7 % Croat, 8.4 % Yugoslav, and 1.5 % Others; the same data for 1991 were 43.7 % Muslim, 31.4 % Serb, 17.3 % Croat, 5.5 % Yugoslav, and 2.1 % Others. And in the Serbian province of Kosovo in 1961, the ethnic breakdown was 67 % Albanian, 23.5 % Serb, 3.9 % Montenegrin, and 5.6 % Others; the same data for 1991 were (roughly) 90 % Albanians, and 10 % Serbs and Others combined. See Lampe (1999: 337), summarizing official census data.
12. As we show in Part Three, the New Hum
13. On October 13, 1998, NATO issued Activation Orders (ACTORDs) "for both internal air strikes and a phased air campaign in Yugoslavia, execution of which will begin in approximately 96 hours….The responsibility is on President Milosevic's shoulders. He knows what he has to do." See "Statement by the Secretary General Following Decision on the ACTORDs, 13 October 1998," in Weller (ed.) (1999: 278).
14. Evidence for our claim that the situation in Kosovo was "relatively stable" between the October 1998 signing of this agreement and the start of NATO's bombing on March 24, 1999, derives primarily from the lack of evidence to the contrary that has been produced by official sources such as NATO itself and its member governments, the OSCE, the State Department, and, most important, the evidence documented by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's three indictments of Slobodan Milosevic et al. for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo. See the review of the actual evidence in Chomsky (2000: 94-147).
15. We caution that estimates of deaths both during and after the war vary, and no definitive accounting has yet to be produced. Our own very tentative estimate of the approximate maximum total number of deaths derives from the combined total of known deaths within Kosovo during the war as of 2000 (3,658) and the International Committee of the Red Cross's total of people missing and unaccounted for (3,525, of which 2,746 were ethnic Albanians, and 779 from other ethnic groups). See (Del Ponte, 2000); and (ICRC, 2001a; 2001b; 2001c). It would seem highly improbable for the actual total to exceed the sum of these numbers, and may very well turn out to be considerably less.
16. After the war, The Economist magazine's Intelligence Unit estimated that Yugoslavia alone (Kosovo included) suffered some $64 billion in combined real physical damage and lost output and income going forward, with its per capita income now "below that of Albania, hitherto the poorest country in Europe." See Agence France Presse (1999); Associated Press (1999); and McClean (1999).
17. According to the OSCE's (1999a: "Forced Expulsions") data on refugee movements during the bombing, the percentage of the prewar ethnic Albanian population that fled Kosovo during NATO's war was approx. 43 percent of the pre-bombing total; but for that of ethnic Serbs, it was even higher—approximately 50 percent, or at least one-half of the pre-bombing population.
18. As Robert M. Hayden explains the "logic" of the classical European nation-state: "The basic problem is that with the success of the ideology of the ethnic state, many identifiable populations have refused to be contained within existing borders. Where populations are not overly intermingled, partition could be accomplished relatively cleanly, as with the separation of the Czech lands from Slovakia, or Slovenia from Croatia. Where populations were intermingled, however, rejection of the state by a large portion of its putative population could only mean disaster. Their secession would lead to the expulsion of the new minority, but preserving borders on the grounds as well as on paper would require either the subjugation of rejectionist groups or their expulsion. Bosnia's agony was determined by the success of the Slovenian and Croatian rejection of the common state" (Hayden, 1999a: 151).
19. As Michael Ignatieff wrote in his exchange with Robert Skidelsky, "Western intelligence confirms that Operation Horseshoe was already underway before the first NATO air-strikes." That no evidence has ever been publicized to corroborate this claim, aside from the public statements of Western intelligence and political figures, clearly does not trouble this New Hum
20. Actually, M. Cherif Bassiouni has worn both hats: That of the New Hum
21. It is worth noting that among the socially sanctioned rewards that have been handed out to the New Hum
22. Clearly, there is much overlap in how we classify these figures, and no rigid classification of them could do justice to the lot.
23. In a beautiful corroboration of what C. Wright Mills might have called the "social composition of the higher circles" of New Hum
24. For example, "Garton Ash right again," Tim Judah writes (Judah, 1999); "Superb," Michael Ignatieff says of David Rieff's work (Ignatieff, 1995); and "an immensely wide-ranging intellect," Rieff in turn says of Ignatieff (Rieff, 2000c). But when he reviewed
25. Among the Human Rights Watch Board members with ties to the U.S. government, note that Board member Morton Abramowitz was a high-ranking State Department official, a former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey; Paul Goble is the director of the U.S. propaganda news network otherwise known as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Kati Marton is the president of the Committee to Protect Journalists and the wife of Richard Holbrooke; and Warren Zimmermann was the last U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia during its breakup.
26. The KPC, inaugurated in September 1999 and modeled on the U.S. National Guard, was recruited from the KLA. Kouchner stated that it had an "emergency response" function "with a mandate to providing hum
27. We say "Westphalian" here because we have noticed a pronounced tendency for the work of the New Hum
28. See Gibbs (2001).
29. See Herman and McChesney (1997).
30. Data based on a byline search using the Nexis database of 18 print media from the U.S., the U.K., and Canada (i.e., the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Time Magazine, Newsweek, The Nation, and the New Republic; the Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Financial Times, the Guardian, the Independent, and the New Statesman; and the Toronto Star, Ottawa Citizen, Gazette (Montreal), Vancouver Sun, and Calgary Herald) for articles published by our sample of 12 New Hum
31. See Brownlie (2000). Also see John Laughland, "Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Achieving Universal Justice?" and Jon Holbrook, "Humanitarian Intervention and the Recasting of International Law," in David Chandler, Ed., Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 38 - 56, and pp. 136 - 154, respectively.
* Agence France Presse (1999a) "War damage may cost Yugoslavia 60 billion dollars," August 22.
Agence France Press (1999b) "Kosovo Commander Denies War Crimes in Croatia," October 12.
* Ali, Tariq (ed.) (2000) Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade. New York: Verso.
* Amin, Samir (1994) Re-Reading the Postwar Period: An Intellectual Itinerary, trans. Michael Wolfers. New York: Monthly Review Press.
* Ash, Timothy Garton (1999) History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s. New York: Random House, 147.
* Ash, Timothy Garton (2000a) "We Are Losing the Peace in Kosovo," Independent, January 18.
* Ash, Timothy Garton (2000b) "The war we almost lost: Was NATO's Kosovo campaign a legitimate response to a hum
* Associated Press (1999) "Kosovo War will make Yugoslavia Europe's poorest nation," August 22.
* Associated Press State & Local Wire (2000) "Order of Lincoln Medallion to go to six Illinoisans," December 27.
* Bogdanich, George and Martin Lettmayer (2000) Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War (documentary film). USA: Frontier Theater Film.
* Brownlie, Ian (2000) "Memorandum submitted by Professor Ian Brownlie," House of Commons, Foreign Affairs—Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence, May 23, [http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/28ap03.htm].
* Beaumont, Peter, Ed Vulliamy and Paul Beaver (2001), "CIA's bastard army ran riot in Balkans," The Observer (London), March 11.
* Canepa, Eric (trans.) (1999) "Important Internal Documents from Germany's Foreign Office Regarding Pre-Bombardment Genocide in Kosovo," [http://www.suc.org/kosovo_crisis/documents/ger_gov.html].
* Cassese, Antonio (1999) "Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Hum
* Chandler, David (1999) Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton. London: Pluto Press, 1999.
* Chandler, David (2001) "Faking Democracy and Progress in Kosovo—BHHRG Report on the Provincial Elections, 17 November 2001," British Helsinki Human Rights Group, [http://www.bhhrg.org/faking_democracy_and_progress_in1.htm].
* Chandler, David (2002a) Human Rights and International Intervention: Reassessing the Ethical Agenda. London: Pluto Press.
* Chandler, David (ed.) (2002b), Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
* Chomsky, Noam (1999) The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press.
* Chomsky, Noam (2000) A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor, and the Standards of the West. New York: Verso.
* Clark, Wesley K. (2001) Waging Modern War. New York: Public Affairs.
* Clinton, Bill (1999a) "In the President's Words: 'We Act to Prevent a Wider War," New York Times, March 25, 1999.
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* Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
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* Erlanger, Steven (1999) "Monitors Provide Chronicle of Kosovo Terror," New York Times, Dec. 5 1999.
* Falk, Richard (1995) On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
* Falk, Richard (1998) Law in an Emerging Global Village: A Post-Westphalian Perspective. Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc.
* Falk, Richard (2001) "In Defense of 'Just War' Thinking," The Nation, December 24.
* Gibbs, David N. (2001) "Washington's New Interventionism: U.S. Hegemony and Inter-Imperialist Rivalries," Monthly Review, September.
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* Goldstone, Richard J. (2000) For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
* Gow, James (1996) Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. New York: Columbia University Press.
* Gutman, Roy and David Rieff (eds.) (1999) Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
* Habermas, Jürgen (2000) "Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Law and Morality," in William Joseph Buckley (ed.) Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B Eerdmans Publishing Company.
* Hammond, Philip and Edward S. Herman (eds.) (2000), Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis. Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press.
* Hartman, Florence (2001) "Will Slobodan Milosevic Receive a Fair Trial?" Transcript # 112301cb.k18, November 23.
* Havel, Vaclav (1998) trans. Paul Wilson et al., The Art of the Impossible: Politics as Morality and Practice. Speeches and Writings, 1990—1996. New York: Fromm International.
* Havel, Vaclav (1999) "Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State," New York Review of Books, June 10.
* Hayden, Robert M. (1992) "Yugoslavia: Where Self-Determination Meets Ethnic Cleansing," New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4, Fall, 1992.
* Hayden, Robert M. (1998) "Bosnia: The Contradictions of 'Democracy' without Consent," East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 1998, [http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol7num2/special/bosnia.html ].
* Hayden, Robert M. (1999a) Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
* Hayden, Robert M. (1999b) in Doug Henwood, "A Very European War," Alternative Press Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, Spring/Summer, [http://www.altpr.org/apr11/apr11_henwood.html ].
* Hayden, Robert (1999c) "Biased 'Justice': Humanrightsism and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia," Cleveland State Law Review, 47 Clev. St. L. Rev. 549.
* Held, David (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
* Henkin, Louis (1990) The Age of Rights. New York: Columbia University Press.
* Herman, Edward S. and Robert McChesney (1997) The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism. London: Cassell Academic.
* Hitchens, Christopher (1995) "Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia," The Nation, October 23.
* Hitchens, Christopher (1999) "Genocide and the Body-Baggers," The Nation, Nov. 29.
* Hitchens, Christopher (2001a) "Of Sin, the Left, and Islamic Fascism," The Nation (webpage only), September 24, [http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=special&s=hitchens20010924 ].
* ICRC (2000) "ICRC News 00/45," November 24, 2000, [ ].
* ICRC (2001a) Book of the Missing, [http://www.familylinks.icrc.org/kosovo ].
* ICRC (2001b) "More than 3,500 still missing in Kosovo," Agence France Presse, April 10.
* ICRC (2001c) "Red Cross Book on Kosovo Grows to 3,525 names," AP Worldstream, April 10.
* ICRC (2001d) "The Mission," [http://www.icrc.org/HOME.NSF/060a34982cae624ec12566fe00326312/125ffe2d4c7f68acc1256ae300394f6e?OpenDocument] .
* ICTY (2001) "The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic," [http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii011122e.htm].
* Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000) The Kosovo Report. [http://www.kosovocommission.org ].
* Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2001) The Follow Up: Why Conditional Independence? [http://www.kosovocommission.org ].
* Ignatieff, Michael (1995) "The Hopeless War," New York Times Book Review, February 25.
* Ignatieff, Michael (1997) "The Elusive Goal of War Trials," Harper's, March.
* Ignatieff, Michael (1998) "When Force Is the only Language for Liberals," Sunday Times, Feb. 22.
* Ignatieff, Michael (1999a) "Only in truth can Serbs find peace: There is racism everywhere in Europe, but only in Serbia is racial contempt an official ideology," Calgary Herald, June 26.
* Ignatieff, Michael (1999b) "Counting Bodies In Kosovo," New York Times, Nov. 21.
* Ignatieff, Michael (2000a) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. New York: Metropolitan Books.
* Ignatieff, Michael (2000b) "The Next President's Duty to Intervene," New York Times, Feb. 13.
* Ignatieff, Michael (2000c) "A Bungling U.N. Undermines Itself," New York Times, May 15.
* Ignatieff, Michael (2000d) The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Transcript 6,740, May 31.
* Ignatieff, Michael (2000e) "The Reluctant Imperialist," New York Times Magazine, Aug. 6.
* Ignatieff, Michael (2000f) "The Right Trial for Milosevic," New York Times, Oct. 10.
* Johnstone, Diana (2000) "NATO and the New World Order: Ideals and Self-Interest," in Phillip Hammond and Edward S. Herman, Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis. London: Pluto Press, 7 - 18.
* Johnstone, Diana (2002) Fool's Crusade: NATO's Conquest of Yugoslavia. London: Pluto Press.
* Judah, Tim (1999) "Garton Ash right again," The Herald, July 15.
* Judah, Tim (2000a) Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
* Judah, Tim (2000b) "Is Milosevic Planning Another Balkan War?" Scotland on Sunday, March 19.
* Kaldor, Mary (1999) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, California: Sanford University Press.
* Kegley, Charles. W. Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond (2002), Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium. (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
* Keith, Rollie, in "Failure of Diplomacy" (1999) The Democrat (Canada), May.
* Kenney, George (1998) "Kosovo: a Short History," The Nation, July 6.
* Kenney, George (1999) "Rolling Thunder: the Rerun," The Nation, June 14.
* Kolko, Gabriel (1994) Century of War: Politics, Conflicts, and Society Since 1914. New York: The New Press.
* Kouchner, Bernard (1999a) "Establish a Right to Intervene against War, Oppression; It's Time for a Global Moral Code that Can Stop Wars Before They Start and Murderers Before They Kill," Los Angeles Times, Oct. 18.
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* Kouchner, Bernard (1999c) in Vladimir Radomirovic, The Reporter (Banja Luka) December 22, [http://www.cdsp.neu.edu/info/students/marko/reporter9.html ].
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* Loquai, Brigadier General Heinz (2000) Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Wege in einen vermeidbaren Krieg ("The Kosovo Conflict: A War That Could Have Been Avoided"). Baden-Baden: Nomos.
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* MccGwire, Michael (2000) "Why did we bomb Belgrade?" International Affairs, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, January-March.
* McClean, James (1999) "Yugoslavia 'will be poorest man in Europe'," The Evening Standard, August 24.
* Mills, C. Wright (1956) The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.
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