Pat Devine's criticism of Parecon structure
By Bernard Leask at May 01, 2009 |
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Hi Mike,
After reading Devine's review of Parecon in Historical Materialism, as well as your reply, I think it might be worth trying to excavate the actual (possibly subtle) differences.
One issue that I think accounts for a significant part of Devine's critical disposition towards Parecon has to do with the desirable composition of a governing council of a production unit.
Devine's vision for the composition of a governing production council bases itself on a concept of social ownership. From your response to Devine: "In Devine's own words, he seeks "social ownership, defined as ownership by the different groups affected by the use of the assets involved in proportion to the degree they are affected." Well, with a little caveat, I wholeheartedly agree with this." (Michael Albert- Devine on Parecon http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/14609.)
In reality it seems that you and Devine take a different interpretation of this principle and its implications. For Devine there are aspects of decisions involved in the government of the production process of individual units that significantly impact third parties; he believes therefore that these third parties should be represented on the governing councils of production units. One of the primary functions of the governing council is to discover and articulate the social interest in relation to the production unit's activities. The workers council in the production unit has autonomy over choices involving the utilization of the production unit's resources in light of the framework established in the participatory process of discovery and articulation amongst the appropriate combination of social owners.
In Devine's own words: "While the governing bodies of production units would be representative of those affected by their activities, including their workers, internal organization would be on the basis of self-management. This would further decentralize decision-making to those affected. Once its governing body had defined the social interest in relation to a production unit's activities, decisions on how best to use the unit's resources to further that interest would be made by those working in the production unit. They would be in possession of the most local level of knowledge and would be best placed to use that knowledge effectively in the social interest." (Devine, Pat. Democracy and Economic Planning, 49)
I believe that your response to Devine was impaired by misunderstandings that stemmed from the fact you were only relying on hints about Devine's visionary proposal that were contained in the book review. Devine's critical stance perhaps becomes clearer with detailed knowledge of his vision. Putting oneself in his shoes: it is obvious to ask why in your Parecon, consumer's interests or the interests of elements of civil society impacted by the unit's activity, or the significant suppliers of intermediate inputs, etc are not actively involved in the governing council of the production unit along with workers?
In the part of your reply concerning the interrelation of a participatory economy with the wide body of citizens you characterize this interaction by relating the constraints that citizen's interests might wish to put on the economy. The examples you give: "laws against killing owls, to give a simple example, or health codes, zoning laws, labor laws, trade norms, and so on." appear to describe, almost exclusively, external restrictions of parecon activity by the citizenry whereas in Devine's vision its seems that the proposed social structure involves a more fully integrated relationship between the political and economic spheres. Can you please discuss these differences?



By Albert, Michael at May 02, 2009 07:11 AM
Hi Bernard...
Honestly, I don't remember an exchange with Pat Devine - Robin is friends with Pat and has had considerable interactions, I think...but I will try to answer your questions...below...if I can discern the context, etc.
You say, "For Devine there are aspects of decisions involved in the government of the production process of individual units that significantly impact third parties; he believes therefore that these third parties should be represented on the governing councils of production units. One of the primary functions of the governing council is to discover and articulate the social interest in relation to the production unit's activities. The workers council in the production unit has autonomy over choices involving the utilization of the production unit's resources in light of the framework established in the participatory process of discovery and articulation amongst the appropriate combination of social owners."
In fact, every economic decision impacts, to some extent, everyone. This is not hard to understand. If we use some resources to produce a shirt, we can't use them to do something else. The something else could be pretty much anything else, and therefore using the resources for the shirt affected anyone who could have gotten the other thing, or worked on the other thing, or its inputs, etc.
The point is, an economy is a holistic system - each part of which impacts the context of all others parts - we might ignore that at times, or we might not care, but it is true.
So the optimal solution to approximating perfect self management will entail deciding economic outcomes - the overall inputs and outputs - the overall plan - largely simultaneously, so that each part is consciously rather than only implicitly setting the context for the rest. If an economy cannot go that, then a political apparatus might be employed/imposed in hopes of getting closer to good process.
Of course if you work in a plant making bicycles - then, yes, you are more affected by its operations than someone who will get a bike, even, and certainly than someone impacted by what the plant is doing only tangentially...though perhaps less so than someone who lives next door and is getting sumped on - but all are impacted, though to differing extents. The trick is to find an allocation system that arrives at overarching inputs and outputs for the plant and for the economy, and also at the basics of compatible operational schemes and schedules within units, as part of a single large decision making process - of course one that is refinable, etc. - that conveys to actors self managing influence and also communicates full social costs and benefits so that decisions are taken smartly rather than in biased settings that pervert outcomes.
Then you quote Devine saying... "While the governing bodies of production units would be representative of those affected by their activities, including their workers, internal organization would be on the basis of self-management. This would further decentralize decision-making to those affected. Once its governing body had defined the social interest in relation to a production unit's activities, decisions on how best to use the unit's resources to further that interest would be made by those working in the production unit. They would be in possession of the most local level of knowledge and would be best placed to use that knowledge effectively in the social interest." (Devine, Pat. Democracy and Economic Planning, 49)
I don't know what you are asking, here - in parecon, inside a firm workers are choosing how to organize their labors, etc. etc. They do it in context of a simultaneous (during the planning period ... and also later during refinements) cooperative negotation of all inputs and outputs. But the idea that awareness of local conditions bears on making good local decisions applies in parecon, of course. When Devine says that inside the plant there would be self management - but implies that there wouldn't be in the broader determinations - I don't see why. It can be true of both...as it is in parecon.
If I remember right, the central difference between Devine and parecon is his willingness and even eagerness, again I am trying to remember and not sure, to utilize markets for most goods and services - though not the most complex investment projects, etc. Once you opt for economic structures that aren't self managing, or aren't even democratic, then, yes, the issue arises of how to utilize the polity to improve the economy, regulate it, etc.
Then you say: "I believe that your response to Devine was impaired by misunderstandings that stemmed from the fact you were only relying on hints about Devine's visionary proposal that were contained in the book review. Devine's critical stance perhaps becomes clearer with detailed knowledge of his vision. Putting oneself in his shoes: it is obvious to ask why in your Parecon, consumer's interests or the interests of elements of civil society impacted by the unit's activity, or the significant suppliers of intermediate inputs, etc are not actively involved in the governing council of the production unit along with workers?"
I am now confused by both what he is saying - not really presented here, and also what you are asking.
Make it simple, a bicycle plant. The consumers of bikes, those who would rather have other things who live all over, those in the area who may hear noise or breathe fumes, etc., are all affected. But the most significant effects on them has to do with the level of the operations of the plant, how much it produces, and to an extent with what choices of technique (pollution, etc.) - and then more broadly with whether it is doing anything internally that would yield negative by products, social hierarchies, etc. The latter problem, which is the only reason for those outside to be concerned about what occurs inside, other than due to implications of what occurs inside for the neighbors, environment, inputs and outputs, is ruled out by the norms and structures of parecon. The former issue is quite real, however, which is why the plan for the factory's output level is worked out in the planning process which involves a cooperative negotiation with the consumers of bikes, and by way of interconnections with all consumers, including those consuming ecological by products, and with other producers, etc.. But suppose you are a worker in the plant. A proposal for x bikes to be made, but with only y workers, or z inputs, does have major implications for you. It sets a context for your determination of the plant's internal procedures, etc. So when you engage in the planning process, you do so in full light, of course, of implications for your work day, work time, etc. etc. Similarly, if society wanted x bikes, say, but you wanted to utilize 4y workers (way more) that would have implications for everyone, arguably wasting assets.
So settling on a mesh of inputs and outputs for the plantand all plants is the planning task, carried out for each plant, however, entwined with the whole rest of the plan. But it also is carried out in context of the implications within the plants, as affecting the workers. However, what about deciding if you work in the morning and I in the afternoon, in the bicycle plant, say, or vice versa? Or deciding what the components of your balanced job complex are, or of mine, or the whole menu of them in the plant - and so on. In context of a cooperatively negotiated plan, these refinements are overwhelmingly about the situation of the local workers and therefore settled by them.
In fact, in other words, delivering self management means addressing all this, at least up to the point of diminishing returns, in one large social project - but certainly conveying much more influence to local workers, even work teams, about their own local situations, then to outsiders - even while outsiders do greatly impact those choices by impacting the overall schedule of inputs and outputs. I hope that is clear...
You continue: "In the part of your reply concerning the interrelation of a participatory economy with the wide body of citizens you characterize this interaction by relating the constraints that citizen's interests might wish to put on the economy. The examples you give: "laws against killing owls, to give a simple example, or health codes, zoning laws, labor laws, trade norms, and so on." appear to describe, almost exclusively, external restrictions of parecon activity by the citizenry whereas in Devine's vision its seems that the proposed social structure involves a more fully integrated relationship between the political and economic spheres. Can you please discuss these differences?
I think you have the differences backwards, actually. The examples you are talking about are non economic impositions on the economy. They are instances of deciding that whatever the freely operating economic logic of the system might have led to, we are going to decide that this and that are ruled out, or this and that must occur, and we are going to impose those results on the economy. So that's the polity setting laws or standards, etc. etc. There is a sense in which saying firms must have balanced job complexes is an example of this, as well.
The reason you might think of that as the only democratic variable is a kind of supposition that the economy itself can't be democratic, or even account for social mattes, etc. etc. - which are reasonable views about capitalism, and even market or centrally planned systems, but not parecon.
Within economic life itself, everyone in a parecon is via self management in units and via participatory planning between units, appropriately influencing all decisions, and even comes to understand this and to function in clear cognizance of it. To transfer or give lots of economic power to the polity, and particularly to some kind of elite political apparatus, is not really a good thing, but rather a kind of necessary imposition, at times. Giving polities lots of economic power can have varied implications. For example, in a market capitalist system or a centrally planned or market coordinator system, some government say over economic life can impose on it a degree of social responsibility or even democratic control - or, conversely, it could also even more dramatically remove from the purview of those affected what limited say over their situation they have and in place of that, allow some typically elite political agency to have massive power. Stalinism is coordinatorism with major state power over economic life (plus dictatorship). Fascism is capitalism with major state power over economic life (plus dictatorship). In parecon the situation is different. The economy is self managing. There is no more reason to think we ought to have the political apparatus make purely economic decisions than that we ought to have an industry council make broad social legislation or judicial decisions.
In an economy, take some big decision - do we have a major solar investment project? Now, if the economy can't generate self managing influence over that - for example in a market or centrally planned system - then, yes, you might want a democratic polity to try to stand in and do better, even with the potential dangers that are associated. But if the economy can address pretty much all economic matters in a self managing way, then there is no point shifting the locus of decision making over to the polity.
The thing about parecon is the economy is self managing - it incorporate social decision making as fully as it needs to be or can be incorporated - without asking a polity to decide.
So when do you need the polity? Well, take a pandemic - you need very swift and potentially forceful actions to be taken, empowered, etc. So that's a good example. Or take banning killing owls. A parecon will not make that decision based on the well being of owls. But a polity might. Or take the rule that firms cannot have wage slaves, etc. There is a place for the polity - political matters. But it doesn't need to oversee the economy because the economy is already, internally, intrinsically, as self managing as the polity - and perhaps even more so.
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