The AFL-CIO Split

In wage terms, de-unionization since 1980 has meant a massive transfer of income from the 100 million or so working class Americans and their families to corporations and the wealthy who live primarily off the proceeds of those corporations (i.e., stock sales, dividends, interest and rent, forms of executive compensation, etc.). For example, assuming the unionization rate today in 2005 were the 22 percent in 1980, an historical union-nonunion wage differential of about 27 percent, and an average hourly wage of $15.89 at the end of 2004 (in 2003 adjusted dollars), such conservative assumptions yield a total savings to corporations due to de-unionization alone of $99.3 billion. That’s just for  2004. 

In addition, the $99.3 billion doesn’t account for additional corporate savings due to reductions in health benefits, pensions, paid leave, and other costs also due to de-unionization that easily add another 25- 40 percent to the total. Nor does it account for similar corporate savings over the preceding 24 years since 1980. The cumulative net result for the corporate U.S. since 1980 runs easily in the trillions of dollars. 

The Density Debate 

U nion density is a measure of the percent of total workers organized. At one level the debate between the CTW and AFL-CIO unions is about how to increase the union density rate from its current historic lows of 12.5 percent and 7.8 percent. But numbers of union members are only part of the story. The equally important issue is how those numbers of union members are distributed across industries and how much bargaining power they can wield. Bargaining density is thus about the concentration of membership in an industry. It is about whether workers are scattered across countless unions and contracts, or concentrated in fewer unions and within larger regional or national contracts. The related concept of political density is similarly important. 

The split in the AFL-CIO is thus not just about organizing new members and how much money and resources to commit to that task, as it has at times been reported in the press. It is about how to concentrate unions and union bargaining power once again. The split is also about what is the best path for restoring political density. Does it makes sense to continue to throw hundreds of millions of union members’ dollars at politicians in elections as union membership freefalls? Or is it better to rebuild the union membership base before doing so. 

The density debate is largely a surrogate for the even more fundamental set of differences over the way  the AFL-CIO is currently structured. The CTW camp maintains the current structure is a major obstacle to implementing changes that are necessary to restore union and bargaining density, which in turn are the prerequisite for later restoring political density. The remaining AFL-CIO unions reject that position, argue the AFL-CIO is basically sound, requiring only minor reforms, and that the way to grow union membership is to reform labor laws that prevent union organizing. Thus, politics is the way to grow membership, which in essence means electing Democratic candidates to office. The question is, What comes first: the commitment of resources and action at the point of production (e.g., organizing, bargaining, strikes, etc.) or political action (electing Democrats to reform labor law)? 

At no time in the past nine months of debate between the two camps, however, has it been clear what structural or organizational changes are necessary. There have been some proposals from some of the unions in the CTW camp, most notably from SEIU, about merging smaller unions into larger ones; some discussion about reducing the size of the executive council of the AFL-CIO, where a host of small, weak unions have virtual collective veto power. But the CTW camp has yet to fully clarify a comprehensive set of organizational reforms. Meanwhile, the unions remaining in the AFL-CIO fall back on their perennial proposal to commit more resources to politics to elect Democrats who will save labor by enacting labor law reform—a proposal that has been unable to get to the floor of Congress for a vote in more than 25 years and shows less likelihood of doing so with each year. 

The unions most heavily devastated by the corporate offensive—both in terms of membership and concession bargaining—have been the manufacturing unions: the steelworkers, autoworkers, paper, rubber, oil, and other such unions. Yet these unions have not led the exodus from the AFL-CIO. They have remained loyal to the status quo and to the leadership team of John Sweeney, president of the AFL-CIO, elected in 1995 and re-elected at the recent AFL-CIO convention this past July. It is appropriate to ask: why? 

One might conclude that the unions suffering the greatest loss in membership would have been the most disgruntled and led the way out of the AFL-CIO—in a repeat of what occurred during the mid-1930s when the industrial unions were those that broke from the old AFL, complaining about an AFL organizational structure that inhibited organizing the unorganized in the new mass production industries. But not this time. 

Instead, it has been largely those unions in the services and related industries who have driven the CTW coalition. Many of the CTW unions are the same unions that a decade ago started a mini-revolution in the AFL-CIO and began to orient toward immigrant, even undocumented workers, and forge a new kind of approach to organizing. 

Organizational Failures 

M any unions suffering large membership losses in their historical jurisdictions (i.e., autoworkers in auto, steelworkers in steel, etc.) have tried to recoup membership (and dues) losses by organizing outside their traditional jurisdiction. Articles 20 and 21 of the AFL-CIO constitution theoretically prevent one union from raiding the members of another under contract with a company. But the AFL-CIO constitution provides no obstacle to another union launching organizing drives where workers are not under a collective bargaining agreement, regardless of the issue of jurisdiction. Thus the Steelworkers organized bus drivers and hospital workers; the Autoworkers have organized freelance writers; Communications Workers have organized city employees. Even AFT, the teachers union, has gone after hospital workers. This has often resulted in a patchwork of balkanized bargaining agreements in a particular industry. Adding to the balkanization have been corporate strategies since 1980 resulting in the break up of once industry-wide and region-wide union bargaining agreements. 

Unions like SEIU, UNITE-HERE, and others in the CTW coalition complain of the inability of the AFL-CIO to regulate this growing fragmentation of bargaining. SEIU has by far the largest proportion of hospital workers organized. When other unions come along and organize a patchwork of small bargaining units in healthcare and then negotiate from a position of weakness, standards are lowered. Often unions with a weak position in the industry settle for far less just to hold on to the membership. 

This situation has been the source of why Andy Stern, president of the SEIU, has called for “forced mergers” of smaller unions in an industry with larger, dominant unions. This idea has evoked a visceral response by other unions trying to organize in new industries out of their jurisdictions. They point to the fact that SEIU at one point had no hospital workers either. They were a janitors union. So why can’t they also organize hospital workers? Sweeney and the AFL-CIO, with Articles 20 and 21, theoretically are supposed to mediate these disputes. But the constitution and the AFL-CIO as structured today has failed to do so, leaving the larger unions in the only growing sector of the economy, the services sector, increasingly frustrated. 

This organizational failure goes one step further, however. SEIU and AFSCME have been raiding each other for years. But raiding has become more aggressive, in particular during the past year. The practice has also threatened to spread among other unions as well. Once again, the AFL-CIO has not been able to check this deteriorating internal trend. 

Another fundamental difference between the two camps is the related question of coordinating bargaining between unions. Across many industries today, corporate management has gotten the upper hand in terms of concession bargaining and has increasingly succeeded in playing off one union against the other in situations where multiple unions negotiate with the same employer. A typical case in point is the newspaper industry where aggressive management typically picks off the weakest (or most terrorized) union in a coordinated bargaining situation, then moves on demanding even more concessions from the remaining unions. The message is clear: agree early and abandon coordinated bargaining and your union might get a little more than the others this time (or we’ll lay them off and not your members). A mini-race to the bottom occurs. 

The CTW coalition unions demand that weaker unions be prevented from undermining other contracts in such situations. The CTW camp would argue the answer is to merge smaller, weaker unions—those that are willing to accept concessions more quickly and easily—into one or just a couple unions to face the same employer. However, other unions agreeing to less point to the right of union members to accept whatever contract they want. That’s basic union democracy, they argue. The AFL-CIO lacks the structure or authority to enforce such CTW demands or even the right to mediate such internal disputes. 

The CTW unions have publicly expressed frustration with the current political process and the hundreds of millions of dollars in union dues money given to politicians, largely Democrats, with little or nothing to show for it the past two decades. In contrast, the remaining AFL-CIO unions point with pride to the increasingly efficient get-out-the-vote apparatus of the AFL-CIO, especially since 1995. They note, accurately so, that organized labor has increased the turnout of union voters in the last several campaigns and point out, without that effort, the vote for Democratic candidates would have been much less and the party would have suffered even greater losses. The CTW unions counter that it means little to turn out a greater percentage of union members to vote when the total membership available to vote is falling so rapidly. Turning out 80 percent today is less than turning out 40 percent 20 years ago. That money could be better spent elsewhere. 

Critics of this will argue that SEIU and other CTW unions have been spending extraordinarily large sums on Democrats in recent elections so they are not increasingly disenchanted with the political process as is. But one might counter in turn they could not have been expected to do otherwise while still within the AFL-CIO structure. The true test of their attitude on this question is yet to be seen, and must await the outcome of the upcoming CTW convention on September 27 and how it formulates its own new political action strategy. 

Yet another factor underlying the split has been the differences in cultural outlook and even personality conflicts between the leadership of the CTW and AFL-CIO camps. It is not a question of Andy Stern vs. John Sweeney and who will be the powerbroker appointing the new head of the AFL-CIO. Behind John Sweeney lie the AFL-CIO “hardliners” who have contributed their part to the split. They are Gerald McEntee of AFSCME, the AFT, and the CWA —and perhaps USWA’s Gerard. Nor can it be ignored that differences in culture and personality have exacerbated the internal conflicts. With nearly every critique of Stern or John Wilhelm (president of HERE) by the remaining AFL-CIO hardliners, there is an accompanying sneering reference to their college backgrounds and education. Their origins in the student and civil rights movements of the 1960s are viewed derisively in some quarters of the AFL-CIO. In terms of cultural orientation, a number of the leaders of the remaining AFL-CIO also still feel quite uneasy about the corporate campaign/community alliance approaches of unions like SEIU and HERE, and in particular the unequivocal support of the latter for organizing undocumented workers. For the CTW’s part, it is also no secret that Teamster President James Hoffa has no love lost for AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Richard Trumka.  

The Run-Up to the Split 

I n the weeks and days leading up to the split, Sweeney and the AFL-CIO attempted to bridge the gap between the two camps with concessions. Significant cuts in AFL-CIO personnel were implemented during the spring, a proposal for rebating 30 percent of unions’ per capita dues for organizing, modest changes were proposed in Articles 20 and 21 to strengthen jurisdictions and in coordinated bargaining to prevent the undermining of contracts by smaller and weaker unions, an executive committee would be added to the unwieldy AFL-CIO executive council, and so on. The CTW response, however, was “too little too late.” 

Several tactical moves by Sweeney and others earlier in 2005, at the executive council’s meeting last winter and during the spring, exacerbated the internal conflicts and contributed to the inevitability of the split. Sweeney and others effectively cut off debate on the CTW unions at the council meeting, aggravating the opposition. Sweeney then unceremoniously declared himself the future winner of a new term as head of the AFL-CIO well before any voting at the convention, several weeks before it even convened. Under pressure from his hardliners, he then sent out letters to all the central labor councils and state federation bodies indicating that any union that might leave the AFL-CIO would no longer be allowed to participate in any local central labor council or state body of the AFL-CIO. For its part, the CTW unions began withholding their per capita payments to the AFL-CIO in anticipation of a split months prior as well. Both camps thus began digging in their heels well before the convention. Intensive negotiations by the few unions trying to mediate a solution at the last moment, during the weekend prior to the start of the AFL-CIO convention on July 25, produced little movement of positions by either side. On Sunday, July 24, the process began with SEIU, then Teamsters, and then other unions leaving the convention and disaffiliating from the AFL-CIO. (Although part of the CTW coalition, the Laborers International Union, remains within the AFL-CIO.) 

In the Wake of the Split 

F ollowing the close of the AFL-CIO convention several important developments have emerged. Within days hardliners appear to have stepped up pressure on UNITE-HERE, one of the major unions in the CTW coalition that left the convention, but had not as yet disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO. The CWA, for example, withdrew $50 million in deposits from UNITE-HERE’s labor amalgamated bank in a warning sign that other remaining AFL-CIO unions would soon follow with similar action as well. 

The CTW declared a date of September 27 for its founding convention in Cincinnati. Rumors abound of possible mergers between the CTW unions, as it puts into practice its declaration of the need to consolidate unions to enhance bargaining density and power. Most likely candidates for such will be the Teamsters with one or more of the other unions. 

The AFL-CIO, for its part, has begun to consider further cuts in its operations in addition to those announced this past spring, as more than 20 percent of its budget has disappeared. Meanwhile, Democratic Party leaders are scurrying around meeting with both camps, seeking assurances of future financial support. 

One of the more significant developments, however, is the apparent growing resistance at the grass- roots level of the AFL-CIO central labor councils to  Sweeney’s directive to prohibit CTW unions from participating in the local central labor councils and AFL-CIO state federation of labor bodies. The pressure from below has been significant enough to force Sweeney to undertake a “review” of the prior hardliners’ decision to kick out the CTW unions. That decision has momentous implications for the AFL-CIO in places like California and, in particular, the Southern California/LA area where by far the dominant, most active unions are those of the CTW. A split at this juncture would have serious consequences for many workers there, given the upcoming special elections initiated by Governor Schwarzenegger targeting them. Perhaps in places like Detroit or Pittsburgh, expelling the CTW unions might find some support. But not so in many other places.  

On the other hand, the AFL-CIO’s Building &  Construction Trades Department (BCTD) has gone in the opposite direction, recently ordering all non- AFL-CIO unions to leave the Department and the local building trades councils under it. This hardline move will no doubt force the Laborers International Union, part of the CTW coalition, out of the AFL-CIO and it might cause it to abandon its approach of trying to maintain a presence in both groups. There is some talk of local construction unions forming separate parallel building trades councils on the local level outside the BCTD, in order to continue to cooperate with Teamsters, Laborers, and Carpenters in the CTW. 

It remains to be seen whether more stable heads in the local central labor councils and state bodies can check the hardliner union heads among AFSCME, AFT, and CWA at the national level who appear intent on widening the chasm between the CTW and the AFL-CIO. A better position by the remaining AFL- CIO unions would have been to assume a higher ground during the events leading up to and immediately following the CTW unions’ departure from the convention and their disaffiliation. Instead of driving unions further apart, strategically leaving the “door open” in various ways for one or more of the CTW unions’ eventual return would have been a far smarter approach. But that has not occurred. 

The departure of the CTW unions has already produced some modest reforms by the AFL-CIO that the latter had discussed over the preceding ten years and never came close to acting on. The split has also caused a fluid situation which, at a minimum, opens the possibility for further significant reforms.  

Will the CTW unions create a new form of organization and clearly chart a new course and strategy for labor at their convention—a course that will excite, energize, and mobilize the union membership base? How differently will the CTW be structured? Will they advocate fundamental organizational change while still employing old strategies and tactics? Will the process “begun at the top” expand to the membership “below” to add further impetus to the historic process now set in motion?  Or will they attempt to keep the reins in hand?  If the latter, the process of change and reform will slow, causing further tensions. The corporate offensive that fundamentally underlies this historic split in U.S. labor is not going away. On the contrary, it shows indications of intensifying further, producing an even greater negative impact on workers’ incomes and welfare and on union membership and effectiveness in the years ahead. 

For more fundamental change to occur new levels of union membership will have to be brought into the process, new organizational forms will have to be developed to mobilize from below, and new kinds of union membership should be created that more closely integrate community allies. Initiatives recently begun to establish international bargaining with multinational companies will have to expand and deepen. A massive organizing campaign to bring in a million members each year will need to be launched—not just Wal- Mart, but a “Wal-Mart-like” campaign will be needed every year for the next ten years. Industry-wide bargaining agreements must be restored. A restructured and revitalized grass- roots approach to point of production activities will need to be launched. A new approach to political action undertaken—one that runs independent candidates against targeted politicians outside the Democratic Party, while supporting progressive candidates within it—and simultaneously targeting those in the Democratic Party that “cross the line,” such as those 15 who recently voted for CAFTA. This would not be a party at first, but an independent  “united political coalition” of labor and its natural community allies—a coalition that no longer writes  blank checks for any party or any candidate.