The Crisis of the Global Left: Part One
[Contribution to the Reimagining Society Project hosted by ZCommunications]
This is a moment of great opportunity, but doubtless of even greater danger, both for the Left and for the whole living world. If we can seize the historical initiative, showing through words and deeds that we have the ability and the right to lead civilization, we may yet mitigate the worst aspects of the global crisis, and perhaps even serve as the catalyst for an epochal transformation of our civilization, nudging our respective societies and national cultures onto a more egalitarian, just, and ecologically sustainable path. If, on the other hand, we squander this moment--if we act badly, or fail to act at all--we will likely make matters worse, emboldening the forces of fear and reaction and leaving our own movements with even less room for maneuver in future. Hence the importance of the dialogues begun on this site, concerning the kinds of socio-economic arrangements and institutions we would like to see take shape in the new society: without a clearer sense of who we are, what we want, and where we're headed, we will neither be able to set strategic priorities for our movement, nor to convince those around us of the rightness of our social vision.[i] Should we structure our economy along the lines of Parecon (participatory economics), market socialism, social ecology, or something else entirely? What kinds of alternative banking systems, institutions of governance, communal associations, etc., would best promote the social and ethical values we hold in highest esteem—solidarity, sisterhood and fraternity, political freedom, individual self-determination, radical democracy? These and other questions urgently need to be taken up and debated at every level of our movements, so that we can reach a provisional consensus on the future society and how to bring it about.
Yet what the discussions here have so far failed to confront, or so it seems to me, is the true depth of the Left's despair—the true dimensions of our crisis. Confronted with determined enemies, and facing a crisis that is global, systemic, and multiply over determined, today's scattered forces of the Left stagger about blindly in a state of stunned bewilderment, hemmed in on all sides by political reaction, growing ecological disturbance, and widening social misery. There are hundreds of small, local, citizens-based organizations and movements throughout the world--movements of the oppressed and marginalized, movements to defend nature and other animals from extermination, movements to democratize the state, movements to enfranchise the landless and urban poor, movements to shelter women from the violence of men, movements to defend ethnic and racial minorities from discrimination by the majority. But such movements are uncoordinated; they operate largely in geographical and ideological isolation from one another; and as a result, they confront a deteriorating social order without shared strategic goals or a common vision of the future society. They operate without a shared organizational or institutional structure, without a phenomenal form to give shape, meaning, and presence to their frequently invisible efforts.
Perhaps, were we able to count on another forty or fifty years of relative global stability, we could soldier on much as we do now, reacting to events, consuming ourselves with acts of triage to contain some of the worst excesses of power, all the while holding fast to our belief that spontaneous, primarily local forms of action and militancy can substitute for large-scale and coordinated strategic action. Certainly the obstinate application of grassroots power year after year has ushered in real social progress in some spheres, especially in the realms of civil rights, gay and lesbian rights, and women's equality. What is striking about the social advances of recent decades, however, is that over the same period other foundational systems of violence and domination have been left untouched. Socio-economic conditions for billions of people have worsened, while the power of corporate capital has grown substantially; the ecological predations of global capital have gained momentum; the numbers of sentient beings hunted to extinction, imprisoned in laboratories, or confined in so-called factory farms has rocketed skyward. Meanwhile, because we have failed to make any headway at all in tackling the problem of capitalism, our movements have had no impact on the authoritarian drift and corruption of the liberal democratic state, not to mention on openly autocratic regimes elsewhere. In short, we have had more luck in revealing the disjuncture between liberalism's promise of equal treatment under the law and the treatment of actual people in fact than in undoing the most deeply rooted structures of power and violence in human culture. Thus, in the US, we have made it possible for African-Americans to vote--yet the national and international racial division of labor remains intact. We have won sex harrassment legislation—yet women are universally degraded in popular culture and pornography, and the incidence of rape and male sexual violence has increased.[ii] We created the conditions under which it became possible, in 2009, for the American people to elect the nation's first black president—but now look on helplessly as that president consolidates the largest banks, escalates the war in Afghanistan, widens military strikes in Pakistan, defends Israel from a UN report criticizing the IDF's war crimes in Gaza, and proposes new increases in the US Defense Department budget (to more than half a trillion dollars per annum). Evidently, then, what we are doing isn't working, or working in the ways we need it to.
If we had the luxury of time, as I say, perhaps we could continue down our present path, slowly chipping away at the more obstinately entrenched of our oppressive institutions, continuing a praxis that is disjunct, dispersed, localist, and uncoordinated. But we do not have that luxury. We are faced with multiple overlapping crises of truly global proportions, crises which will only worsen in the coming decades. The global ecological, economic, and social situation is deteriorating. As Immanuel Wallerstein suggests in his online essay, the capitalist world system as it has existed for the last 500 years is coming apart, and a new order is likely to emerge in the next 20-40 years to take its place. As Wallerstein therefore warns, "if the left has no plan for [the] middle run, what replaces capitalism as a world system will be something worse, probably far worse, than the terrible system in which we have been living for the past five centuries." The trouble is, not only do we not have a plan for the middle-run, we even lack a clear sense of what we mean by "we" or "the Left" at all.
A century and more of failed historical experiments and often bitterly divisive theoretical and doctrinal debate within and among the various strands of praxis—Marxism, anarchism, feminism, anti-colonialism, queer theory, etc.—has left the terrain of radical thought strewn with the near-lifeless bodies of contested and competing ideas. To be sure, theoretical debate and ideological conflict can be both goods in themselves and means to other social goods, such as democracy or innovation. Indeed, dissent, conflict, and perpetual self-critique may be one of the distinguishing differences between the cultures of the Left and Right.[iii] But somewhere there is a meaningful line to be drawn between healthy debate and complete confusion and chaos, and I fear that some time ago we crossed that line. Our movements today have no identity, no outward representational form, no overarching intellectual coherence or strategic orientation.
The Left's doctrinal confusion and lack of self-clarity largely reflects the confused and diminished state of our movements, which have on the whole declined sharply over the last quarter century. The reasons for this decline are many (Barbara Epstein addresses some of them in her online essay for this project). But we can identify a few of them. Decades of neoliberal capitalism have taken a tremendous toll on human culture and consciousness. Privatization and laissez-faire economics have corrupted the liberal state and seriously eroded democratic institutions throughout the world, causing widespread cynicism toward government. The demonstrated spectacular helplessness of the state before perfectly foreseeable natural and economic crises—hurricanes and earthquakes, global financial shocks, unstable commodity prices, etc.—has led to a profound and widening legitimation crisis of the state. What appears to be waning is not just popular faith in the state, however, but faith and reverence for fundamental liberal values like democracy and human rights as such. In theory, this might be an opening for us to popularize a more radical critique of the established order. However, since it is the Right that is better organized, the waning of liberalism represents a great danger. In the absence on the Left of a serious and intelligible alternative to present-day realities of alienation and injustice, millions of people are being drawn into the orbit of extremism, as religious fundamentalism and virulent forms of nationalism rush to fill the vacuum created by the political and, as it were, existential abdication of the state.
Other objective social and cultural factors have also made effective grassroots organizing and resistance more difficult. Among these, we might mention state repression, the commodification of culture, and the intrusion of technological media into daily life. The impact of this last development, in particular, the technological reification of daily life and consciousness, should not be underestimated. Historically, the basis of human solidarity has always been found in relatively unmediated, communal, face-to-face forms of experience and human connection, most of them tied to place (neighborhoods, workplaces, universities, and so on). Today, however, our relations with others are becoming progressively more instrumental, abstract, and quantitative. As a result, the human basis of solidarity is being undermined. While many academic theorists have trumpeted the alleged democratic virtues of the new digital media, relations of trust and solidarity are simply more difficult to establish in an anomic and narcissistic culture dominated by blogs, Facebook, cell phones, and iPods. Advanced capitalist culture is undergoing an ontological and epistemological shift at least as profound and unsettling as modern industrialization was in the nineteenth century. The fabric of social life is being pulled apart and reconstituted; the public sphere—what little remains of it—is being razed to the ground. But we have only the faintest notion of what the new form of society—or anti-society—is in the process of being born. The compression of space-time under post-Fordist capitalism leads to an experience of social and cultural acceleration—a speeding up of our subjective experience of time. Temporality and historicity as such break down. Not only do cultural commodities now circulate more rapidly (reaching obsolescence in days or weeks, instead of in years), rapid deterioration of ecological conditions combined with the synergistic decay of social institutions and traditional beliefs are stripping human beings of their sense of place and identity. As technological simulation comes to stand in for, and assume the false distorted shape of, what was formerly a communal life—as newspapers go under, literacy declines, and digital consume every hitherto private space for individual reflection--it becomes more and more difficult for even educated individuals in the First World to discern our real conditions of life. This crisis of time thus produces a crisis of knowledge, a rupture in the epistemological ground of praxis itself. Conditions require us to intervene forcefully right now. Yet just as the polar bears do not have time to evolve new forms of culture and physique to adapt to global warming, we do not have time to get a cognitive and experiential handle on the complex interplay of overlapping and mutually reinforcing crises, social forces, political developments, cultural changes, etc. Even the most sharp-eyed critics and activists on the Left are finding it difficult to identify clear strategic prospects—opportunities e.g. for effective mass mobilization and institutional challenge--in a context where all that is solid truly melts into air—or rather, cyberspace.
These and other social conditions are partly to blame for the decline of the Left. However, the Left's crisis is also thoroughly historical and dialectical. This is to say that it is at least partly of our own making, the result of our own historical failure to demonstrate our moral and political competence in the eyes of the world's peoples. In many ways (and this will not come as news) we are still coming to terms with the collapse of Marxism, and with the waning of socialism more broadly. Throughout much of the 20th century, Marxism provided a paradigm of practical action, movement unity, and global transformation, particularly in the Third World. Among other things, it provided generations of activist intellectuals with a total critique of existing society, a strategy for achieving radical social change, and a coherent, self-reflexive body of knowledge grounded in human experience and practice. However, with May 1968 and the subsequent emergence of the New Social Movements, Second and Third Wave feminism, the gay and lesbian liberation movements, urban social movements, and so on, socialism as idea and ideal began to wane, and the Left soon lost any broad historical understanding of itself as the vessel of utopian dreams and practical collective action. Today, the sociological limits of Marxism as a "stand alone" theory, particularly vis-à-vis questions of gender, sexuality, ecology, and animal rights, are now widely recognized: capitalism is not the only form of power, nor is class conflict the only source of historical transformation, nor is class identity the only or primary means for constituting what we call the "social." To be sure, Marx's critique of capitalism remains insightful and vital in the 21st century. Nonetheless, the erosion of Marxist theory as the preeminent and most persuasive doctrine of revolutionary change has had a devastating effect on theories of praxis more generally.
Socialism has suffered its most resounding defeats, however, not in the corridors of theory, but on the battlefield of actual historical practice. In many ways we are still picking through the pieces of the shattered revolutionary tradition, that tradition which dominated radical politics for much of the 20th century. As most, though not all[iv], on the Left are now willing to concede, the two greatest state-communist experiments, the USSR and China, proved catastrophic at every level—economically, politically, morally, and ecologically. Millions died--from civil war, from famine, from imprisonment--or were simply killed outright. Today, Russia is a grim and desperate place dominated by the informal mafia economy, corporate oligopolies, and state authoritarianism; China, the world's largest, and in some ways, most ruthless, capitalist state. And while alienation is widespread in both nations, post-Communist elites have been adept at channeling public anger over rampant corruption, social equality, and ecological destruction into nationalism, consumer culture, and racism and ethnic pride. In this respect, one of the tragic, if overlooked, consequences of totalitarian communism has been the degree to which the crimes of Stalin and Mao have cast a dark pall over every other manner of socialist belief and practice (and not only in that bastion of anti-communist sentiment, the US). To the hundreds of millions of people who once lived--or who still live--under authoritarian communist rule, socialism today gets viewed as a dangerous pipe-dream. Years of political terror, corruption, and economic hardship exercised in the name of Marx do not work wonders for the democratic sensibilities or socialist yearnings of a people.
As for the anti-colonial movements and nationalist revolutions of the Third World, those once-fiery beacons of hope, none has managed to sustain a "third way" of socialist and democratic development outside the dominant terms of the global capitalist economy.[v] Most post-revolutionary states have been derailed by corruption, capitalist recidivism, internecine party squabbles (or outright civil war), authoritarian rule, and/or indifference toward human rights and democratic process. Zimbabwe thrashes in agony under a megalomaniacal thug (the former revolutionary leader, Robert Mugabe). Algeria hovers between reactionary Islamism and an ineffectual, Western-backed comprador class. In Vietnam and Laos, elites connive with multinational companies to facilitate colonial plunder "by other means." And in post-apartheid South Africa, the formerly revolutionary ANC has similarly accommodated itself to international capital—as well as to the indigenous white elite-- to preserve the socio-economic inequalities of the apartheid era. (The ANC reached a nadir of moral bankruptcy in June, when Jacob Zuma, a manipulative demogogue and accused rapist, was elected to the post of party leader and national President. The government's new ministers promptly went out and purchased $100,000 cars to be chauffeured around in.) And so on.
The trouble is that the death of the socialist imaginary, as a global imaginary, not only removed one of the last ideological hurdles in the way of world capitalist expansion and hegemony, it also led to a crisis of self-representation on the Left. What we lack is a coherent worldview and shared language of politics from which we might step back and analyze our past weaknesses and failings, in order to move forward as an inter- or transnational movement. We are unable to see clearly who we are and what we want, hence are unable to represent that conception of ourselves to others. Today, only Latin America, where the resurgence of left movements and parties has fueled the hopes of leftists everywhere, remains a bright spot. The Zapatistas still organize, hoping to democratize the Mexican state and win concessions for the indigenous poor; Hugo Chavez's Peronist policies, though imperfect and demagogic, are opening up space for worker cooperatives and other alternative structures in Venezuelan civil society to flourish; Leftist governments in Ecuador and Bolivia are enacting progressive tax policies and trying to empower the landless poor. However, it is still too early to know whether these populist experiments, vulnerable as they are to fluctuations in world commodity prices, and lacking a coherent theory or ideology of the path for social transformation, will be able to consolidate their gains and finally rid the continent of the capitalist social relations that still subdue the continent. It is also unclear whether the Latin American model of a strong interventionist leftist state, combined with grassroots worker-based initiatives can be replicated elsewhere. Because the political economy of Latin America has always been tightly bound up with the foreign policy and national aggression of the United States, labor militancy in the region has often taken an anti-imperialist and hence internationalist cast. Latin American social movements thus set out with the natural advantage of a shared cultural and historical tradition of rebellion against the world's leading capitalist state--a convergence of culture and internationalist politics we don't find elsewhere.
That Latin America is the exception that proves the rule becomes apparent as soon as we train our gaze elsewhere. With the exceptions of Greece, Nepal, and a handful of countries in Latin America, the term "Left" today has in fact little significance in the minds or daily lives of most people in the world. I have already mentioned the poor state of affairs in China and Russia (together home to more than one in five human beings), where we find no sign of an indigenous democratic Left movement or party of any consequence. But the situation is little better in other national contexts. Whether in Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, Kenya, or Israel, fundamentalist and extreme-right movements and parties are flourishing, while the Left barely exists, or has been beaten into a corner. In Japan, the economic recession has led to an influx of young people into the Communist Party; however, the overall numbers so far have been modest. In Europa, meanwhile, that morally besmirched continent, former historical midwife to the very idea of Revolution, we find a Left that is defeated, demoralized, and isolated, hoist on the petard of its own discredited, market-friendly, social democratic policies. Elections to the European Parliament in June 2009 confirmed the drift of the continent as a whole to the right and far-right. Center-right parties consolidated their influence, while ruling social democratic parties in Portugal, Britain, and Spain took a drubbing. But the real story lies in the ground gained by xenophobic, racist, and extreme nationalist parties, who gained ground in nine countries. Neo-fascist or hard-right parties won seats in Demark, Greece, Romania, and Finland, and doubled their parliamentary numbers in Austria, Hungary, and Italy. In Britain, the neo-fascist British National Party won two seats; in the Netherlands, the anti-Islamic Freedom Party won 17% of the vote.
Only in Germany has there been some good news: in the August elections, the radical-left Die Linke Party won more than 20% in the state of Saarland, and the Party is polling well at this writing on the eve of the September elections. Looking elsewhere, though, one wonders how the European Left could have fared so badly, in the middle of the worst capitalist crisis since the Depression, and also in the wake of a serious erosion in popular consent to US neoliberal hegemony (during the Bush years). Apparently, only the far-right, and to a lesser extent the Greens (who also gained a few seats in the June elections), seemed to offer the electorate a real break with the bankrupt politics and failed economic policies of the past. The European liberal-Left, having identified itself for decades with capitalist institutions, political centrism, and the sterile proceduralism of a bureaucratic and bloodless state, meanwhile finds itself mired in a legitimation crisis of its own making. As Maria Margaronis wrote in The Nation,
In France and Germany, voters see little difference between what social democrats are offering and the policies of their soft-right governments....When it comes to managing a crisis, one welfare capitalist seems as good as another—and better the devil you know than the devil who is...in a state of disarray.[vi]
The right's openly racist campaign themes have clearly struck a chord with millions of unemployed or otherwise vulnerable members of the white working class. But reaction and resurgent nativism alone cannot explain Europeans' disenchantment with the Left. It is also the Left's own failure to win over the people with a compelling narrative of its own. As Margaronis observes, "No European left-wing party has articulated a convincing alternative to the bailouts, or a coherent vision of the future."
In the US, the story is similar. The American Left remains largely a notional force, barely existing outside the pages of Z Magazine, The Nation, and a handful of leftist radio stations. Indeed, at least at the level of a recognizable politics, only liberalism and the extreme right are visible "going concerns" in the US today. So excluded is the Left from the public sphere today that most Americans associate the "Left" with the cynical and accommodationist machinations of the Democratic Party. In the people's eyes, therefore, it is "the Left" that is bailing out American finance capital; "the Left" that is increasing the size of the US military budget; "the Left" that has escalated the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan; "the Left" that opposes socialized health care. And if—or rather, when--the US economy takes a catastrophic turn for the worse, it will be "the Left" that gets blamed for that as well. (Already, the Right has used the Administration's mishandling of the economic crisis to brand Obama as a "socialist," as a way of discrediting radical politics as such.) In 2008, star-struck liberals favorably compared Barak Obama's climb to the Oval Office to the ascension and resurrection of Christ. But rather than try to enact a grand vision of national renewal and reform, one that might have educated the people about the true nature of the society they live in, Obama has instead proposed only the mildest reforms of the existing order, stepping carefully to avoid offending the interests or sensitivities of the most powerful financial interests in society. Despite the Democratic Party's sweeping electoral victory, he has been unable or unwilling to leverage his party's gains into a hegemonic social and political project of the kind brought to fruition by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.[vii] Contrary to expectations, Obama's triumph has yet to yield a general political realignment in the US. On the contrary, polls suggest that Americans are for the most part as divided and as ideologically incoherent as they were four years ago.[viii]
Since the elections, the Republican Party has been in severe disarray, embroiled in struggles of its own. But it would be a profound mistake to write off the far-right as a spent force. Recall that after its years in the political wilderness during the 1920s, the Nazi Party surged into power not long after the sharp economic downturn of 1930, as Hitler's message of radical economic reform, national rejuvenation, and racial purity resonated with the psycho-affective needs, prejudices, and aspirations of millions of ordinary Germans. Already, far-right ideologies are gathering momentum again at the US grassroots, as witnessed in the fanatical nativism and conspiracy mongering of the "birthers" movement, as well as hysterical opposition to the President's health care initiative. Just as importantly, the authoritarian drift of the US state now appears to be permanent: even President Obama, a moderate Democrat, has sought to preserve the expansive presidential powers claimed by his predecessor in the Oval Office (e.g. holding "enemy combatants" indefinitely and without charge, trying enemies before military tribunals, etc.), confirming a historical sea change in the relation of the capitalist state to domestic civil society, with the latter now viewed as a legitimate field for military maneuvers and counter-insurgency operations.
In sum, capitalism is undergoing its worst crisis in generations, if not ever; the material conditions of human society and animal ecology are worsening by the hour; and the political right is resurgent in most regions of the world. Meanwhile, the Left seems paralyzed, unsure of itself, weighed down by a past that has not always been noble, and haunted by a future whose elusive horizon seems to be rapidly receding from view. The Left today enjoys majority status in no parliamentary body in the world (leaving aside corrupted liberal organs like the British Labour Party, or totalitarian ones like the Chinese Communist Party). It has no significant intellectual centers or think-tanks capable of influencing state policy, no way to respond effectively to national and international emergencies, and no coherent shared sense of itself as a historical movement. In the US alone, tens of millions of people are unemployed or underemployed; local and state governments are slashing public services and balancing their budgets on the backs of those among us with the least power and influence—children, documented immigrants, the poor. But where is the Left? Who is organizing the unemployed? A few months ago, a team of scientists released a new report predicting that by the end of this century, the earth's atmosphere would warm at double the previously predicted rate.[ix] Where is the international movement to sound the alarm, or to force the US, China, and other states to agree to mandatory carbon limits, let alone to force a broad reappraisal of the rapacious nature of capitalism as such? Where is the coordinated global defense of the other great orders of sentient beings—Aves, Mammalia, Reptilia, Amphibia, Osteichthyes, Chondrichthyes—many of whose species are in imminent danger of extinction? In June and July, millions of protesters filled the streets of Teheran in June and July to signal their discontent with the ruling theocratic authorities—but the streets of New York and Berlin, Tokyo and Amsterdam, Beijing and Moscow, were eerily quiet. And so they have remained.
...Or so they remained until today. As I write these words, on September 12, 2009, the news shows are filled with images of tens of thousands of mostly white Americans marching in Washington, D.C., to protest President Obama's policies, denouncing him as a "communist" for advocating health care reform and bailing out the nation's banks, and calling upon the American people to take "back" their nation. The march, organized by a coalition of right-wing groups, is the culmination of a year-long campaign of grassroots protests modeled on the Boston Tea Party. How ironic that the torch and pageantry of Revolution should now pass to the political Right. (As the procession passes, we are tempted to ask, as Peter asked Jesus when he saw him heading back to Rome, quo vadis? Where are you going? The extreme Right is resurrected--again.)
Those who now lord over human society have demonstrated with every failed attempt to stave off economic crisis, every bungled effort to protect the citizenry from natural and social disasters, just how unfit they are to govern. But the question remains, why should the people have faith in us, the ostensible alternative? What have we accomplished? Mired in a post-New Left, perpetually "ad hoc" and reactive movement culture, what remains of the Left is fragmented and ideologically inchoate, its energies split between liberal and piecemeal reform (progressive caucuses, lobbying groups, and NGO's) and enervated, fly-by-night and disorganized grassroots movements on the other. More than this, what remains of Left movement culture often seems insular and self-limiting. What, then, makes us so sure that our philosophy of society is ultimately superior to that offered by the ruling elite? Can we be sure that it would conduce to greater happiness and freedom? Why should humanity have faith in our ability to lead a project of civilizational transformation and renewal?
I would not be writing this if I did not believe we can come up with plausible and compelling reasons for why the vision we have to offer human civilization—or rather, our diverse human civilizations--is more just, and more sustainable and desirable, than those on offer by liberal capitalism, religious fundamentalism, and the far-right. However, it is past time for us to let go of any illusions we may still have that the existing approaches, cultures, institutions, and ideologies of the Left are remotely adequate to the historical task at hand. If we are to "reimagine society," we will first have to reimagine ourselves. We need a gestalt switch in our own self-understanding as a movement. So long as we remain paralyzed by dischord and limited by a tragically reified conception of who and what we really are, however, radical reform and renewal of our own movements will lie beyond our reach, and our case for civilizational reform will not be heard by the people. What we need, then, is a new set of cultural practices, a new approach that would be able to bestow upon our many scattered movements (1) a single intelligible form, (2) a focused strategic purpose, and (3) the irresistible power of a moral idea. Together, these three dimensions of praxis--unity of form, strategy, and moral leadership—are the indispensable preconditions for building an effective transnational movement, one that would have at least the potential to shepherd humanity through the global crisis, and to set the terms of the new world order that emerges at the long end of what is likely to be an extremely traumatic and violent period of historical transition. What it would mean to take these three dimensions of praxis seriously—what would it mean to conceive of the Left as a major world religion--will be the subject of my discussion in Part Two of this essay, to follow.
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[i] I would like to thank Barbara Epstein and Zipporah Weisberg for their helpful comments and criticisms of an earlier draft of this essay.
[ii] In 2008, the National Crime Victimization Survey found a 42% increase in the number of reported incidents of domestic violence, and a 25% increase in the incidence of rape and sexual assault of women, in the two year period between 2005 and 2007. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/18/us-soaring-rates-rape-and-violence-against-women
[iii] As the socialist British filmmaker Ken Loach observes: "The right's interest is in maintaining the status quo, so it doesn't really deal in ideas. It might deal in populist slogans, but it doesn't have to make an analysis of the situation in order to see how to change it, which is what the left has to do. If you look at what ideas there are on the right, they're fairly derisory and you can't formulate an analysis from them. The left has always been about ideas—conflicting ideas." As Loach suggests, this may be one reason why the Right so often seems better organized than the Left. Graham Fuller, Loach on Loach (London: Faber and Faber, 1998), p. 104.
[iv] The Left's continuing failure to come adequately to terms these and other crimes of mass violence by nominally "communist" regimes—remains a deep moral stain on our character as a historical movement, and a disturbing reminder of the Left's continuing equivocation on the fundamental problem of political violence—when, if ever, it is justified. It also casts doubt on the willingness of the Left as a whole to defend the principle of democracy in all contexts, including its own. Recently, in much the same way that European and US leftists long avoided criticizing Stalin and Mao, significant sectors of the US Left today have expressed support for the reactionary Iranian theocracy—against the nascent democratic reform movement there. They have also turned a studiously deaf ear to the praise Hugo Chavez has lavished on that ugly Russian tyrant,Vladimir Putin. Ironically, the Left's failure to come to terms with its authoritarian past, or to unequivocally oppose dictatorship, has only made it harder to organize in the post-Communist context, since many people are rightly suspicious of a movement that would show such low regard for truth, freedom, or human rights.
[v] Cuba under Fidel Castro, Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, and Eritrea under the People's Front for Democracy and Justice perhaps came closest. But in all three cases, the rulers proved unable to reconcile socio-economic equality with political freedom and human rights at home.
[vi] Maria Maragonis, "Europe Lurches Right," The Nation, June 29, 2009, p. 7.
[vii] See Stuart Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal (London: Verso, 1988).
[viii] The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Independents Take Center Stage in Obama Era: Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 1987-2009," May 21, 2009 (http://people-press.org/report/517/political-values-and-core-attitudes).
[ix] "Modellers Predict Doubly Bad Global Warming," Physicsworld.com, May 22, 2009.



Re: The Crisis of the Global Left: Part One
By Wetzel, Tom at Oct 30, 2009 11:06 AM
I'm not sure I know what "the Left" is nor do I necessarily identify with it. I'll assume you mean the anti-capitalist left. There have always been various basic differences of opinion in regard to strategic focus among activists of "the Left." One main strategy has been partyism...trying to coalesce the various mass movements and oppressed groups behind the banners of a political party with the aim of capturing a state (or building a new one) and then implementing a program through the hierarchies of the state. I think that strategy can't eliminate the subordinate and exploited status of the working class because it will continue a dominating class, as experts and managers of industry and society.
But I expect that a certain fragment of "the Left" are very likely to continue to look to new variants of the partyist strategy. And there are also going to continue to be those of us who reject a partyist strategy....as the libertarian left has mostly done historically.
But I think there is another way of framing this. Your term "the Left" is ambiguous in that it does not clearly distinguish between political or ideological organizations and mass organizations or mass social movements. I would look to social movements to be the directing and dynamic force for social transformation. Activists of "the Left" will be present within them. I think what is important is developing alliances among social movements and mass organizations. But even here it is likely there will always be divisions. I think, for example, that a labor movement genuinely run by its members in the USA will inevitably have to emerge apart from the bureaucracies of the AFL-CIO and CtW unions because I don't think those national unions can be transformed. I'm sure there are other cases where, at the level of mass organizations, there will still be divisions, due to divergent politics and structure. I do think tho that there would need to be an alliance with radical politics that is sufficiently large and united to change the society.
Maybe it's a question of "how unified" because it is true that a unified political organization with influence in mass movements is likely to influence movements in the direction of an alliance of the sort needed. But I also think it is unrealistic to suppose that there won't always be divergent "Left" ideological organizations...and activists with divergent ideas about strategy. However, there are also likely to be situations where activists of divergent "Left" political organizations or ideologies work in concert in particular cases, especially in the context of struggles of mass organizations. And I think this may be the sort of situation that Steve D'Arcy was thinking about.
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Tom's Comment
By Sanbonmatsu, John at Oct 31, 2009 14:57 PM
What I mean by "Left" is akin to what people mean when they say "Christian" or "Sufi." That is, the Left is a historical movement, a constellation of social groups, based on a particular transcendental conception of the world. Unlike the other religions, however, the Left is simply disinterested in matters of metaphysics and theology. It takes no stand on the question of God, because it realizes that the belief in a God or gods per se has no necessary bearing on our existential and political choices. But the Left is akin to these and other religious ideas insofar as (1) it is a belief that gives human beings an identity and purpose in the world, (2) it affirms a determinate set of universal ethical and social norms for all of humanity, (3) it has its core the utopian vision of a world made whole, and in which justice is made the basis of reality.
So my conception of the Left is certainly anti-capitalist, but it is much broader than that. In negative form, it is opposed to all forms of inegalitarian or oppressive social relations. In positive terms, it is a movement for true human solidarity, ecological harmony, and animal rights. The Left is a movement for total civilizational reform. The abolition of capitalism--its replacement by the sorts of anarcho-syndicalist work relations Tom nicely describes in some of his essays--must be constitutive of its vision. To prefer one form of work relations over another is already to prefer one set of values over another, one form of human life over another. But such relations are meaningless unless the other relations of society are not also transformed: patriarchy, the mass killing of other sentient species, the racial division of labor, and so forth.
I agree with Steve and Tom that the Left will never be completely unified, nor that it should be. However, I think we are well past the point where we can continue along our present path, hoping that a mix of local, anarchistic efforts are going to erode the massive power structure we are facing. We need one--or more--transnational organizations, highly organized yet democratic and supple, not bureaucratized--that can take advantage of structural weaknesses and strategic opportunities within the system. And this requires a much, much more coherent (and cogent) conception of who and what we are and what we want than is presently realized.
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Re: The Crisis of the Global Left: Part One
By Moorey, Crip at Oct 04, 2009 19:38 PM
[The politics of dispersion is unhelpful, it's apolitical, and it isn't working.]
Hear! hear!
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Re:
By D'Arcy, Steve at Oct 04, 2009 23:54 PM
"[The politics of dispersion is unhelpful, it's apolitical, and it isn't working.]
Hear! hear!"
At 41, I regard myself as too old for polemics, so I will try to respond to this bold claim in a non-polemical way. Who knows if I will succeed?
In John and Moorey, we have at least two people who believe that the "politics of dispersion" -- by which we all mean, in this context, following a policy of 'strategic dispersal and tactical concentration' -- isn't working for the Left. Is a consensus emerging? A convergence toward unity? Maybe so. Nevertheless, I find this claim to be inconsistent with what I have seen on the Left in recent years.
If (for simplicity) we look only at the North Atlantic countries (Canada, USA, Western Europe), over the past 10 years (1999-2009), what sorts of things have "worked" for the Left?
I would single out three political approaches that have been attempted, each standing out in an era of generalized weakness on the Left as uncommonly (though not unequivocally) successful and productive, and each clearly exemplifying the policy of strategic dispersal and tactical concentration.
First, there were the 'global justice' mass demonstrations, in cities like Seattle, Prague, Quebec City, Genoa, etc. Seattle, for instance, is a sort of paradigm case of "the politics of dispersion" (to use John's formula, which symptomatically drops the crucial reference to "tactical concentration").
Second, there were the Social Forums in Europe, the USA and elsewhere (modeled on the WSF originating in Brazil). As one should expect, these yielded mixed results, but on balance they were far more productive than the vast majority of approaches attempted in the same period.
Third, there have been the range of projects -- again, each with mixed results, obviously -- that take the form of pluralistic 'socialist alliances,' such as RESPECT in the UK (a negative example, some will say, but compared to what? Compared to what existed before it? Or since its collapse?), the Scottish Socialist Party, the Anti-Capitalist Party in France, the Socialist Alliance in Australia, die Linke in Germany, Quebec Solidaire in Canada, and so on.
By their very nature, each of these projects has taken as its founding premise the permanence and indeed productivity of political differentiation, when this differentiation can be made consistent with 'tactical concentration' in the sense that John discusses (and rejects as unhelpful and apolitical).
I would be the first to insist that each of these three political approaches has had mixed results. But it is in the nature of strategic action that, with every move, one not only delivers blows to one's adversaries but also receives blows in return. Who can doubt, however, that these three approaches have been more successful than almost anything else tried by radicals in the past 10 years?
Unhelpful? Apolitical? Not working? I don't find these claims convincing.
Most people who study strategy in a serious way would regard it as a truism to say that a policy of strategic dispersal and tactical concentration is likely to be far more effective than a policy of strategic concentration. John, obviously, is an exception to that generalization, since he studies strategy very seriously indeed, yet takes an unorthodox position. But the facts about what has worked on the Left in recent years seem to confirm the conventional wisdom on this point.
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Dispersion is a Tactic, Not a Strategy
By Sanbonmatsu, John at Oct 24, 2009 13:21 PM
One of the central confusions on the Left today continues to be on the difference between tactics and strategy. A tactic is a method, campaign, or political tool that is used as part of a wider plan to realize a concrete political objective. A strategy is the overall *plan.* In other words, a strategy will integrate a variety of tactics, over an extended period of time, in order to achieve one or more objectives. One of the central confusions on the Left today continues to be on the difference between tactics and strategy. A tactic is a method, campaign, or political tool that is used as part of a wider plan to realize a concrete political objective. A strategy is the overall *plan.* In other words, a strategy will integrate a variety of tactics, over an extended period of time, in order to achieve one or more objectives.
These basic distinctions are worth keeping in mind as we consider Steve’s objections to my argument. Dispersion can undoubtedly be a useful tactic, under certain carefully thought-out conditions. But only as part of a strategy to move our movements from point A to point B to point C. At the risk of sounding heretical, none of the three “projects,” as Steve terms them—(1) the anti-globalization protests in Seattle, Quebec, Genoa, etc., (2) the Social Forums, and (3) the rise of anti-capitalist parties and alliances in Europe and Canada—are strategies, or even strategic campaigns. In terms of anti-capitalist alliances, in particular the rise of more radical political parties in Europe—these are indeed a cause for celebration. Parties by nature adopt policy proposals, engage in public debate, and present a public face or form to the people. The rise of Die Linke, thus, is an encouraging development. That said, there’s only so much a series of small, uncoordinated national parties of the Left can do, particularly on a global scale. Having a few national parties is not a global “strategy” as such.
In terms of the other two modes of praxis Steve identifies—the anti-globalization movement and the Social Forums—from any conceivable strategic perspective both have been failures. Why? Because no one in my family, and none of my neighbors or their friends and family, have ever heard of the anti-globalization movement, let alone the Social Forum. They have no analysis, let alone critique, of capitalism. Nor have they any clue that there are any potentially workable alternatives to the world capitalist system. In other words, these movements, which had no concrete objectives (beyond making inchoate and unfocused “demands”—and to whom?) achieved nothing whatsoever tangible. Nor could they have, since they never conceived of their various tactics—mass protests at meetings of an elite, in the first case, and lots of presentations and panels of sympathetic activists, on the other—as part of a temporally and spatially defined plan to reshape the global order. However psychologically bracing we have found it to know that thousands of activists have met in Porto Alegre or Boston, or that elites have been harried in Genoa, these events or “happenings” in themselves did little to alter the prevailing balance of forces. The proof can be seen readily in the fact that even at its greatest moment of weakness since the 1930s, capitalism has remained triumphant in Europe. That is, even in a region where knowledge about oppositional ideas and movements is more widely dispersed than here in the US (which quite possibly has the most uninformed populace on Earth), the Left has been unable to leverage its meetings and window shatterings of the last 10 years into anything tangible, let alone into a widespread revolt. (With only a few exceptions, the elections in Europe over the last four months bear me out.)
As I argued in my first book, “The Postmodern Prince,” the Left stubbornly continues to confuse activity—doing lots and lots of stuff—with strategy and making social change. Both the anti-globalization movement and the Social Forum movement fall into the category of “doing lots of stuff.” We behave as though pursuing our current modus operandi will magically get us to where we want to be. Our revolutionary battle cry? “Two, three, many Porto Alegres! Two, three, many Genoas!” Well, perhaps we will all wake up one day in the leftist Afterlife. If so, I suspect, many dyed-in-the-wool dispersionists will take comfort in the fact that, though the Earth was in the end reduced to a burnt-out cinder, we nonetheless managed to break a few shop windows, and to attend quite a few panel discussions on the transgressive nature of Hip Hop culture and the importance of Lacan and Spinoza for the Multitude, while we were still alive. However, I won’t be one of them.
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how important is 'unity' on the Left?
By D'Arcy, Steve at Sep 27, 2009 23:59 PM
This piece very effectively presents a certain, seemingly grim perspective on the present state of the global Left (although the pessimism -- if that's what it is -- may be offset in Part 2). I found it very interesting and stimulating.
I certainly agree that the global Left, at least outside ofLatin America , remains mired in a chronic crisis. But I have some significant disagreements with the analysis, which I would like to bring up in a "comradely" spirit.
I have two points: one about the estimation of the value of unity and unanimity; and one about assessing just how weak the Left is.
FIRST, on unity and unanimity. A key theme in the article is that the Left is insufficiently unified and that this is a bad thing. We are urged to "reach a provisional consensus on the future of society and how to bring it about." It is said to be bad that we are "without shared strategic goals or a common vision of the future society." The Left verges on "chaos and confusion" because it lacks "intellectual coherence or [a shared] strategic orientation." We lack "a coherent worldview and shared language of politics." "What remains of the Left is fragmented...." What we need is "a single intelligible form" of Left politics, as well as "unity of...strategy" and a unifying "moral idea" that could animate Left 'praxis.'
It goes without saying that this assessment has SOME truth to it. But I want to resist the idea that this is actually one of the major problems with the Left. First, note that if it is true that the Left can only be strong and effective if we all agree in adopting the same vision or strategy, then the Left is unlikely ever to be strong and effective. There is an ineliminable element of pluralism about these matters. There are so many variables, so much room for people to draw different conclusions about what works or doesn't work, what is worth aiming at or not worth it, and so on, that people are bound to go on arguing about all these things, producing familiar forms of political disagreement: debates between reformists and revolutionaries, between 'humanists' and 'anti-speciesists,' between those who emphasize distributive equality (like some market socialists) and those who emphasize self-management and democratic planning (like many pareconists or other economic democracy advocates), and so on.
Second, I would argue (and have argued here) that a more effective approach to building the Left (especially in non-revolutionary times) is to pursue an approach of "strategic dispersal and tactical concentration," which is to say, encouraging the development of a pluralistic Left, comprised of many differentiated organizations, pursuing differentiated aims, and emphasizing differentiated tactics and strategies, appealing to differentiated constituencies, yet cultivating the capacity to engage in "timely tactical convergence" in support of shared demands with broad appeal. This is the classical Left approach of the "united front." But united fronts are ways of integrating political differentiation into the 'praxis' of the Left, rather than seeking to merge the whole Left into a unified force or organization with a shared analysis, vision and strategy. I'm convinced that the Left will be easier to defeat, not harder to defeat, if it is unified to the point of only having one major "doctrine," one major vision, one major strategy, and -- worst of all -- one big organization or party which most people on the Left join. Imagine an army that ONLY had tanks. That's a recipe for defeat, even if they're really, really good tanks, and even if you have lots and lots of them.
Take the difference between (1) radical social democrats, who think that building a Left party (like die Linke, to give a relatively good example) to contest elections should be at the centre of Left strategy, (2) so-called "dual-power" anarchists, who think that building counter-capitalist institutions, like co-operatives, "anarchist universities," and other "mutual aid" vehicles, should be at the centre of Left strategy, and (3) some Marxists, who think that building mass protest movements, along with a revolutionary party, should be at the centre of Left strategy. This is a real debate. We know that this debate is not going to just go away. But should we bemoan that fact? I think that the Left is stronger because of this "strategic dispersal" in programmatically differentiated Left organizations, as long as these forces remain capable of timely tactical convergence in united front action, in a spirit of solidarity. The latter can be different, but at least it doesn’t require convergence of most of the Left around a single analysis, vision, and strategy.
Similar points can be made about forms of Left social analysis, such as (various variants of) Marxism, socialist feminism, social ecology, ecosocialism, 'radical political economy,' 'parsoc,' and so on. It is precisely the divergence between these views that gives the wider Left access to a more comprehensive set of critical perspectives and insights. If the 'fragmentation' took the extreme form of rendering it impossible for the Left to converge around some key points -- support for political and economic democracy, and for social and environmental justice -- then the 'pluralism' might be a problem. But I'm not convinced that this is happening today, except in ways that are, as I said above, normal and ineliminable (e.g., debates between reformists and revolutionaries, etc.).
SECOND, and hopefully more concisely, I want to make a point about the assessment of how bad things are for the Left. If we focus on the "visibility" of the Left in mainstream public debate, things are very bad indeed. If, moreover, we focus on the strength and scale of Left protest movements, then too, things are very bad. True, both of these are legitimate "metrics" to consider, I concede. But there are other dimensions of the Left that are not visible within these two frames. First, there is the vitality, or lack of it, among currents of anti-capitalist radicalism. And second, there is the work being done, often "under the radar" of mainstream attention, to create anticipatory, post-capitalist institutions and practices which model sustainability and social justice.
In both of these respects, too, the Left is weak, but not catastrophically weak. I actually believe that, within most currents of anti-capitalist radicalism, there are strong traditions of critical analysis of capitalism AND Stalinism, and a lot of serious analysis of the political economy of contemporary capitalism, ecological destruction, sexism, racism, etc. For this reason, I'm not half as gloomy about the state of the radical Left, in terms of its "health" and "vitality" (in contrast to its size and impact on “policy,” which are obviously minimal). These currents lack mass influence, it is true. But that is a function of the weakness of unions and Left protest movements and the self-immolation of social democracy, not some inherent weakness in the politics of radical anti-capitalist currents today. If you compare the politics of anti-capitalist political currents in 1968 to those active today, I believe that radicals today have a much more robust critique of Stalinism; a more sophisticated way of integrating race, gender, capitalism, ecology, imperialism, into their thinking; and also a more self-critical and pluralistic approach to political disagreement between activists.
Finally, I believe that, taking into account not only what self-conscious radicals are doing, but also what “non-radical” community members are doing at the grassroots level, we will see forms of strength and efficacy that are missing in other sectors of the Left, and which we ought to appreciate more than we sometimes do. For instance, consider all that is being done around urban farming and community gardens, building up the "social economy," including co-ops and other forms of local economic democracy, fair trade arrangements, and so on.
So, although the Left is in crisis, and very week in all respects, the grave weakness in the areas of (1) mass appeal and influence, and (2) the building of effective protest movements, is partly offset by the relatively “less weak” state of the Left in the areas of (3) alternative institution-building and (4) the cultivation of currents of anti-capitalist radicalism.
That’s my take, anyway. But y’know, assessments of this sort of thing ought to be pursued collectively, because individuals mostly have an anecdotal perspective, and/or a perspective that gives too much weight to their own particular concerns and priorities.That certainly applies to me.
In solidarity,
Steve.
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Re: how important is 'unity' on the Left?
By Sanbonmatsu, John at Oct 03, 2009 20:37 PM
Steve—
Thanks for your most thoughtful response. You offer two objections to the argument of my first essay: (1) that the absence of unity on the left, whether ideologically or practically, is not a hindrance to our movements, but on the contrary the source of our strength; and (2) the state of the Left is not as bad as I make out my essay.
First, you disagree with my proposition that “the Left can only be strong and effective if we all agree in adopting the same vision or strategy.” As a practical matter, you observe that “there is an ineliminable element of pluralism about these matters.” As a result, with “so many variables,” and so many different points of view, “people are bound to go on arguing about all these things, producing familiar forms of political disagreement.” Surely, no reasonable person would disagree with you that pluralism is “ineliminable” in politics. Nor am I so naive as to think that all disagreement between and among us on what we call the Left will ever miraculously end. Nor would such an outcome be desirable, since it would signal a bad form of identity—i.e. the collapse of all differences in consciousness into one Absolute. This much, then, we are in agreement on. The question, though, is what degree of unity, what degree of consensus we need in order to move forward in an effective way. And in this regard, I wonder if you have really provided any compelling reasons for preferring a politics based on movement dispersion to one of (relative) unity.
You advocate “‘strategic dispersal and tactical concentration,’ which is to say, encouraging the development of a pluralistic Left, comprised of many differentiated organizations, pursuing differentiated aims, and emphasizing differentiated tactics and strategies, appealing to differentiated constituencies, yet cultivating the capacity to engage in ‘timely tactical convergence’ in support of shared demands with broad appeal.” This sounds reasonable, but what would it mean in practice? How can a world system as entrenched and carefully controlled as capitalism, say, be uprooted using dispersed tactics? On the contrary, won’t focusing on purely local tactics allow capital to maintain its geographical mobility? For instance, a union in Australia might go on strike, forcing up wages. But that won’t change the underlying nature of property relations. Worse, the owners might simply respond to the strike by uprooting production and moving over to Indonesia, where wages are lower. Like other systems of power, capitalism is like a balloon. Squeeze on one part of the balloon, removing air from that sector, and the air only moves to another. The only way for the balloon to be popped would be to apply pressure on all points simultaneously. But for that, dispersion won’t work--only sustained, coordinated, strategic action will.
Differentiated groups, while remaining ineluctably separate and “pursuing differentiated aims” (presumably forever) would meanwhile engage in “timely tactical convergence’ in support of shared demands with broad appeal.” But this begs the question of who, exactly, is going to call for such “convergences,” and how wildly “differentiated” groups, each pursuing its own values, aims, etc., are going to discover “shared demands with broad appeal.” Why should they? Or rather, how can they, if their starting presumption is one of “ineliminable plurality”—in short, mutual estrangement, difference in perpetuity? Or will my movement or organization cooperate with yours only when we perceive a coincidence between our interests and yours? How are we even to know what a “shared” demand is, unless we first have some notion of what it would mean to have something in “common” at all? And how are we to determine which demands are to be “shared,” unless we first have in place something like a leadership to facilitate discussion about how we ought best to relate ends to means?
I could not help but be struck by the seeming contradiction in your remarks between your prescription for the Left—essentially, if I may say so, business as usual: fragmentation, mutual estrangement, ad hoc coalitions, differentiation and sub-differentiation—and what in fact seems implicit in your own mode of address, viz., a unitarian conception of the Left. That is, despite your emphasis on eternal difference between and among (and presumably within) our many movements, you nonetheless refer unselfconsciously to something you and I call “the Left,” as though that concept were self-evident in meaning. However, if we really all are so different, with different values, aims, tactics, constituencies, and so on, then what binds us together, even conceptually? What basis do we have, if not some underlying philosophy of life and politics, some shared civilizational project or program? My point is not that we all do, in fact, already agree on what the Left means, only that we are in a stronger position, it seems to me, not a weaker one, the more clear we can get about what being on the Left means. Because clearly, it means something. Whatever it means, however, it does not mean “difference” as such. (If it did, then we would also want to include the John Birch Society and the September 12 Tea Party movement as part of our conception of “the Left” too, since they represent radical alterity to our presumed identity.)
You argue that what we need is a more sophisticated version of the “United Front” strategy. The original United Front of course was extremely short-lived (1921-23), and as a consequence it is hard to know whether its early gains would have been consolidated had Stalin and the Comintern not put the kabosh on it. Nevertheless, I agree that it is a strategy worth revisiting. However, recall Gramsci’s analysis of the defeat of the Italian workers’ movements on the eve of the United Front policy: “The defeat of the working class was due to the political, organisational, tactical and strategic deficiency of the party of the workers. As a result of this the proletariat did not succeed in putting itself at the head of the insurrection of the great majority of the population.” I am not suggesting here that we should return to a worker led movement as the solution to all our problems. I am only pointing out that the felt need for a United Front approach in the early 1920s grew directly out of a widespread perception in Europe and the USSR that the socialist movement needed much greater structure and organization than it had thus far achieved. While it is de rigeur among theorists today to dismiss this sort of organized approach as “Stalinist,” or simply Leninist, we should recall that Gramsci was not calling for “simple” Leninist approach (i.e., a secretive party vanguard that would effectively dictate things from on high), but a more democratic conception that would forge links with disaffected elements of other classes and social groups. Gramsci’s conception of a united front was in essence the counter-hegemonic bloc. What Gramsci had in mind was the genesis of a single movement, one that would be able to draw into its orbit all oppressed groups in society. As Richard Bellamy puts it, such a counter-hegemonic politics would represent the effort “through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world.”
Unfortunately, the Left today has neglected Gramsci’s conception, conceiving of inter-movement politics as a matter of coalition. We are all aware of the politics of coalition: ad hoc, opportunistic, short-term. Instead of building institutions, developing a permanent foothold and presence in daily public and private life, coalition-building means setting up a brief “convergence” of narrowly defined, particularist interests, and engaging in one or another form of ephemera, before dissolving the coalition again. Each time, the wheel has to be reinvented once more. If we conceive of a new united front in such a fashion, as essentially “shallow” and opportunistic connections between and among diverse movements, then we lack the insight necessary to advance left praxis beyond its present condition of near-total marginality. A truly counter-hegemonic praxis would not be coalitional, but rooted in a new, holistic politics of coalescence.
Whereas “coalition” implies difference in perpetuity—estrangement between our movements, endless bickering, lack of coordination, and so on—“coalescence” means together growing into one. The term, which originally comes from plant biology, describes the organic process by which initially different biological elements of the same dynamic, living organism develop harmoniously into a single being. To develop a conception of unity based on coalescence would mean to conceive of our multiple practices, movements, and philosophies as distinct elements within a prior, necessary whole. That is, rather than seeing ourselves as an unintelligible aggregate, a “potato sack” of forever distinct entities, we would see each movement, each tradition of praxis, as integral elements necessary in the achievement of an organic whole. Conceived this way, the hegemonist would no more strive to achieve a unity in which all people, all movements were reduced to “the same,” any more than a farmer or botanist would try to cultivate a new sorghum plant in which every part or organ of the plant was identical to every other. Neither in nature nor in politics could such an organism exist. Rather, every organic unity is a whole constituted on the basis of different parts and functions. In Gramsci’s words, then, a hegemonic praxis would mean pursuing “what is identical in seeming diversity of form and on the other hand of what is distinct and even opposed in apparent uniformity, in order to organise and interconnect closely that which is similar.”
In your response, noting the vast differences of opinion that separate Marxists, anarchists, social democrats, and so on, you write, “We know that this debate is not going to just go away. But should we bemoan that fact? I think that the Left is stronger because of this ‘strategic dispersal’ in programmatically differentiated Left organizations, as long as these forces remain capable of timely tactical convergence in united front action, in a spirit of solidarity. The latter can be different, but at least it doesn't require convergence of most of the Left around a single analysis, vision, and strategy.” I don’t think this is a coherent statement of the problem. We have known since Genesis that human beings are a contentious and argumentative lot, and that we seldom agree on anything. Naturally, then, there will always be debate, argument, and all the rest of it. But that is not the point. The question is how the Left is to achieve certain effects, and what the best way of achieving those effects is. Obviously, if no two people on the Left could agree on anything, then we would have no movements, no organizations, and not even a nominal left. So, it appears that some level of ideo-practical concurrence is necessary for even the most elementary group to be a group. Even a group of Black Bloc anarchists needs to decide which street they are going to run down, whether they are going to destroy property or shoot at the police, and so on. (In spite of the lip service given on the libertarian left to pluralism, if a Black Bloc member unfurls a racist banner praising Rush Limbaugh, he or she will be jumped by the others, the banner torn to shreds. Nor will he or she be invited to play in future reindeer games.) What we afre debating, then, is not whether critical movements are to be unified and have a common conception of the world, but only the degree and nature of that coherence, and the geographical extent and structural arrangement of that unity.
To oppose the coalescence and unity of the Left is therefore not in fact to oppose ideological coherence and practical unity as such; it is only to deny us the coherence and unity that would be required to transform us from nobodies into somebodies—i.e. coalescence and unity on a geographically expansive scale. It need hardly be pointed out, moreover, that single issue, single identity movements, particularly when confined to one locale, can be ideologically blinkered and even regressive in outlook. (The classic example is NIMBY-ism.) One need look no farther than the mainstream American labor movement, for example, to see how difficult it has been for that movement to shed its masculinist, nationalist, and at times xenophobic ethos. Evidently, we are to say to such movements, “Join us in ‘tactical convergence’ in the spirit of solidarity, at your convenience!” But so long as rank and file whites in the labor unions see racial injustice as a “separate issue,” they will not naturally gravitate to a solidarity march to protest the beating of a black teenager by white thugs. Nor will they want to “converge”—tactically or strategically—with the battered women’s movement. And so on. Obviously, there can be no psychological, structural, or material basis for “solidarity” in the absence of a prior, shared set of values and goals, commonly held or perceived. The question is how such a basis is to be established. I for one for one do not see how movements whose “difference” and mutual alterity is to be reified into an ill-defined politics of dispersion can develop even tactical relations of solidarity and convergence. Is this going to happen spontaneously? Or is it going to happen only by cultivating a common conception of the world and establishing a permanent framework and institutions for bringing our movements into closer and closer harmony and coordination? In a word, by unifying them?
When you write that it is “divergence between these [different] views that gives the wider Left access to a more comprehensive set of critical perspectives and insights,” I can only agree to a point. Suppose there are four of us standing on a bridge, and we suddenly notice that a child has fallen into the water beneath us. Being four different individuals with four different sets of experiences, strengths, perspectives, etc., we might come up with four different approaches to the problem of how to save the drowning child. One of us may propose that the strongest swimmer among us dive in. Another, pointing out the dangerous rocks beneath the bridge, might suggest instead running across the bridge and getting a life preserver to throw to the child. A third person might point out that the current is moving too quickly, and the best thing would be to run along the bank and grab hold of the child before she goes under. The fourth person, finally, taking stock of all these points of view, might suggest that one of us run to the camp to get the life jacket and some rope, another call 911, while the other two head down to the bank to wade into the water to grab the child. Realizing that this indeed made the most sense, the four of us instantly set to work. The child is saved.
This scenario shows why having different perspectives and experiences can be quite helpful in getting things done. Prima facie, therefore, it would seem to confirm the dispersed, “tactical convergence” model. After all, no one was in charge, and the individuals ended up performing different kinds of actions. Having different perspectives gave the individuals present “access to a more comprehensive set of critical perspectives and insights,” as you rather nicely put it. In fact, though, the scenario does not legitimate the dispersion model at all, because even acting out of “tactical convergence” presupposes that the parties involved start out with some fundamental commonalities. In our scenario, thus, note that all four individuals share the same strategic goal of saving the child’s life. If they did not, they could not have cooperated on the rescue. Second, all four set out from a common ethical framework. (Imagine there had been four S.S. officers on the bridge, and that the child who had fallen in was Roma or Jewish, and you see the point.) Perhaps more to the point, if our friends on the bridge accepted the permanence of their dissensus and allowed it to define them, it is hard to see how they could have cooperated at all. You write, “people are bound to go on arguing about all these things, producing familiar forms of political disagreement.” But imagine that instead of talking about what to do and reaching consensus on what was to be done, the four of us had instead stood around disagreeing about what was to be done. The child would have drowned. Clearly, there is a point at which diverse perspectives cease to be merely beautiful, and become something more real—a hindrance to action, or an excuse upon which to hang one’s bad faith.
Debate and disagreement are therefore necessary conditions for good, sound, effectual strategizing, but they are in no way sufficient conditions. At some point, the group qua group has to make a decision about which course of action is to be followed. While all perspectives should be aired, all voices heard, this in no way means that all perspectives are equally valuable or are to be followed all at once. That’s because while everybody may indeed be “entitled” to their opinion, opinions vary greatly in truth-value, pragmatism, ethical content, and so on. To assert that all strategies are equally valuable, or have an equal chance of success, would be absurd.
One might well argue, as a libertarian or poststructuralist leftist might, that the proper thing to do would be for each individual on the bridge simply to take action on his or her own. But what if all four decide to call 911 on their cell phones? Perhaps they would jam the lines, calling at once. Or maybe the child would drown before help arrived. (Of course, a consistent libertarian or anarchist would not dial 911 at all, disdaining the state! But no matter.) Or suppose, not being very good listeners (because, being prone by the nature of their theoretical commitments to believe that, since everyone is “different,” everybody therefore must have incompatible, but equally valid, ways of knowing the world), three of them plunge over the side of the bridge, not heeding their friend’s warning about the rocks. My point is this: whether the child lived or not would ultimately hinge on which mattered more to the group, pluralism and “difference”-- everyone being heard, and no individual’s ideas or strategies being privileged over anyone else’s--or saving the child.
If we want to save the ecological system from being so destabilized that the other beings perish; if we want to create an alternative world economic order in which wage slavery has been eliminated; if we want a different gender order, one in which men and women and trans individuals can explore their sexuality and identities freely, without social repression and violent reprisal, then we need to think long and think hard about how such epoch-changing goals are to be achieved. And I have yet to hear anyone explain the “miracle” by which any of these and other critically urgent goals can be achieved through a model of fragmentation and dispersion. You write that, “If the 'fragmentation' took the extreme form of rendering it impossible for the Left to converge around some key points -- support for political and economic democracy, and for social and environmental justice -- then the 'pluralism' might be a problem.” In fact, though, the point is not for us all to converge in “support” of these goals: the point is to achieve them. This may sound like a semantic or pedantic point to make. But I don’t think it is. The Left suffers from an acute metaphysical delusion. We believe, or act as if we believed, that by coming together, here and there, to express our displeasure with existing policies and institutions, we will thereby magically effect the changes we want. It is this metaphysical belief that makes perpetual fragmentation and opportunistic coalition-building seem so appealing.
This brings me to our second point of disagreement: whether or not the Left is faring as badly as I suggest. You write: “If we focus on the ‘visibility’ of the Left in mainstream public debate, things are very bad indeed. If, moreover, we focus on the strength and scale of Left protest movements, then too, things are very bad. True, both of these are legitimate ‘metrics’ to consider.... But there are other dimensions of the Left that are not visible within these two frames. First, there is the vitality, or lack of it, among currents of anti-capitalist radicalism. And second, there is the work being done, often ‘under the radar’ of mainstream attention, to create anticipatory, post-capitalist institutions and practices which model sustainability and social justice.”
I think this is an excellent summary of the “metaphysical” approach to praxis, the very one that has so severely crippled the Left globally this past quarter century and more. Machiavelli correctly pointed out five hundred years ago that politics is the art of appearance. Not to appear in the world, not to be visible, is not to exist politically. Why? Because politics is a struggle over the terms of a society—the values, norms, beliefs, perceptions that constitute and govern the lived reality of a people (or a species). And while there are certainly many ways to change perceptual reality (including planting urban gardens), none of the others can remotely compete with being seen by others. Being visible is the sine qua non for changing the world. There is no hope to be found among “hidden” movements. When a people are flooded from a hurricane, or starved from drought, or whipped along a dusty road as refugees, they have no use for ghosts and chimeras. Unseen currents of “anti-capitalist radicalism”? Community gardens? Fair Trade (which makes up just .000125% of total world trade)? It is all well and good to speak of “prefigurative pilot projects,” useful efforts and ones that we surely ought to encourage. But they are scarcely enough, and there is a huge--and if I may say so, bizarre--disconnect between these extremely modest efforts at the fringes of civil society and the profound crisis that lies before us. Half of the world lives in poverty today. What is going to change that? Those suffering billions need a vital, intelligent, determined advocate—or rather, they need leaders capable of helping them mold themselves into a unified collective force. All else is smoke and mirrors.
What we need to be doing is not reifying our differences, but using theory and practice to strengthen the connections between and among our many movements; to clarify what binds us together at the level of ideology and philosophy; and to identify aspects of our existing practice that are a positive hindrance to the coalescence of those movements. The politics of dispersion is unhelpful, it's apolitical, and it isn't working.
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By Adamroca, Adam at Sep 23, 2009 01:51 AM
This is one of the better articles that I have come across in a while. It does an excellent job surveying the International state of things & placing it in historical perspective, while remaining amazingly concise and succinct.
I noticed that there is somewhat of a divide and disconnect between the folks who focus almost exclusively (or at least seam to) on strategies & visions for the future seemingly almost entirely in isolation from the rest of the world, and community organizers who often seem too overwhelmed with fighting off an attack on many fronts to really develop any kind of coherent and long-term plan that takes larger geo-political realities into account. Are institutions like National & International Think Tanks something the Left should look towards as a potential model to help bridge this disconnect, or are we still lightyears away from having any kind of consensus on our goals and beliefs for this to be reality. Perhaps more importantly, is there a more organic model that we can create (or has been created) that would better allow grassroots movements to develop their own strategies and visions that can help inform future aciton?
I always have such mixed feelings and lack of clarity over the technology issue. In many ways, it has fostered an increasingly individualistic, atomized and even ADD-inducing sense of the world. Your points on its role in undermining some of the key ways that feelings of solidarity and community have been built between folks in important social movements are particularly astute. On the other hand, technology has also allowed inspiring movements (like the ones you mentioned that are happening in Latin America) that serve as important models to be known and fairly accessible to a lot of people all over the globe thanks to technology. I am tempted to temper that statement by pointing out that I so happen to live in a country very much so dominated by technology, so I am probably overstating this point. But, I think its also true that in many of the places where important social struggle has taken place, the role of 'advanced' technology has either been relatively small (and therefore neutral) or actually proved to be somewhat important. At any rate, this is somewhat of an aside, but I'll definitely be interested to hear what you have to say about the role of technology (if any?) will play in helping the Left rethink its goals, strategies and even its identity.
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Re: Technology and praxis
By Sanbonmatsu, John at Sep 26, 2009 19:20 PM
Thanks for your thoughts, Adam. The “disconnect” you mention between practitioners and theorists—between the people in the trenches doing the activist work, and the people busy polishing and repolishing the philosophical cutlery, as it were—is indeed a problem. The gap between the two has only widened in the last thirty years, in part because of the professionalization of critical theory, which now functions primarily as an academic commodity, and only distantly (if at all) as a normative guide to praxis. Certainly there is a case to be made—and indeed has been made, by various authors over the years--for more left-wing think-tanks, institutions like the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington or the Small Planet Institute. (There may be some outside the US, too, but if so, I don’t know about them.) However, my feeling is that this disjuncture between theory and practice won’t be easily solved. It has a lot to do with the commodification of knowledge generally, and with the stranglehold that poststructuralist theories have on so much of contemporary critical theory, in particular. Think-tanks would be a good start, because they could free intellectuals from the mind-numbing pressures academics currently face to justify their existence using the “baroque” language of postmodernism. Independent left “imagineers” (if I may coopt Disney-speak for a moment) could be funded with scholarships to develop and hone our collective utopian aspirations, as well as to work more closely with grassroots activists and organizations to develop practical medium-term strategies. By the same token, activists and nonprofits could also use funded sabbaticals that would allow them to spend more time being exposed to contemporary sociology and political theory.
One caution, however: left-wing think-tanks are unlikely ever to perform the same hegemonic function that the think-tanks of the political Right or the “center” do—organizations like the Heritage Foundation, Brookings Institution, or American Enterprise Institute. Such institutions are powerful because they are funded by and cater to policy-making elites. As such, they are granted a place in the media limelight, which in turn allows them to shape the public discourse and the intellectual life of the nation (such as it is!). By contrast, radical think-tanks like IPS can be and are safely ignored by the state and the media alike. And unfortunately, having been conceived largely as lobbying organizations, they are also ignored by the grassroots left—mostly because no one there has heard of them. Consequently, there seems little point in proliferating left-wing think-tanks unless we are also going to close the gap between theorists and practitioners. And that's a tougher problem to solve.
On the question of technology, you are certainly right that the new communications technologies have been employed to useful effect by innumerable organizations and movements. So the news is not all bad on that front. However, one should bear in mind that the political right takes equal advantage of the same technologies. Moreover, if I am right that increased reliance on media technologies tends to fracture society further, alienate individuals from their neighbors, and erode literacy and critical reflective consciousness, then it is logical to assume that such technologies will ultimately benefit the most irrational forces in society, not the more reasonable and ethical (i.e. other-oriented) ones. But I concede that this is a big “if.”
As I said in my essay, countless well-heeled academic scholars have made fine careers for themselves claiming that the new technologies are “liberating.” (Among these I would draw especially attention to the horrid Henry Jenkins of MIT, who is little more tyhan a shil for the video game industry.) Mostly, though, I think we need to be extremely skeptical of technophilism, and look more critically at the new technologies, many of which have the paradoxical effect of facilitating the most superficial communications between persons, while at the same time desublimating aggression (i.e., removing behavioral inhibitions “prematurely”—which is to say, at a time in history when such inhibitions may in fact serve a useful and necessary adaptive function). Technology is a cultural artifact, and as Langdon Winner pointed out, artifacts have a politics. It is therefore never “neutral.” Yes, even revolutionaries have made use of the internet—the Zapatistas, for example. But consider: the French Revolution was organized overnight, without the benefit of so much as a single mimeograph or telephone call. Something is evidently keeping us from coming together in an effective way to change society. Perhaps technology has nothing to do with it. But then, it doesn’t seem to be helping very much, either.
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Well Done
By Shadwell, Stuart at Sep 22, 2009 16:08 PM
Very well done. A lot of the time the left lets pettiness shatter and fragment itself.
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Well done
By Szczepanczyk, Mitchell at Sep 22, 2009 13:13 PM
John,
This is an extraordinary essay -- well-defined, well-researched, informative, readable, and inspring. It spells out matters in clear detail and doesn't mince words. Despite the sweeping scope of the essay, it doesn't feel overwhelming either. I await with bated breath Part 2 of this outstanding essay.
Let me raise one point. You write: "It is past time for us to let go of any illustions we may still have that the existing approaches, cultures, institutions, and ideologies of the Left are remotely adequate to the task at hand." While this might be true, it's might also extend to the name "Left" since it's, as you note, "the term 'Left' today has in fact little significance in the minds or daily lives of most people in the world." So, if we're jettisoning a lot pertaining to the 'Left', perhaps we should include the term as well.
-- Mitchell
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