The Left & Climate Change 3/3: A Way Forward
[This is the third and final part of a three part ZNet commentary series by political economist Robin Hahnel posted between Dec. 24-26, 2009. Part 1 / 2]
Part 3: A Way Forward
What should Leftists do between now and the meetings of the Conference of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in Mexico next year to get our own train as well as international negotiations back on track? We must begin by affirming how Kyoto put us on the right track, and insist that formal negotiations get back on the track that began in Rio and ran through Kyoto.
(1) Climate change will not be averted unless countries mutually agree to binding reductions in an international treaty. Any illusion that voluntary actions on the part of countries, or even small groups of countries in consort, will secure reductions sufficient to avert climate change is pure fantasy. Theory predicts a voluntary approach will not work and the historical record between Rio and Kyoto confirms it.
(2) Countries bear different responsibilities for causing climate change, countries have different capabilities to bear the costs of averting climate change, and efforts to mitigate climate change should reflect these "differential responsibilities and capabilities." Countries where the majority of citizens have yet to enjoy the benefits of economic development should not be expected to bear the same burdens as more developed countries to prevent climate change. If anything good came out of Copenhagen it is that the less developed countries made very clear they will not agree to any treaty that in effect requires them to give up hope of developing.
But Kyoto was flawed in important ways, and we must demand key changes in a post Kyoto treaty. In short, using Copenhagen as a wakeup call to get Kyoto fixed and back on track is our best chance to combat climate change effectively and fairly in the foreseeable future.
(1) Set a cap on global emissions at whatever level the scientific community tells us is necessary to stabilize carbon concentrations at 350 ppm.
Kyoto set a cap on aggregate emissions in 2012 from Annex-1 signatories at 5.5% below their aggregate emissions in 1990. New scientific evidence indicates that global caps on emissions for 2020 and 2050 must be much lower if we are to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentrations at a level that reduces the risk of cataclysmic climate change to an acceptable level. But why argue for a global cap based on a 350 parts per million target rather than a global carbon tax?
In theory a carbon tax is the best approach because it does not create a new tradable commodity and market that can careen out of control. However, climate activists were not able to win consideration for a significant international carbon tax during the 1990s, and Annex-1 countries agreed to a cap on aggregate Annex-1 emissions for 2012 that, while insufficient, was a significant step. More importantly, at this juncture it is even more apparent that we can win much larger global reductions through caps than we can win through an international carbon tax. Recently an 80% reduction in global emissions - or more - by 2050 has come under serious consideration. Nobody knows how high a global carbon tax would have to be to achieve reductions this deep, but everybody knows that a tax of that magnitude is completely out of the question. In other words, it has turned out we could win much better deals in the form of caps than through carbon taxes.
At one level this is completely irrational because an 80% reduction in global emissions will put a price on carbon just as high as a carbon tax high enough to yield an 80% reduction. On the other hand it is not so irrational if one stops to consider why many people, and therefore even some of their elected leaders, have come to the conclusion that they support a reduction in emissions on the order of 80% or more. The scientific community, in a truly remarkable display of virtual unanimity, is telling us that unless we reduce emissions by 80% or more by 2050 we run a significant risk of cataclysmic climate change. The scientific community is not qualified to recommend how high we would have to set a carbon tax to reduce the risk of cataclysmic climate change, and makes no attempt to do so. But sensible people are now willing to accept the advice that a unified scientific community can offer about the amount and pace of necessary global reductions to reduce the risk of cataclysmic climate change to an acceptable level. The fact is climate activists were getting nowhere as long as economists and politicians dominated the climate debate, and climate activists only started to move forward when the scientific community seized the microphone. In order to embrace the incredible coup the scientific community has pulled off we need to accept a program based on caps rather than taxes.
(2) Cap emissions in all countries but give less developed countries much higher caps, including caps in excess of their present emissions for some years into the future, and place more stringent caps on more developed countries by whatever amount is necessary to achieve the global emission cap determined in #1.
Much of the literature criticizing carbon trading consists of exposes of cases where certification and sales have taken place when credits were awarded for reductions that were not legitimate because the emission reductions were not "additional" to what would have occurred in any case, or the reductions credited indirectly permitted emissions to increase elsewhere in the country, a problem referred to as "leakage."
But what many critics fail to understand is that if the seller of a bogus "certified emission reduction" (CER) is located within a country whose national emissions are capped this does not erode overall emission reductions as long as the seller's country is forced to comply with its national obligations under Kyoto. Suppose the CERs for a 100 ton reduction sold by a Canadian power company to a Japanese power company is completely bogus -- a pure hoax. Under Kyoto, Japan can now emit 100 tons more than it would have been permitted to otherwise. The Canadian power company, by assumption, will not emit any less than it would have in any case. However, the country of Canada will now be required to emit 100 tons less than it would have been required to otherwise because a source within Canada sold CERs for 100 tons to a source outside Canada, and therefore those responsible for verifying that Canada has met its Kyoto treaty obligations will add 100 tons to the reductions Canada is required to make. So global reductions will be exactly equal to the global reductions agreed to by Canada and Japan even if the CER is totally bogus, as long as the Canadian government is forced to meet its obligations under Kyoto.
In other words, when sources in countries whose national emissions are capped sell bogus CERs to sources in other countries the effort to avert climate change is not "cheated." But if not the environment, then who has our devious Canadian power company cheated by accepting a handsome payment for doing nothing? When an apple seller cheats by selling a rotten apple it is the apple buyer who is cheated. However, in the case of CERs the Japanese power company got exactly what it wanted - credit for reducing 100 tons which allows it to emit 100 tons more than it could have otherwise. But if neither the environment nor the buyer of the bogus CERs were cheated by the Canadian power company scam, then who was cheated? Could this be one of those so-called crimes without victims? Unfortunately not. The Canadian power company has cheated its fellow Canadians. By selling bogus CERs it has forced Canada to reduce its emissions by 100 more tons than it would have had to otherwise. Somebody else in Canada is going to have to reduce their emissions by 100 more tons than they should have had to. It is other Canadians who are the victims when a source in Canada sells bogus CERs to someone in another country.
Where critics of carbon trading have a valid point is when they argue that if a seller of a bogus CER is located in a country whose national emissions are not capped this diminishes global reductions and the goal of averting climate change is cheated. If the credit is legitimate - i.e. "additional" and without "leakage" -- then the global reduction target is not undermined and there is no problem. But if the credit sold from an uncapped country is not legitimate we have a problem. Moreover, there is every incentive for the seller of the credit to try to cheat, there is no incentive for the buyer of the credit to insist on its legitimacy, there is no incentive for the country where the buyer is located to care if the credit purchased is legitimate, and in the case of a country whose national emissions are not capped, there is no incentive for the government where the seller is located to make sure the credit is legitimate either.
Of course this is why Kyoto gave the power to certify emissions reduction credits to the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and did not rely on host governments of non-Annex-1 countries to monitor the legitimacy of requests for credits by sources in their national territories. But it is not easy to establish a hypothetical base line scenario and determine how much more a project reduced emissions than they would have fallen anyway, much less be sure the project did not indirectly allow for an increase in emissions somewhere else in the country. By capping emissions in all countries we guarantee that even if bogus projects are approved, or even if projects are awarded more CERs than they merit, the global emission target is not undermined in any case. In effect, by capping emissions in all countries we protect the integrity of the overall treaty objective from certification mistakes that are predictable.
Critics will no doubt object that this is not fair. They will say it is not fair to cap emissions of poor countries who are least responsible for causing climate change and least able to bear the costs of curtailing climate change. Critics will argue this effectively prevents poor countries from developing and catching up with the developed economies. These arguments against capping emissions in every country are absolutely correct if the caps are equal for all countries. However, none of these arguments against capping emissions everywhere holds true if countries have different caps set according to their different "responsibilities and capabilities."
Of course equally restrictive caps for all is unfair. But sensible people, and even sensible governments, understand this. The European Union has assigned lower caps to more developed member countries like Germany and France and higher caps to less developed members like Portugal and Ireland. Once it is understood that capping everyone does not mean the same cap for everyone it is apparent that equity can be achieved at the same time that erosion of global emission reductions resulting from failure to cap emissions in all countries is prevented. Moreover, there is no reason we cannot allow poor countries to increase emissions for some time, as long as the increase is capped.
One excellent proposal for determining equitable caps for developed and developing countries alike is the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework proposed by Paul Baer, Tom Athanasiou, and Sivan Kartha. (The Right to Development in a Climate Constrained World: The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. Berlin: Heinrich Boll Foundation, Christian Aid, EcoEquity, and the Stockholm Environmental Institute, 2007.) They address the complaint that while more people in lesser developed countries have failed to benefit from economic development than in more developed countries, nonetheless there are some poor people living in more developed countries who also should have a right to benefit from economic development and not have to bear the costs of preventing climate change. Moreover, there are some wealthy people in lesser developed countries who have enjoyed development and can afford to bear part of the cost of preventing climate change. These authors propose a practical way to measure the proportion of each country's residents who have already enjoyed the benefits of economic development, and therefore should be expected to bear some of the costs of preventing climate change, which can then be used to calculate a set of equitable caps for all countries. The principle of differential responsibilities and capabilities was implemented in Kyoto using a discrete variable to divide countries into two groups and requiring mandatory reductions from more developed countries while leaving lesser developed country emissions uncapped. This may well have been the best way to affirm an unwavering commitment to equity at the beginning. But the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework formula arguably implements the same principle better via a continuous variable that has the considerable advantage of permitting us to cap emissions in all countries, guarantee that any bogus trading cannot undermine planned global reductions, and thereby remove any obstacles to maximizing the flow of income from North to South that full trading yields.
Of course the more we allow developing countries to increase emissions before reaching their caps, more stringent caps must be on industrialized countries in order to meet a given level of global reductions. Nobody is suggesting that reaching agreement on differential caps will be easy. But agreeing on differential caps for Annex-1 countries was not easy in Kyoto, yet agreement was reached. In any case, the answer is simple no matter how difficult negotiations may prove: Capping all countries is the only way to guarantee that we will meet our global emissions reduction goal. Capping all countries is the only way to reap the full efficiency gain possible from carbon trading and maximize the flow of payments from North to South without risking undermining the overall reduction target. And by varying the caps for countries with different responsibilities and capabilities sufficiently - including allowing emissions increases for some time in poorer countries - equity can be secured.
(3) Cap national net emissions rather than national emissions.
If the international treaty held governments responsible for national net emissions, governments would have an incentive to discourage activities that emit carbon and also have an incentive to encourage activities that increase carbon sequestration. The international treaty needn't dictate to governments how they go about doing this. Since conservation generally yields fewer net emissions than deforestation followed by replanting, national governments would be foolish not to make sure that conservation was also financially more attractive.
(4) Give national governments the power to certify or refuse to certify emission reduction credits for sale by parties operating in their territories.
As long as emissions from non-Annex-1 countries are not capped there is no choice but to give an international agency the power to review applications for CERs from applicants in those countries because there is no incentive for non-Annex-1 country governments to blow the whistle on bogus proposals for CERs by home country applicants. For this reason Kyoto had no choice but to create an international professional bureaucracy to play the role of sheriff.
However, as hard working, honest, and professionally competent as the clean development mechanism (CDM) Executive Board and the Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) they work with may be, the CDM is still an international bureaucracy subject to the pressures all international bureaucracies respond to. In the end they have nothing at stake but their salaries and reputations. Meanwhile they are subject to political pressures from different sides. On the one hand, international environmental organizations concerned with preserving the integrity of global reductions apply political pressure on the CDM to tighten standards and deny certification to questionable projects. On the other hand, those who wish to sell or buy CERs, any governments who lobby for business interests operating in their territory, and those who favor the income flows from more developed countries to lesser developed countries which CER sales generate apply political pressure on the CDM to approve more projects and increase the volume of CER trading. The result has been suboptimal in two ways. While most projects approved have been legitimate, a troubling number of bogus projects have also been approved which has undermined planned global emissions reductions. Meanwhile those worried about the negative effects of bogus projects have succeeded in limiting application of the CDM mechanism by requiring Annex-1 countries to meet their reduction quotas "predominantly" from internal reductions, and by excluding certain categories of projects deemed too difficult to evaluate and monitor. This has led to a failure to minimize the global cost of achieving reductions and also limited the transfer of income from MCDs to less developed countries.
However, once net emissions are capped in all countries, not only do mistaken awards of CERs no longer undermine the global reduction target, there is also a policeman available with a great deal to lose from mistaken awards, including awards for projects that increase sequestration. It is in the interest of country governments to keep private parties operating within their territories from selling more CERs in the international carbon market than the amount by which a project actually reduces emissions or increases sequestration above and beyond what would have occurred had the project not been undertaken because, as explained above, if country governments whose net emissions are capped fail to prevent this, it will be those governments or their citizens who will suffer the adverse consequences of having to cover the shortfall by reducing net emissions more than they would have had to otherwise.
(5) Concentrate attention on the relatively easy task of measuring national net emissions and the crucial task of establishing effective penalties for non-compliance.
Measuring national annual emissions is relatively easy based on readily available information about production levels and technologies in use. And yes, this means the fuss in Copenhagen over Chinese refusal to allow outsiders to engage in on site inspections was actually quite silly. Verifying national carbon emissions is not at all like verifying compliance with a non-proliferation nuclear weapons treaty where onsite inspections of nuclear energy programs play a critical role. Similarly, global information systems (GIS), international temperature and rainfall readings, and international biological maps now make it relatively easy to measure how much carbon is sequestered in the national territory of a country during a year. On the other hand, measuring how much an individual project decreased net emissions over its lifetime compared to what would have happened had the project not been undertaken is quite difficult because it requires establishing a hypothetical baseline and evaluating net emissions over multiple time periods. Much discussion about measuring and cheating confuses this crucial difference between what is easy to measure and what is difficult to measure.
The international treaty needs only to measure annual, national, net emissions because that is what signatories commit to and must be held responsible for. That task is relatively easy and governments will have a difficult time claiming treaty monitors have made significant errors. What the international treaty organization needs to worry about instead of measurement problems, which for the treaty organization are minimal, is how to secure an agreement among signatories on an effective set of penalties for non-compliance, without which the entire exercise is pointless. Continuing to postpone discussion of how to enforce compliance guarantees that negotiations will not be taken seriously. The fact that most Annex-1 signatories will fail to meet their commitments under Kyoto in 2012 miserably proves that the issue of enforcement can no longer go ignored.
If reduction or sequestration credits are to be traded between private parties operating in different countries as I propose, the amount by which net emissions have been decreased through the efforts of the seller must be measured. Yes, they must be measured, and certified, and the judgments about additionality, leakage, and permanence this requires can be quite difficult. But once net emissions are capped in all countries any errors in these measurements and certifications cannot prevent the treaty from achieving its global, net emission target -- provided national annual net emissions are measured accurately and treaty signatories are induced to live up to their commitments. In other words, if the treaty is fixed as I have outlined above, the fact that it is difficult to determine how many credits a seller should be awarded does not matter in the way critics believe. Mistakes in assigning reduction credits for individual projects merely benefit the seller at the expense of the seller's fellow citizens if the seller is awarded more credits that deserved, or benefit compatriots at the expense of the seller if fewer credits are awarded than deserved.
While lesser developed country governments in particular may well appreciate help and advice in awarding CERs to applicants operating within their territory from a staff of experienced professionals whose salaries are paid by an international treaty organization, national governments should have the right to make decisions that affect only their own citizens, and once national, annual, net emissions are capped, governments will have every incentive to make accurate awards.
(6) Once these five changes in Kyoto are made we can then hold our noses and support full carbon trading for three reasons.
First, no matter how badly the carbon market functions, no matter how much an unregulated financial sector inserts carbon permits into its murky, toxic, financial soup, no matter how impossible it becomes to verify that what has been chopped up and divided, bought and sold, repurchased and resold, and packaged in a myriad different forms and combinations with dozens of other questionable assets are in fact real emission reductions rather than fakes; necessary global emission reductions guaranteed by #1, and a fair distribution of the costs of achieving those reductions guaranteed by #2 will not be undermined or compromised in any case.
Second, full trading of emissions credits will produce a flow of income from North to South that far exceeds current aid flows or any reparation payments that are likely to be agreed to. Many Left critics fail to understand that carbon trading of legitimate CERs not only reduces the cost of compliance for more developed country sources and governments - which is good not bad because it makes it easier to lower their caps even further - it also provides a substantial benefit to lesser developed countries. Lesser developed country sellers of CERs and more developed country buyers of CERs divide the efficiency gain from reducing emissions in the lesser developed country rather than in the more developed country between them. The higher the price paid for CERs the more of the efficiency gain goes to lesser developed countries, the lower the price of CERs the more of the efficiency gain goes to more developed countries. But in either case the CDM generates a flow of income from North to South that would stop if the CDM were shut down, as many on the Left have called for.
And third, emission trading will lower the global cost of achieving emission reductions considerably and thereby make it easier to win political approval from electorates in more developed countries for the deep level of reductions necessary.
In short, this is why the Left should support an international treaty with mandatory caps rather than waste time we don't have trying to change course once again calling for an international carbon tax that would not be nearly high enough. This is why it is counterproductive to forego the benefits that trading emission credits brings in a world driven by market forces. And these are the changes in the Kyoto Protocol that would make it effective, fair, and well worth fighting for as we continue to work to convince more and more people to throw off the capitalist albatross that regrettably still hangs around our necks.
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Making Carbon Programs Progressive
By Hahnel, Robin at Jan 18, 2010 21:36 PM
Yes... We are in agreement.
Equal dividends for all people is highly progressive in the US where income distribution is highly unequal. (I'm guessing that income distribution is not quite as unequal in Denmark, which would make equal dividends for all not quite as progressive there.
While carbon consumption (direct plus indirect) is correlated positivey with income, since lower income people spend a higher percentage of their income on carbon that is why puting a price on carbon, in and of itself, is regressive. At least here in the US it is not only very poor who spend more of each dollar on carbon, this is true on up through the income distribution. Only because the rich have so much more income and spend so much more do they also consume more carbon. At least in the US, per dollar of income lower income people buy more carbon than higher income people. That is why a carbon tax, or a cap and trade program, is regressive unless revenues collected are rebated in a way that makes up for the regressivity of the tax.
There are excellent empirical studies of the distributive effects of the Cantwell-Collins "cap and dividend" bill here in the US. If 75% of the revenues from selling 100% of the permits is used to give every legal resident of the US an equal dividend -- as the bill proposes to do -- households up through the 70th percentile get more back than they lose, and only those above the 70th percentile lose income.
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Re: Making Carbon Programs Progressive
By Corbett, Jean-Francois at Jan 19, 2010 04:45 AM
> "At least in the US, per dollar of income lower income people buy more carbon than higher income people. "
I've heard this a lot, but I'm still trying to convince myself that this is really true...
I understand that consumption in lower-income groups includes a relatively high proportion of such necessities as electricity, heat, and commuting, which are almost exclusively derived from fossil fuels and therefore carbon intensive (CO2 emitted per $).
But is the extra (differential) consumption by higher-income people really less carbon intensive -- and is it significantly so? For lack of better data, I picture lower-mileage cars, larger homes (and so more heating and electricity), more airplane trips, all of which seem equally carbon intensive... What exactly would be the things that are less carbon intensive than what less wealthy folks buy? (I'm guessing perhaps designer/luxury items, entertainment...)
If you happen to know of a data set you could point me to, that would really be great. To a first approximation, US data is probably applicable to any western economy, so that would be fine!
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Diviends and Progressivity
By Hahnel, Robin at Jan 14, 2010 09:08 AM
Jean-Francois Corbett is completely correct, and I was wrong about equal dividends for all not being progressive a progressive payout. As he says, the sign change -- paying out instead of collecting -- makes all the difference in the world. In a world of unequal incomes, equal lump sum payouts is progressive. As in all programs we can always fight for making the payouts even more progressive, but equal dividends for all is progressive. My bad.
I was thinking (poorly) about another fact that makes designing a progressive tax or cap and trade policy difficult. Puting a price on carbon -- whether via tax or cap and trade -- will hit lower income folks harder than higher income folks, i..e. lower income people will pay a higher percentage of their income on the new tax. Energy and gasoline bills will be higher as will the prices of all products whose production is relatively energy intensive. Lower income people spend a higher portion of their income on these items than richer people, who save a higher portion of their income as well. So a well known problem with energy taxes, and green taxes in general, is that they have a regressive impact when we trace through what economists call the "tax incidence." That means the rebates have to not only be progressive in and of themselves -- which equal dividends for all is -- they have to be MORE progressive than the regressivity of the energy tax incidence. In order for the entire program -- tax plus rebate -- to be progressive the payout must MORE THAN MAKE UP FOR the regressivity of the tax incidence.
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Re: The Left & Climate Change 3/3: A Way Forward
By B, Harel at Jan 10, 2010 20:04 PM
(I already have your contact information so no need to share it; my email to you may have to wait until next weekend though..I'm not as efficient as you at juggling all the fulltime prof plus activism at the same time, as you are;all the more power to you!)
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Re: The Left & Climate Change 3/3: A Way Forward
By B, Harel at Jan 10, 2010 19:57 PM
Growth of GDP is growth in the VALUE of goods and services produced in the economy., not necessarily the PHYSICAL MASS of goods produced. Aside from any problems of mis-measurement, and misinterpreting growth of GDP as an indicator of overall economic performance, this is very different from growth of "through-put.
Agreed. And I certainly do not under-value the role of more refined economic terminology and analysis. However the theorem "if (GDP growth is positive) then (growth of use of physical resources)" being true (even while the two are far from the same) the problem that people are trying to highlight, people waking up to ours being an economy based on never-ending growth, is a real one we can make common cause with them to address in moving to a different economic model.
Sadly, it is apparently the case that anytime one composes a long enough post, the login times out and you lose everything you type. Again, in my case. So I won't try to reproduce the other pints; I'll resort to email, hopefully without being considered an intrusion. It's about time this math professor admirer of yours and of Z magazine and concerned about AGW and peak, introduced himself.
Harel
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Peak Oil
By Hahnel, Robin at Jan 09, 2010 10:07 AM
Back in the early days of "limits to growth," environmentalists (Lester Brown, Club of Rome Report) worried that global capitalism was not sustainable because we were using up key natural resources, like oil, at a rate that would exhaust supplies before adequate substitutes could be found, if substitutes were even possible. In short, we were going to starve to death for lack of oil.
Now scientists tell us that the problem is we are burning fossil fuels, like oil, at a rate that will create catastrophic climate change long before the supply of fossil fuels is exhausted.
You can only die once.... and you will die of whatever the first disease to kill you happens to be, which makes the second disease completely irrelevant.
While I do not pretend to be a scientist I believe that scientists have made a useful correction in light of new data. While it may have once appeared that the important problem with regard to natural resources was exhausting their supplies before adequate substitutes could be found, in light of new data about the effects of burning fossil fuels on atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases it appears that we are actually on course to broil ourselves to death long before we starve to death.
If scientists are now correct -- and I believe they are -- does this not imply that collapse theories based on "peak fossil fuel" problems are no longer of interest? Put differently, hasn't the problem turned out to be that we did not arrive at "peak oil" and "peak coal" soon enough!
Note: It may be important to distinguish between oil and coal in this regard. It is conceivable that we could run out of oil sooner than we broil ourselves to death by burning both oil and coal. In this case we might have a "peak oil" problem that precedes cataclysmic climate change created because coal supplies were too large and we could not kick our habit of coal gorging soon enough. But my non-professional reading of trend lines leads me to doubt it. I think we need to worry about broiling ourselves to death.
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Need coalition between EcoLeft, Parecon, and POAM
By B, Harel at Jan 07, 2010 18:28 PM
"Right now I think we are at least 10 years away from having any chance to replace global capitalism"
Indeed. And the "at least" part looks pretty gloomy. At the same time, climate tipping points and non-linear sudden negative changes are possible not only "starting 10 years from now" but, indeed, in the meantime.
I'm woindering if you (RH) have considered any partnerships or at least dialog with, the "peak oil [awareness] movement"?
Although I am more aware than most (having been involved for some years and following peak oil since 2000) of some of the negatives of that movement (including not just 'survivalist' and 'black helicopter' but also quite strongly racist/antisemitic/xenophobic elements) there are within that broad movement moderates and progressives who understand something very central, that most people, even most liberals and at this time even most progressives do not understand:
* That any economic system which necessitates perpetual growth (as the present one(s) we have do/es) is not merely undesirable but a physical/mathematical impossibility.
Michael Albert argues, fairly persuasively I think, that a big obstacle, perhaps one of the largest, to getting people to listen to non-capitalist and/or post-capitalist ideas is not that they have many illusions about the present systembut that they think another one is not possible (hence his analogy to tryingto talk to people about human mortality and trying to convince people to join himin a movement 'to fight against it')
In light of this, what could be more powerful than an increasing mass of people in the U.S. and the developed world, then, who realize that not only is the present system NOT destined to be the only one that can work, but, quite the opposite, is 100% CERTAIN to NOT stick around indefinitely? So have you interacted at all with or tried to interface with the peak oil [awareness] movement? (POAM)
This would seem to be a separate issue from "how do we fight for as much change to help the environment as is possible, while we're still stuck with our corporatist "capitalist" system?" and in a way it is, however, I hope you'll agree that we don't have the luxury of deciding which of these two struggles to engage in..we must BOTH (a) work on mechanisms, perhaps cap-and-rebate and others, within the present systemAND (b) do all we can to hasten the arrival of the day a criticdal mass of people realizes we must move to another economic system -- and I think (b) MUST go along with (c) creating models on a small/regional scale, otherwise the realization of (b) may end up with powerful movements to change from the present system to something else just as bad or worse.
Because if we don't work on (b) (and alongside it, (c)) then that "at least 10 years" will become "At least 25 years" and onwards (until the system 'breaks', but then without (b) and (c) that breakage would lead to somethign worse, e.g. fascisto-feudal, etc)
And the beauty of the notion I'm suggestion of working with (enlightened) elements within POAM is that those enlightened elements understand, better than most, the climate crisis (and understand why peak oil won't save us from it), so we can work with them both on the (a) part of cap-and-rebate and other policies (like moratorium on coal as per video etc) and also work with them towards (b) and (c).
The enlightened subset of which I speak is not a huge..but it's large enough that, compared to the number of Zmag style folks working on both (a) tactics and activism and on imagining and thinking about (b)/(c) towards post-capitalism, that former group is of very considerable size; I'd guess enough to help more than double our side if they joined forces with us. Have you followed peakoil.com at all? Energybulletin.net? Theoildrum.com? (See e.g. HErman Daly's guest post on steady state economy -- there is a 10 point summary at the end -- at http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3941 )
What do you think? Are you and others who've advocated Parecon, EcoLeft (including self described eco-socialists) and others, willing to take steps to look for partners in the (IMHO rapidly growing) POAM?
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Re: Need coalition between EcoLeft, Parecon, and POAM
By Davidson, Carl at Jan 08, 2010 09:05 AM
You have to clarify 'perpetual growth.' Perpetual growth in knowledge and high design is not only possible, but highly desirable. And information is indeed a commodity, even if one of a special type. In fact, it's the way to reduce or hold steady production in other sectors. Otherwise, even if we all live with the light footprint of the Amish, we'll still run out of land.
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Growth of What?
By Hahnel, Robin at Jan 09, 2010 10:43 AM
I agree with Carl Davidson about the importance of being very careful what you mean when you talk about "growth," "perpetual growth," "exponential growth," or any of the other phrases that are commonly used in these discussions. In particular, "how can we have infinite growth on a finite planet" is a phrase packed with imprecision that leads to much confusion.
Growth of GDP is growth in the VALUE of goods and services produced in the economy., not necessarily the PHYSICAL MASS of goods produced. Aside from any problems of mis-measurement, and misinterpreting growth of GDP as an indicator of overall economic performance, this is very different from growth of "through-put." "Through-put" is a concept ecological economists developed. It refers to physical matter that enters the economy -- natural resources that exist in finite supplies -- and physical matter that is depsited back into the natural environment -- physical waste of different kinds that the natural environment has a finite capacity to absorb. It is inherently impossible to measure in an unambiguous way because there are different components to the physical matter included in "throughput" -- coal, top soil, tin ore, for example -- but the concept is still useful precisely because it distinguishes something that is physical matter from something that is VALUE not physical matter per se. Infinte growth of through-put is impossible on a finite planet. Infinite growth of GDP is possible on a finite planet.
BTW: Any constant rate of growth is, by definition, "exponential growth."
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In Response to Steve D'Arcy
By Hahnel, Robin at Jan 07, 2010 17:23 PM
Steve D'Arcy wrote:
"So, in a nutshell, what bugs me about the article is that it is (1) utopian in its assumptions about how the political process works in capitalist states, and (2) that, rather than admitting that this is just "ideal theory" with limited real-world application, it presents its policy framework as something to be adopted by the actual movement, to be used as a basis for mobilizing people."
Steve finds me politically naive about how "the political process works in capitalist states." jRather than get on my high horse and point out I have been a radical anti-capitalist precisely because I recognize the limits of what can be accomplished within capitalism for over forty years, let me try to be more constructive. What I think this disagreement comes down to is how far any particular capitalism can, or cannot be improved short of system change, and how close we are, or are not to being able to achieve system change. Leftists have disagreed about these matters from time immemorial.
Right now I think there is a relatively large area for possible improvement. The kind of neoliberal capitalism we are suffering under is in serious crisis and falls far short of a more social democratic kind of capitalism that is certainly possible. Of course that requires powerful social movements and a successful political strategy to reduce the power of giant corporations and dispell capitalist myths among a large sector of the populace. But in my view this is possible and well worthwhile. It requires a lot more intelliegent hard organizing work than the Left has show the stomach for in quite some time.
Right now I think we are at least 10 years away from having any chance to replace global capitalism with participatory eco-socialism -- Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and a few other bright spots notwithstanding. No matter how much ruling elites screw up and put their own system in jeopardy, and no matter how much the climate crisis turns for the worse --- both of which are quite likely -- we are 10 years away from desirable system change because the system we want is a democratic one -- one which enjoys the support of a majority of the population and is led by a significant minority who know how to build participatory eco-socialist economies. In other words, the constraint on system change is not lack of crises in the foreseeable future but the pitiful size and strength of the movement for participatory eco-socialism at present.
So, (1) climate change both can and must be addressed in a far more effective way than it is currently in the next 10 years, and (2) we need to convince many more that we have better ideas about how to solve economic and environmental problems than those who rule today. When judged with regard to their ability to help us accomplish those two tasks I find the Climate Justice Action demands I evaluated very lacking. I think the demands/program I proposed go a long way toward providing a useful list of demands to fight for that demonstrate our ability to solve problems much more effectively.
Besides, I have suggesting ADDING a more concrete program to Climate Justice Action's agit/prop program, not eliminating the Climate Justice Action demands. The only think I have argued Climate Justice activists must eliminate is trashing any and all proposals that involve any kind of carbon trading.
In effect, I find the Climate Justice Action demands and criticisms of cap and trade programs economically naive. They do not reflect any understanding of how a global market system works, and/or a naive believe that we can quickly will global capitalism out of existence.
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Re: The Left & Climate Change 3/3: A Way Forward
By B, Harel at Jan 05, 2010 19:47 PM
I think the system just lost my post of 5 minutes ago which would be a shame since it was not only a good vent but tried to say more directly and bluntly some realities we need to face. I hope it's not lost I hope it shows up later.
Meanwhile I agree with much of what you said Steve D., but I don't think Robin was (absurly or not) trying to "dismiss" the Climate Justice list...but rather to AUGMENT it. And what you're saying (and some of what I tried to say) could be used to augment what Robin Hahnel said. Robin was saying the demands of the C.J. movement are good, but we need to augment [I]. [those demands] by [II][.some cap&trade related demand demands] (even if we agree with Steve D, as I personally do! that they will never be agreed in anywhere near full form by today's capitalism/political leaders) and then we can say, strategically over the next 10 years and in short term specific tactics, we need [III] civil disobedience and [other tactics] to augment [I] and[II].
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pragmatism? or utopianism?
By D'Arcy, Steve at Jan 01, 2010 15:15 PM
I don't have too many objections to the imagined policy framework proposed in Part 3 of this article, as long as it is understood as a strictly intellectual exercise, of no particular relevance to the political conflict around climate crisis mitigation. It may be true that, IF we could imagine ALL of these provisos being adopted, and IF we could imagine them being implemented over time in a sustained way, THEN the outcome with respect to climate change in the coming couple of decades might be better than the climate outcomes if no carbon trading scheme were adopted, given that we have to "be realistic about time frames" on the climate issue.
What bothers me about the article, though, is that it is NOT proposed as a purely intellectual exercise, of no relevance to political conflict. On the contrary, it is explicitly pitched under the false pretence of pragmatism. Robin is saying that his view is MORE realistic and pragmatic, and LESS utopian and fantastical, than the agenda proposed by Climate Justice Action. If the Left had more impact on outcomes than it now does, I would regard this as a positively dangerous intervention, and I would be worried that it might gain influence with a section of the movement, with possibly disastrous outcomes for humankind. Of course, this fact -- that what Leftists believe has little impact on what actually happens in international climate policy-making -- is cold comfort indeed, since the world really needs a strong and influential climate justice movement. As people concerned about the future of humanity, we have to do whatever we can to push the movement in the right direction, which is a concern that Robin obviously shares. But I draw very different conclusions from this concern than the ones that Robin proposes.
First, why is it so implausible to present carbon trading of the type proposed in Part 3 of the article as a pragmatic, realistic alternative to a more sweeping social-transformation agenda like the one proposed by Climate Justice Action? The answer will, I hope, be clear to most readers. Robin writes as if policies adopted by governments vary independently from policies favoured by corporations. Just stating it out in the open is enough to discredit this suggestion. Policy-making in a capitalist-dominated polity is not an independent variable, but on the contrary it tracks profit-maximization. We know far, far too much about the policy-making process in capitalist states to believe for a second that a policy that is vigorously opposed by a unified corporate class because of its expected adverse impact on profitability, yet which is manifestly in the public interest, will be adopted without a massive fight. Moreover, more often than not it will be defeated even with a massive fight. It is different, of course, if the investor class is internally divided. That can open up possibilities for policy-making that complies with the public interest to some extent, in spite of significant corporate opposition. But Robin has not introduced that kind of consideration, here. He has not, for example, written here about how the movement can become such a source of subversion and radical dissent that relatively low-carbon sectors of big business will break ranks with high-carbon sectors, in order to protect their own hegemony and to protect the system as a whole from being discredited over this issue. On the contrary, he writes in the second last paragraph as if the real problem is "winning political approval from electorates," as if it was not corporate power, but public opinion that stood in the way of a serious attempt to address the climate crisis.
Things look very different, however, if we start out with a more evidence-based assessment of the policy-making process in capitalist states, and a plausible estimate of both the extent of corporate power in that process and the unanimity of elites against any policy framework that could possibly approach (for example) Robin's first policy proposal to "set a cap on global emissions at whatever level the scientific community tells us is necessary to stabilize carbon concentrations at 350 ppm." Once we admit to ourselves that big business will fight tooth-and-nail against anything that comes close to that, we quickly begin to see the folly of encouraging the environmental movement to "buy into" the corporate-dominated climate treaty-making process. If the Left has a role here (which I believe it does), it is to intensify that fight: to put the system on trial, to discredit big business and its underlings in government, and to encourage more and more people to adopt a deeper and more radical critique of the system, as well as an ever-greater willingness to confront the system and its defenders in the context of mass protest, civil disobedience, and other forms of social unrest. THAT is the best way to win concessions: to give elites something to fear even more than they fear the wrath of Shell and Exxon. And THAT is precisely the political strategy of Climate Justice Action, embodied in its excellent list of demands, quoted by Robin but then dismissed by him in a way that sometimes seems frivolous. (Most of his criticisms were of this type: the demand rightly highlights a necessary measure, but by itself that measure would not solve the whole problem -- which is an absurd criterion to apply to a whole list of demands, never mind to each demand taken individually).
Climate Justice Action is correct on two counts. First, they correctly see that capitalism can't solve the problem, because capitalism IS the problem, so we need systemic change in the long (but hopefully not TOO long) term. Second, they correctly see that the best way to win concessions in the meantime (before the system is replaced with a sustainable and just alternative, far more responsive to the public interest) is to provoke divisions and vacillation within ruling elites by using the system's unwillingness to address a pressing human need as a means to put system on trial, radicalize masses of people through grassroots struggle, and intimidate elites into worrying that they are losing their hegemony and becoming discredited because of the intransigence of the most carbon-heavy elements of the ruling class. If, on the other hand, the climate justice movement were to go around demanding carbon trading, the real result is easy to anticipate: we would end up with a set of policies written in large part by advocates of fossil fuel and transportation industries with a lot of help from the banking industry, and the climate justice movement would be in a position not unlike that of the 'liberals' demanding healthcare reform and/or universal healthcare insurance in the US today: they would find themselves getting something that had a similar name to the proposal they themselves advocated, but would in actual fact achieve almost none of the aims that had motivated their proposals in the first place.
So, in a nutshell, what bugs me about the article is that it is (1) utopian in its assumptions about how the political process works in capitalist states, and (2) that, rather than admitting that this is just "ideal theory" with limited real-world application, it presents its policy framework as something to be adopted by the actual movement, to be used as a basis for mobilizing people.
In solidarity,
Steve.
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Need to move forward on common ground
By B, Harel at Dec 30, 2009 21:09 PM
Robin,
Thanks for your comments. I agree and if it wasn't clear, of course demonstration projects are not a
substitute..they are, hopefully one of many catalysts to speed up awerness-raising..we really need to use all
tools we have from lobby, to civil disobedience, to demonstrating "positive solutions" on a small scale..time
is short for the planet's future to be made less grim. We also need to show non-capitalist alternatives on a
small scale because truly getting away from disaster must mean moving away from capitalism in the "medium
term", which is a way of saying, beyond the "short term" during which, yes, we can (thank goodness) despite
being stuck with corporate capitalism, we can still make some progress to avert the worst for climate.
A. I do realize that Cap&Dividend is a type of, but I don't think there is a "conflating" issue here *if* we
are talking about, first, messages to send to our representatives, and two, messages when to do public
outreach and public: we need to start being on-message both with representatives and our fellow citizens, both
on what we demand of corporations (that they pay rather than get permits for free) and second, it can help
"win over"more fellow Americans (and fellow citizens in EU/Canada/Australia) if they realize there is a
Cap&Dividend option out there.
From a logical point of your I see what you are saying about an international treaty on the one hand, and
national policy on the other hand, but from the practical point of view of "when we say what" we need to start
talking about Cap&Dividend NOW to fellow citizens; if we say nothing about it now, and hope they will support
Kyoto first, and "worry later about national policy" we might not save Kyoto..if our fellow citizens know
about cap and dividend, as part of the overall package we're hoping to get to, then they are more likely to
support Kyoto...heck middle of the road and some mildly conservative Americans might have their ears perked
when they hear about the dividend..So: better justice AND better chance of converting citizens and getting
them to join us to press our national govts ..this is what I was trying to say (not having any illusions that
it would be "less likely to prevent speculators...") I hope we're in agreement on this.
B. As for her (Annie Leonard's) video, I too thought it was a bashing video initially but when I watched again
and all the way to the end it's not a pure bashing video..she does not rely on guilty by association by tries
to warn us about the "devil's in the detail" and her message (as I hear her) is NOT "we must kill Cap and
trade" ..that's not her message. Warning us to press to avoid "carbon offsets" for questionable projects, for
example, that's not saying kill C&T, that's saying, press officials on that issue. " This is a TERRIBLE choice
and should be ADAMANTLY OPPOSED by all progressives because it essentially gives away very valuable new wealth
created as soon as emissions are capped to wealthy polluters" She wholeheartedly agrees and made that point;
one of her main points (4:00mins into video, "cap and giveaway") If you watch the video again to the end, she
is not as far away from you in her position :-) She is saying we should not "put the cart before the horse" by
"Rushing to trade schemes [before first]" making sure we have a firm Cap, plus no give-aways and no bogus
offsets, and something about paying climate debt (even if less than ideal, even if only partial) because that
might be necessary to get the third world to agree to Kyoto anyway, so, she suggests, even from a pragmatic
point of view you want to have those "horses" before the "cart" of trade "schemes" (mechanisms, I assume she
means) being finalized in written in stone first. 7:30minutes in: without these things, would the third world
be on board? "I don't think so" and "if [the version and horse before cart order] of C&T is stopping us from
actually capping carbon, it's a dangerous distraction" (7:40minutes) I might be misreading her but I see her
saying she's NOT oppose to C&T but saying we need to make sure those ducks are in a row before spending energy
on a version of C&T that is (a) deformed so bad for climate and (b) may not even get the developing nations on
board due to the unfairness, and thus not be passed or pass but without India etc on board, the climate is
again screwed. I think she'll agree with most of us and you that C&T once these are addressed, could be a very
positive step forward (other steps: the dividend etc)
She also says a 2009 proposed U.S. C&T law gutted the Clean Air Act. Whether she's right or to whatever
extent, her "if..then" statement seems correct: if a particular U.S. C&T law *weakens* the EPA's ability or
CAA's ability to regulate, that could be a step backwards. (She quoted coal-pal Congressman Rick Baucher who voted for a C&T as saying that C&T "strengthens the case for utilities to continue to use coal") Again she is not making an anti C&T statement but
against certain versions/types of C&T that indeed, seem worthwhile to warn ourselves and others
about. (7:45min and following) She says she bashing "these C&T proposals" (8:34mins) so not bashing C&T itself
in principle. When she says "the next time someone tells you C&T is the best we're going to get, don't believe
them"I think she is again, not against C&T but emphasizing the need for best version of C&T our citizen
pressure can get AND the other actions (ending subsidies for coal is one she mentions inter alia) This
problem is so dangerous we can't afford to fracture: let's try to find common cause on the 95% she and you and
we agree on and press together on all those fronts :-)
C. Re "not can it be" -- in pragmatic terms or in principle? In principle an international treaty could
require each signatory nation to use Cap&Div, it would seem. From pragmatic point of view I won't argue- the
US is so powerful that our job is to press our representatives to move in that direction and the international
community by itself (without massive US citizen involvement) could not get the US government to do C&D, I
agree..
D. Very good points about sanctions and boycotts. Add domestic civil disobedience. I fear there will be other
negative consequences. Over 5 years ago I wrote on usenet that "I predict REAL eco-terrorism" I pointed out
that the term is used in a *bogus* way today, and today the real eco-terrorists are corporations, etc, not
some activist tied to a tree. However, if the US and others continue committing indirect murder of people by
these GHG emissions: rising sea levels, droughts, extreme weather, ocean acidification, weather killing crops
people need to eat, etc, this will kill even more people than today, on a per annum basis, and before too long
- I don't know if it's in the next 10 years or in the next 25 but before long, there will be what Ed Herman
and Chomsky call "retail terrorism"by the victims in retaliation. I don't applaud this but it's easy to
predict as a likely consequence. We need to really education fellow first world citizens (a) how badly this is
screwing over the developing world and (b) how "even" we in the first world are screwing ourselves so citizens
realize the third world is not the enemy but rather our allies on the same side of the fence with
short-term-profit-driven-economics based corporate industrialism being the enemy on the other side.
E. With the tiny number of decades/years we have left to make a difference we need to (intelligently, weighing
things carefully) use everything we've got, from the more reformist/pragmatic to the more radical
post-capitalist mini-projects that can show people in 15 or 25 years when larger numbers realize we need a new
economy, they will have models to help them move faster, and every since 12-month year we can get progress to
happen earlier, is a life and death issue..it's too late to avoid dangerous AGW, it's too late to avoid
disasters, it's not too late to make the disasters smaller and fewer, that's the phase we're in, this is dead
serious.. -Harel B.
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Re: Need to move forward on common ground
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 31, 2009 11:37 AM
In response to B. Harel's initial summary:
I'm glad we are in agreement that we need to push on two fronts -- responding to climate change in the here and now in the most effective and fair way possible while global capitalism persists, while working to replace global capitalism with participatory eco-socialism ASAP. While this does create some intellectual difficulties -- supporting certain market based policies in the present while opposing the market system in principle and in general -- I see no poltitcal obstacles to working out an approach all can be happy with that keeps us from contradicting one another and working at odds. "Replace the market system eventually, and tame the market system in the meantime" describes a great deal of what we need to be doing in many areas as well as with regard to climate change.
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Re: Need to move forward on common ground
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 31, 2009 12:04 PM
B. Harel's point B:
I have not seen the actual video so I should not comment further. I have only a draft script dated November 9, 2009. However, I do wish that Annie and others would read what I have explained about the way the CDM mechanism actually works. Much of the concern over bogus emission reduction credit trading is ill-informed. Much of the criticism also fails to recognize that the CDM is an effective way to achieve more North-South equity than any other mechanism we have ever seen. And none of the criticism of bogus credits acknowledges that there is a simple way to solve the problem entirely -- cap emissions in all countries permitted to trade. People who suggest much will come in the form of reparations I think are misleading the third world. The third world could get a much bigger income transfer through an improved CDM mechanism which is already agreed to.
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Re: Need to move forward on common ground
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 31, 2009 11:55 AM
In respnse to B. Harel's lettered points:
A: I agree. In the US our best domesic policy hope is what is now called "cap and dividend." I think we on the Left should call it "cap and rebate/invest" because "dividend" is SOOO capitalistic! "Dividend" also suggests that equal dividends for all families independent of income is expected. But this is the equivalent on the pay-out side of what has been called a "head tax" or a "poll tax" on the pay-in side -- which is about as regressive as taxes can be.
But fighting for a low cap so the rest of the world can move forward knowing the US is no longer free riding on their efforts to combat climate change, fighting for 100% auction so "we the people" get the new wealth, fighting for rebates that are inversely proportional to family income which is what is fair, and fighting for effective subsidies for new technologies in renewable energy and energy conservation that are not corporate giveaways is the right way to go.
I am not suggesting that we go for an international treaty first and wait to do domestic policy afterwards. That would be a disaster. The US Senate is not going to ratify any meaningful international treaty right now, so we here in the US need to prioritize the fight for a good domestic climate policy like the one above. However, the rest of the world needs to get on with a good treaty and Obama and the US just through a serious monkey wrench in that process in Copenhagen. We need to the US to get out of their way so they can get a good post-Kyoto treaty in place by 2012. What my series was about was what that treaty should look like and what international Leftists should support.
At first the US won't be able to ratify that treaty -- because of our special problem called the US Senate and US Constitution written in 1789 -- but other countries will be able to. If we pass a "good faith reduction" climate bill in the US then other countries can go ahead with a good international treaty that is a modification of Kyoto with the changes I spelled out. That would leave the US as the only non-signator. It would also get China on board as a signator committeed to firm caps because they are above Chinese current emissions for some years into the future, after which China must also agree to caps that amount to reductions. At that point one of two things can happen. Diplomatic pressure of the kinds I suggested before will be brought to bear on the US in any case. And either the US can do what Mexico has done via OPEC -- not become a member but act as if it were anyway -- or the US can get solve our Senate problem and ratify. As I understand it Mexico because of some internal political legal situation cannot join OPEC as a formal member. But it participates just like an actual member in the essentials of limiting production in line with OPEC decisions. The rest of the world could carry through with an effective international climate treaty if the US would simply do that. Instad what Obama did was in effect say that the rest of the world cannot move forward any faster than the US Senate will move forward. And that is a recipe for broiling the planet.
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Re: Need to move forward on common ground
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 31, 2009 12:28 PM
B. Harel's point C.
Climate change will not be averted until an international treaty putsa cap on emissions from all countires -- net emissions is better if we want to get technical. That can be done fairly using the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework formula. That kind of international treaty leaves it up to every country to come up with whatever domestic climate policy or policy mix it wants to meet its treaty obligations. It also leaves every country free to sanction sales of certified emission reductions from sources operating in their territories, or not to do so if the country doesn't want to. If a country sanctions bogus sales this will not adversely affect the effort to avert climate change as long as the country's national emissions are capped. It simply means others within that country will have to make up for the sale of any bogus emission credits. (Annie and those who she works with seem not to understand this at all.)
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Re: Need to move forward on common ground
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 31, 2009 12:31 PM
B. Harel's points D and E:
I agree.
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Who pays?
By Davidson, Carl at Dec 29, 2009 11:59 AM
My point remains a simple one. Any treaty has to be approved by the Senate. And any measure restricting carbon placed in the Congress, including the Senate, that rewards finance capital at the expense of the working class, is going to be opposed by voters, and given the current relation fo forces, will fuel rightwing populism. A carbon tax, rebated progressively to household energy bills, is probably the best direction. But if it's declared off the table, then the Cap and Dividend version of Cap and Trade, as in Cantwell's bill, is the second best hope. Otherwise, forget it. The rightwing has convinced too many that climate change is simply a hoax, or simply a ploy by the banks and liberals to rip them off, even if there is some reality to it.
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Re: Who pays?
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 31, 2009 10:30 AM
Carl Davidson writes:
My point remains a simple one. Any treaty has to be approved by the Senate. And any measure restricting carbon placed in the Congress, including the Senate, that rewards finance capital at the expense of the working class, is going to be opposed by voters, and given the current relation fo forces, will fuel rightwing populism. A carbon tax, rebated progressively to household energy bills, is probably the best direction. But if it's declared off the table, then the Cap and Dividend version of Cap and Trade, as in Cantwell's bill, is the second best hope. Otherwise, forget it. The rightwing has convinced too many that climate change is simply a hoax, or simply a ploy by the banks and liberals to rip them off, even if there is some reality to it.
I'm not sure what you are saying here. When we talk about a carbon tax or cap and dividend we are talking about a domestic US climate bill, not an international treaty. So the problem -- which is a very big one -- that the US Senate must ratify any treaty that commits the US government to specific behavior is beside the point.
However, the US Senate must pass any domestic climate bill, so let's deal with that constraint first before we deal with any constraint you think might be imposed by the US working class. Regarding a domestic US climate bill we cannot win approval in the Senate, or the House for that matter, for a carbon tax that is high enough to achieve the same emission reductions as we can win in the form of a bill that caps US emissions but allows trading of permits. That is the political constraint -- tax phobia -- that suggests we go with cap and trade rather than a carbon tax as domestic policy in the US. Is there any way to make this second best domestic climate policy fair enough to warrant support by progressives who want to reduce US carbon emissions dramatically but do it fairly?
Yes. The first step is to make sure 100% of the emission permits are sold at auction -- which Obama to my surprise since he is such a "centrist" favored while campaigning and even during his first 3 months in office, but will surely backslide on. The second step is to make sure enough of the revenues are earmarked for "dividends" -- I think the Left should use the word "rebate" so we don't give the impression that the working class can become wealthy because we all will become capitalists living off our dividends -- so the bottom 70% of the population is "made whole." We should fight for "rebates" inversely proportional to family income. We should also fight for allocating some part of the revenue to subsidies for renewable energy and energy conservation. That is both the right thing to do given how quickly we need to stimulate new technologies, but also politically necessary to win the full backing of the Enviromental community. This kind of "cap and dividend" as it is commonly called, although I think the left should call it "cap and rebate/invest," domestic policy can be made fair enough so it is a second best policy worth fighting for.
However, I have yet to see a cap and dividend policy that would prevent Wall Street from getting hold of the new commodity, carbon emission permits, working them into their toxic financial soup, and essentially taking their slice of the action at the expense of the working class. I think people fool themselves that the cap and dividend law can accomplish that. If you are saying that as voters the working class will not permit any policy that does that, then I think we are at stalemate on climate policy until one of two things happens. Anti-tax phobia is overcome in the US so a carbon tax that Wall Street does not benefit from becomes possible, or financial reform is won so a progressive tax and rebate/invest policy is possible without a Wall Street rip off.
It has been a long time since I have seen the American working class veto any policy that benefits capital, so unfortunately, I'm not sure that constraint is as binding as the US Senate constraint that rules out a carbon tax that is high enough, at least for the moment. I also believe that unless we win financial reform, disarm Wall Street, and break the power of US financial capital there is little prospect for moving forward on any front in the US. So I would rather see us commit to an all out campaign against Wall Street which would then remove any reason not to pass a cap and rebate domestic climate bill in the US.
PS: Without financial reform the Wall Street rip off due to emission permits will be only marginally higher than the Wall Street rip off without permits because we never passed a domestic cap and rebate/invest bill.
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Re: Re: Who pays?
By Davidson, Carl at Jan 01, 2010 07:11 AM
I think we're in agreement. Cantwell's 'Cap and rebate/invest' has a 65 percent rebate and a 35 percent invent in green technology/jobs ration. Combine it with a transactions tax with revenue going into a green industrial development fund, and we'll have something workable. The fight, however, will be fierce. The potential is there to assemble a counterweight to the hegemony of finance capital and the carbon-based industries, but making it real would require a degree of unity on the anarchist, Green, Marxist and neoKeysian left that has never been seen. But it's a good fight. Do it for that reason, and we'll see what happens.
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Re: Re: Re: Who pays?
By Hahnel, Robin at Jan 01, 2010 12:22 PM
I think we're in agreement also. One of the reasons I wrote the series for ZNet on the Left and Climate Change , and also organized a panel on this subject for the Union of Radical Political Economists at the big ASSA Annual Meetings in Atlanta on January 3, is to try to see if we can get more unity on the Left on this subject. I think we should be able to agree if we can achieve greater intellectual clarity about how things actually work and move past rhetorical posturing that has dominated too much of the discussion up to now. And as you point out, if the Left continues to be strongly divided over climate policy there is little chance we will be able to influence outcomes in a positive direction.
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The UN
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 29, 2009 08:13 AM
Democratizing the UN is, of course, an important task. And the undemocratic nature of the Security Council -- who sits on it, what power the security council has above and beyond the General Assembly, and especially the veto within the Security Council -- are the most undemocratic features of the UN.
However, democratizing the US will not be accomplished easily nor quickly. And I do not think an international climate treaty under UN auspices should or can wait until the UN is thoroughly democratized.
Fortunately this needn't be an insuperable obstacle. While it would be far better to have a democratic UN powerful enough to sanction rogue nation states, there are other means available to the international community to pressure countries who ignore the will of the global community, short of military measures.
There are two different "enforcement" issues that need to be addressed: (1) Since it will always be in the best interest of any single country to refuse to sign an international climate treaty which requires them to reduce emissions, and simply free ride on the emission reductions of other countries we need to consider negative consequences other countries can apply to such an immoral and rogue state. (2) Once countries have signed a treaty there need to be significant negative consequences for failure to meet one's treaty committements.
Moving forward from Copenhagen requires paying attention to the second problem which involves fines of one sort or another that are serious enough to induce compliance with something one already agreed to do. Agreeing to serious financial penalties is not an easy matter which is why it has been avoided so far. But it no longer can be avoided.
The first problem -- which really applies only to the US at this point, but potentially to China as well if China will not sign a treaty that requires it to meet binding caps even when set above China's current emissions level for years into the future -- can be addressed through diplomatic boycotts, economic boycotts, and travel bans among other measures. These are available means that have been and are used currently. It is possible to make a rogue state an international parriah and that can be a very powerful inducement -- even for a country as large and potentially self-sufficient as the United States. If necessary some of these measures can also be used to force compliance with treaty obligations a country has committed to but continues to fail to live up to.
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Re: The UN
By McGehee, Michael at Dec 29, 2009 10:41 AM
"binding caps [...] can be addressed through diplomatic boycotts, economic boycotts, and travel bans among other measures."
do you think those measures could also work to revive efforts to create the treaty?
if so, what do you think the left could be doing to encourage other governments/nations to take such measures?
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Re: Re: The UN
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 31, 2009 12:40 PM
One confusion in our discussions is failure to distinguish the US Left from the international Left. Even if we agree on goals that doesn't mean our tasks are always the same. The international Left should press their governments to proceed with fixing Kyoto and ignoring the US if the US government doesn't want to get on board. The international Left should oppose their governments succumbing to the lure of making concessions to the US to bring the US on board. THAT is a recipe for killing any effective international treaty. Then the international Left should push their governments to use all those diplomatic tools to pressure the US to join the international treaty on THEIR terms, not on US terms.
The US Left should oppose US government attempts to undermine and subvert an interntional treaty that takes the form of an improved Kyoto. And the US Left should concentrate on efforts to get a good "cap and rebate/invest" domestic policy passed ASAP because that is what is most important to preventing climate change and doing it fairly, because that will put the US on a road so we could ratify the only kind of international treaty that is worthwhile, and that is the kind of good faith gesture that will allow the rest of the world to move ahead and do their part.
All Leftists should continue to point out that the corporate market system is the root source of this problem, as well as many others. And all Leftists should be building living experiments in sustainable equitable cooperation as an example of how things should and coult be, and as preparation for replacing the economics of competition and greed with the economics of equitable and sustainable cooperation in more and more countries and eventually world wide ASAP.
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Re: The Left & Climate Change 3/3: A Way Forward
By B, Harel at Dec 26, 2009 13:25 PM
See also http://www.storyofstuff.com/capandtrade/
She's the one who made or narrated (both?) the "Story of Stuff")
She's not really bashing Cap and Trade per se...she brings up thte issues you and I have brought up, and I couldn't agree with her more that a strong "Cap" that is solid, is certainly something worth supporting.
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Re: The Story of Climate Solutions
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 28, 2009 09:43 AM
I have a draft copy of this piece dated November 9 2009 in front of me. It is very much a dismissal of cap and trade that I call "cap and trade bashing" for short. Here are quotes:
"Then I said, wait a miute. What exactly are they planning to do about this problem? So I looked into it. And I gotta tell you, not all the solutions they're working on are what I'd call solutions. In fact, the leading solution, known as cap and trade or emissions trading, is actually a huge problem."
Everything that follows from this beginning is a denunciation of cap and trade.
"OK, meet the guys at the heart of this so-called solution. They include the guyus from Enron wo designd energy trading, and the Wall Street financiers like Boldman jSachs who gave us the subprime mortgage crisis."
She also calls cap and trade a new carbon stock market which it is not.
This is guilt by association. Here are some other people who support a cap and trade international treaty: Frank Ackerman of the Stokholm Institute, a life long leftist and founder of the New American Movement back in the 1970s. Eban Goostein, national director for the Focus the Nation campaign two years back. James Boyce, Professor of Environmental Econmics at the University of Massachussetts in Amherst and fellow at the Political Economy Research Institute, and yours truly. You can go to the Economics for Equity and the Environment website, www.e3network.org, and get a very long list of left environmental economists, the "e3 network," almost all of whom support a cap and trade international climate treaty. The majority of environmental organizations support a Kyoto type international treaty.
Just as support for an idea from bad guys does not necessarily mean an idea is bad, -- which is what most of her argument consists of -- support fromgood people does not make an idea good either. But the fact is that most progressive environmental economists are supportive of a well done cap and trade international treaty., and I have presented a strong case for why the Left should support fixing Kyoto rather than nixing Kyoto because it is a cap and trade treaty.
In her description "So how does cap and trade work?" she conflates an international treaty that caps national emissions with domestic cap and trade programs which is simply wrong. A cap and trade treaty like Kyoto leaves countries free to decide what domestic climate policies they will pursue. I have tried to argue in this series that fixing Kyoto is the ONLY realistic and timely solution to the climate crisis at the international level, and without this there is really no hope of averting serious climate change. There are many options for domestic policies worth debating -- including a carbon tax for countries that do not suffer from tax-phobia.
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Re: The Left & Climate Change 3/3: A Way Forward
By B, Harel at Dec 26, 2009 13:24 PM
Glad to see I'm not the only one who wondered about Cap and Dividend (see first comment in this thread, "so many angles to think about")
where government sells the cap allowances but the revenue directly goes 65% back to the ordinary taxpayers as dividends and the other 35% into a fund for development in renewable technologies
That's rouhgly my understnading ("renewable" here meaning more broadly, conservation/curtailment and efficiency as well as generating from renewables) though one element not in the above quote that is my understanding of how it would work,would be each person getting some basic carbon allowance. What your income or loss would be your share of that 65% (or wahtever the percent) plus A if you are A below your allowance, or else your share of that 65% minute B if you are B units above that allowance. It allows people living carbon-frugally (a group that correlates strongly though not identical to, lower income) to gain even more. It gives people the 'freedom to choose' to pollute more and above their allowance, but that chips away their share of that 65% down to a lower level or down to zero or down to a negative 'dividend'..
I also agree that we must convince Congress (convince meaning, not just 'arguments that logically convince them' but really, pressure strong enough to counter the corporate lobby pressure) no point always saying how badly disappointed we are at Obama when the Senate or House are to his right on many climate or healthcare policies and we have not yet pressured that branch sufficiently.
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Re:
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 26, 2009 17:56 PM
Glad to see I'm not the only one who wondered about Cap and Dividend (see first comment in this thread, "so many angles to think about")
where government sells the cap allowances but the revenue directly goes 65% back to the ordinary taxpayers as dividends and the other 35% into a fund for development in renewable technologies
That's rouhgly my understnading ("renewable" here meaning more broadly, conservation/curtailment and efficiency as well as generating from renewables) though one element not in the above quote that is my understanding of how it would work,would be each person getting some basic carbon allowance. What your income or loss would be your share of that 65% (or wahtever the percent) plus A if you are A below your allowance, or else your share of that 65% minute B if you are B units above that allowance. It allows people living carbon-frugally (a group that correlates strongly though not identical to, lower income) to gain even more. It gives people the 'freedom to choose' to pollute more and above their allowance, but that chips away their share of that 65% down to a lower level or down to zero or down to a negative 'dividend'..
There are several "cap and dividend" proposals out there but they are all proposals for a national policy, not for an international treaty. I could describe what cap and dividend would look like as an international treaty, but when I did none who read ZNet would support it, and it is not anything anyone is discussing at this time.
The important thing about all cap and dividend domestic proposals -- which I support -- is that they ALL support 100% auctioning of the permits iniitially. This is perhaps the most crucial issue when discussing domestic cap and trade policies. When they are auctioned off, in effect "We, the People" are made the owners of the new wealth created by the national cap on emissions. The alternative is to give them away to emitters for free -- the traditional system also called the grandfather system for distributing permits. This is the major fight facing progressives with regard to cap and dividend programs -- making sure the permits are all auctioned off so there are revenues to work with. You mention a particular proposal to then use 65% of the revenues from the auction as "dividends" given back to households to defray their increased energy bills, and use 35% to finance investment in energy efficiecy and renewables. A fine proposal -- which has nothing to do with an international treaty at all. Also, PLEASE NOTE, cap and dividend IS ONE KIND OF CAP AND TRADE POLICY. After the initial auction parties are still free to trade emission permits among themselves as they see fit. That means there will be a new commodity called a carbon emission permit, which speculators can buy and Wall Stree financiers can play games with. Cap and dividend still creates all the problems with Wall Street people worry about.
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A better way
By Davidson, Carl at Dec 26, 2009 06:22 AM
Perhaps I missed something, but my main argument against 'Cap and Trade' over a carbon tax is that it sets up yet another steady revenue stream to finance capital, the traders, out of our pockets, since the cost is passed on to us. There's a much better alternative already in the form of a bill, 'Cap and Dividend,' where government sells the cap allowances but the revenue directly goes 65% back to the ordinary taxpayers as dividends and the other 35% into a fund for development in renewable technologies. Wall St is kept out of the picture. It's not as good as a straight-up carbon tax, but still works.
Otherwsie, by declarinf this or the carbon tax 'off the table,' it's deva vu all over again with the HR 676 and public option battle, where we're simply told to surrender to finance capital in the form or insurance companies because no other world is possible.
Out task is to fight this out locally, with our Members of Congress, because nothing the President agrees to otherwise, without their approval, means anything anyway. The best sell is one even the climate change skeptics can see as having a direct benefit to them, and 'Cap and Trade' is way down on the list.
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Re: A better way, cap and dividend?
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 29, 2009 09:22 AM
Carl Davidson and B. Harel both bring up "cap and dividend." Here are some important things to bear in mind regarding cap and dividend.
(1) Cap and dividend is not under discussion, nor can it be, as an option for an international treaty. In this three part series I was discussing international treaties only, the Left's attitude toward different kinds of international treaties and negotations, and fixing Kyoto which is a kind of cap and trade international treaty. So cap and dividend is not an answer to what we should do internationally.
(2) Cap and dividend as a domestic policy is not an alternative to cap and trade because it IS a kind of cap and trade policy. The defining features of a cap and trade domestic policy are: (a) a cap on national emissions below current emission levels, (b) requiring emitters to have permits sufficient to cover their emissions, and (c) allowing these permits to be bought and sold, i.e. traded, between those who have them and those who want them. Cap and dividend is a version of cap and trade because it contains all three of these elements. Cap and dividend does have two additional feataures. The three defining features above of all cap and trade programs do not specify how the permits which the government prints up are initially distributed. There are two ways to do that: (a) give them out free of charge, or (b) sell them at an auction. Traditionally cap and trade programs have done the former, two well known examples being the US sulfur dioxide cap and trade program and the more recent EU carbon cap and trade program. This is a TERRIBLE choice and should be ADAMANTLY OPPOSED by all progressives because it essentially gives away very valuable new wealth created as soon as emissions are capped to wealthy polluters. The best thing about cap and dividend is that it uses the second method to distribute permits initially, via government auction. This essentially awards the new wealth to "us, the people" which is the only fair thing to do. It also gives the government a large batch of new revenue it did not have before. And that is where the second part of cap and dividend comes in. Either all or part of that revenue is designated to be given back as "dividends" to households to defray the costs of higher energy prices that will lower households' real incomes unless they are compensated. So cap and dividend is not an alternative to a cap and trade domestic climate policy, but it is a very good form of domestic cap and trade policy. -- particularly in a country like the US where there is strong tax-phobia which makes a high carbon tax very, very difficult to win politically.
(3) The important issues to be considered with regard to a domestic cap and dividend program after securing a low cap and insisting on a 100% auction of permits are (a) how to give out the dividend, (b) how much, if any of the revenue to use for some other purpose, and (c) how to use any revenues that are not disbursed as dividends to households. The dividends can be given out on an equal basis to all households, or inversely proportional to househhold income. Clearly the second option is better than the first, although I do not know of any cap and dividend proposals out there that goes that far. Giving equal dividends to all households is the equivalent of a negative flat tax which is obviously not the kind of tax policy progressives usually support. How much of the revenues to use for dividends and how much to use to stimulate conversion from a fossil fuel based economy is a trade off between the priorities of "making people whole" in the present given the increase in energy prices, and speeding up technololgical change needed to address climate change in the long-run. A popular proposal among Enviros is to designate a large part of the revenues from the auction to subsidize renewable energy and energy conservation. There are better and worse ways to do that. In particular figuring out how much and in what order to stimulate different clean energy sources and different ways to conserve energy is a serious problem most environmentalists don't recognize as a problem. But Leftists should understand that much of any subsidy would be done as subsidies to private businesses. There is also the political issue of winning political support for a cap and dividend policy. Clearly the larger the dividend the easier it is to win political support.
(4) Cap and Dividend is no more or less likely to prevent speculators, hedge funds, and Wall Street from incorporating the new commodity, a carbon emission permit, into their speculative games than any other cap and trade policy. No matter how the permits are intially distributed -- free of charge or sold at auction -- they are then "tradable," i.e. they are a commodity like any other commodity. Speculators can buy at the auction or buy from others who bought at the auction. To put it simply, once they are out there in the commodity based global economy, they will be treated just like the global financial community treats everything else -- which is of course not in a way that we like.
(5) The good news is that no matter how badly the financial speculators screw up their handling of carbon emission permits they cannot undermine the cap, i.e. the reductions needed will not be compromised. And if the dividends are distributed fairly financial shenanigans cannot undermine equity either. This is also the case with reagard to a well designed international treaty with the changes I recommended in part three of my series.
(6) I will check on Senator Cantwell's cap and dividend bill. Jim Boyce who is an excellent political economist and environmental economist at UMass Amherst and the Political Economy Research Institute drafted early versions of her bill and they may have tried to write in ways to prevent speculation by limiting who can buy, sell, or own carbon emission permits. However, I would be very skeptical of claims that this will be done effectively for several reasons: (a) They will want to permit some trading because otherwise sources who need to have permits will be unable to make adustiments in light of new information. Some sources will buy too much or too little at the auction and preventing them from making adustments afterwards is inefficient. (b) Global finance is going to do everything in its power to get its hands on a commoditiized form of new wealth that is literally unprecedented in size. Has anyone stopped them from circumventing regulations recently? (c) The real problem here is the financial industry and taming it through competent regulation. We have to do that to avoid further inequities and new financial crises whether or not we have tried to deny them access to a new commodity called a carbon emission permit. Besides, if we don't tame finance I doubt we will be able to prevent them from getting access to the emission permits in any case. People will only fool themselves into thinking they can.
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So many angles to think about
By B, Harel at Dec 25, 2009 19:07 PM
"If the international treaty held governments responsible for national net emissions, governments would have an incentive to discourage activities that emit carbon and also have an incentive to encourage activities that increase carbon sequestration."
Sounds good, however I would like to see a clause added against unilateral 'geo-engineering' projects. I don't want one country to be able to ask for and get credit for some massive project it claims will take CO2 out of the atmosphere but whose long-term (or maybe even "medium-term") consequences are unknown, making it essentially a unilateral experiement on planet earth whose consequences might be just as dire as those of climate distabilization itself. Some kind of clause against geo-engineering project done unilaterally by such countries, and only by intenrational agreement, to avoid a incentivicing such actions to make a very low 'net carbon' score for their country.
On other issues, I'll have to re-read some of the above. If asked by a skeptic to give an air tight argument about why "emission trading will lower the global cost of achieving emission reductions considerably" I'd have to think about it (and also, lower compared to what? compared to doing nothing? compared to any of an infinity of other global policy agreements?) There is also the 'chain is only as strong as its weakest link' as far as how corrupt the proccess may be. Nevertheless as my comment on one of the earlier parts of this article indicate, a comment I wrote before reading this, I'm skeptical about a global carbon tax being the best, and even more skeptical about it being the only solution to pursue.
My comment there also suggested a third track besides tax and caps (in parallel, not instead of) namely, creating local demonstration steady-state non-growth healthy economies, as best as we can. If we can't, who the hell are we to tell the world that it must move away from the grow-model. A tall order for activist,s but I'd do my part to support local/regional well thought out project that attempt this -- think big (link to worker owned democratic workplaces, link to permaculture projets and much more)
Lastly, cap-and-trade versus cap-and-dividend has been a distinction emphasized by others and the latter being much better, didn't see that addressed here but again I need to re-read some parts above. Thanks for thet work on this important issue.
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Re: Local solutions
By Hahnel, Robin at Dec 28, 2009 15:38 PM
B. Hare suggests creating "local demonstration steady-state non-growth healthy economies." I totally support these efforts and argue they are very valuable. However, absent an effective international treaty limiting national emissions, and absent domestic policies that provide powerful incentives for all to avoid carbon emissions, these "experiments in equitable and sustainable cooperation" will not prevent cataclysmic climate change. They are a powerful catalyst and consciousness raising component of a successful effort, but no substitute for an international treaty and domestic policies.
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Re: Re: Local solutions
By McGehee, Michael at Dec 28, 2009 15:50 PM
i dont know if you saw it on the first essay, but i commented that on top of all these things one particular un reform that is absolutely necessary (i believe this is what you have in mind when referring to the need to fix the un, especially in terms of the security council) is the end of veto powers because the US has proven time and time again that binding treaties means nothing so long as they have veto power to obstruct justice for violating them.
both the US and China could sign a binding international treaty, walk away and pretend it never happened and if other countries balked and presented something to the UNSC all they have to do is concoct some story about sovereignty and need to protect themselves and veto. or threaten to stop aide before it even gets to that point...
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