The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia by Ben Dangl

The Cochabamba water war of 1999-2000, the subject of chapter three, is widely acknowledged as the turning point that ruptured years of neoliberal hegemony and helped Bolivians make connections among a myriad of issues, including the anti-imperialist struggles against coca-eradication, peasant struggles for agrarian reform, and universal concerns about the government’s economic policies. The water issue served as a catalyst for a broader set of popular grievances relating to the toll exacted by neoliberal reforms on Bolivia’s working classes, uniting rural and urban residents around a common regional concern. 

After the water war, social movements focused on two basic issues—the demand for radical social change through a politics of “basic needs” and the nationalization of natural resources—which culminated in the gas wars of October 2003 and May-June 2005. 

While Dangl is keen to demonstrate the creativity and vitality of the Bolivian social movements that helped to elect MAS in December 2005, he also provides a cautious assessment of the possibilities and limitations of MAS’s electoral strategy. 

At the heart of the dilemma are strategic questions about the relationship between the social movements and the political party and whether it is possible to execute radical change through parliamentary channels. Dangl clearly sides with the “movimientistas,” such as Oscar Olivera of Cocha- bamba’s Coordinadora, who fears that if social movements identify too closely with Morales’s party, “It will be more difficult for people to mobilize…. If Evo fails, it will be a failure for the social movements. The gains of six years of struggle will be lost.” Dangl, similar to Olivera, is skeptical about participating in the traditional political system while also expressing his sympathy for MAS’s victory. 

One of the central problems confronting a “social movement party” like MAS is that its legitimacy is now derived in part from its agreement to play the “rules of the game.” It came to office through parliamentary channels so it is not likely to eschew them. In its bid for office, however, the party has used a radical rhetoric, but taken more moderate policy stances than the social movements on the streets. In its first year in office, the Administration has also been very cautious to build consensus so as not to provoke a violent reaction from the right, as exemplified by the Constituent Assembly. 

Indeed, MAS is not really as radical as it sometimes sounds. The re-nationalization of the oil and gas sector in autumn 2006 basically amounted to a renegotiation of the terms of public-private partnerships between the state and multinational corporations. Dangl describes in the last chapter entitled “Bolivian Moment” that the plan has also been highly criticized by the radical social movements who took to the streets in 2003 and 2005 demanding expropriation without indemni- fication. 

In the following chapter, Dangl writes, “Putting resources into government hands is far from a foolproof alternative to corporate control. Though YPFB offers hopeful examples for state control of gas, the government-run industry has the potential to be just as exploitative, corrupt, and inefficient as corporations. Much would depend on the YPFB management.”  Indeed, one of the first tasks confronting MAS administration is to rebuild the state’s administrative capacity and build a “different kind of state” after it has been gutted and corrupted from years of neoliberal reforms. 

The more troubling question for further debate is whether the social organizations in Bolivia have the power to implement their vision. In chapter seven on El Alto, Dangl is rightfully impressed by the “self- organization” of the masses in this “self-built” city, but he shares a troubling tendency to romanticize the “spontaneous” forms of social organization that supposedly exist there, which leads to some ambiguity in his analysis. After devoting various pages to describing the way social movements have built up collective grassroots organizations over the past decade, such as the neighborhood councils of El Alto, he comes to the rather puzzling conclusion that the mobilizations of October 2003 and May-June 2005 had no leaders and no structure. He relies heavily on the interpretation of Uruguayan sociologist Raúl Zibechi (a partisan of the “changing the world without taking state power” camp) who writes that “It could be argued that if unified, organized structures had existed, not as much social energy would have been unleashed. The key to this overwhelming grassroots mobilization is, without a doubt, the basic self-organization that fills every pore of the society and has made superfluous many forms of representation.” An alternative interpretation suggests that while the social movements in Bolivia are well-organized at the grassroots level, they have systematically failed to present an alternative to state power. In the absence of such an alternative, the more reformist MAS has filled the political void. 

The aftermath of the water war raises similar questions about social movement strategy and organization. Dangl observes, “Corporate control of water horribly affected a majority of the population, and yet, after Bechtel was kicked out, the subsequent public control has also left much to be desired.” In part this is due to the fact that the much-celebrated ad hoc coalition known as the Coordinadora, an unorganized structure par excellence, could not sustain the high level of mobilization needed to follow through with its vision of reform. The coalition eventually split into different factions representing competing interests between, for example, organized workers and poor water consumers. Social movement leaders were faced with the task of managing a complex bureaucracy, but with the social movements weak and divided at the local level, international funding agencies and elites were able to set the conditions for reform, rather than the Coordinadora, whose leaders envisioned a truly democratic management. If organization is the weapon of the weak, a lack of organization and leadership can be debilitating. In short, some structures of representation and democratic accountability within any social organization are necessary to counter any form of power and it is not clear that ad hoc coalitions such as the Coordinadora offer an alternative to mass parties or other experiments that have been tried, such as soviets, councils or democratic trade unions.  

Dangl is correct to observe that much depends on the ability of autonomous social movements to push MAS in the right direction. In the words of political analyst, Helena Agirakis, “The [54 percent by which Morales won] isn’t a blank check; it’s a loan.” Fortunately, what makes MAS so different from previous governments is Morales’s invitation to the social movements to keep him in check and to help his administration defend what some have called the “third revolution” from being highjacked by the right, which remains an imminent possibility. 

Dangl’s book reminds us that one of the most positive outcomes of the MAS’s electoral victory is that it has raised peoples’ expectations, both in Bolivia and abroad, fomenting the belief that creating another world is not only possible, but necessary. Anyone interested in the inspiring social movement struggles in Latin America should read this book. 

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Susan Spronk is a post-doctoral fellow at Cornell University and has spent the last few years doing research and living in Bolivia.