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Very Elementary Thoughts on Thinking About Now
By Michael Albert at Mar 22, 2011 |
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Thought One
Good, insightful people can have conflicting views about Libya, the Mideast, and North Africa, and the UN and U.S. role there.
Rather than flinging verbal daggers at one another until irretrievable splits permanently part us, can we disagree but also hear others and realize we may not be right? Can we even find a way to pursue the logic of our views, differences and all, in a shared agenda?
Thought Two
To that end, can we agree on some basics to have in mind to test positions against the immense amount we know about U.S. policies, the limited amount we know about events in Libya, and our shared values and commitments?
About the U.S., we know that U.S. foreign policy stems from three highly related sources:
1. Geopolitical, economic, and social interests which in Libya are overwhelmingly dominated by oil and by U.S. ability to coerce regional outcomes toward U.S. agendas.
2. Desires to maintain an ideological facade to ward off dissent by claiming to respect people, law, and justice, even while actually pursuing antihuman, illegal, and unjust acts.
3. Being forced by dissent and activism to do what they would otherwise not do, but then of course seeking to implement the two above points, as well.
About Libya and the region, we know:
1. That the Mideast and North Africa are in turmoil including challenging and even toppling existing relations, in turn potentially affecting regional decisions about oil, Israel, the U.S., etc., and
2. That the internal balance of power varies from country to country, often involving serious repressive obstacles to change.
About our values, we all presumably want:
1. Maximal gain in the quality of life, freedom, and future prospects of people in as many countries as possible, both in the region and elsewhere too, and...
2. That popular movements in Libya and throughout the region have room to enlarge their awareness and demands and to press their cases without suffering extreme repression or even massacre.
Can we agree, therefore, that any U.S. undertaking in Libya - or for that matter anywhere - will have as its intentions virtually zero to do with saving innocents other than as something to claim for purposes of rationalization? And can we agree that U.S. intentions will have everything to do with attaining better results for empire, albeit in a difficult situation where U.S. interests are challenged and may be seriously diminished and where public pressure is limiting U.S. options? And can we agree that we want to aid prospects for oppositions to institute new relations throughout the region?
Thought Three
If we can agree as noted above, wherein lies the basis for dispute?
Some activists will feel that the potential massacre of the opposition in Libya must be avoided at nearly all costs. These activists, even with a full understanding of the dangers inherent in unleashing U.S. military might, see the UN injunction and ensuing intervention as the least harmful real protection and space gaining option for the Libyan opposition.
Other activists will feel, despite their fear for the very survival of the Libyan opposition, that U.S. intervention - and British and French - are so grotesquely motivated that while one could conceive of their spontaneously stopping at merely protecting the opposition, there is no reason to believe that anything like that will happen unless it is forced so that the cost of intervention will be horribly unacceptable including co-opting or subordinating the opposition to U.S. dictates.
The debate could become more nuanced and precise or more polarized and harsh.
Both sides might agree that whether we like it or not, clearly Qaddafi has some support so that this has become a protracted struggle. In that context, one side may say, okay, intervene with a no fly zone and perhaps even some very limited attacks on repressive forces about to strike the opposition to prevent massacre and to level the playing field for Libyans to determine their own future by debate and without violent repression. The other side might say, stay out so that Libyans can determine their own future because greater intervention will in fact generate both greater carnage and also nationalism so great as to trump the true issues of the day and generate only a typical interventionist horror and nationalist reaction, usurping the more creative and far reaching dissident potentials.
Some will qualify the above views one way, some another way. Some will feel strongly one way, others another way. Some will feel they don't know enough to have an opinion about the nuances at all - or perhaps even that no one does.
Conclusion?
In the real circumstances that actually pertain, if we can agree to disagree respectfully about other matters, can't we then all also agree that at most limited protection of the opposition should occur and that as little as possible beyond that will be better than escalating intervention, and that in any event actions widening the assault into an interventionist war would be horrific for countless reasons?
And if we can now agree on that much, then whether one wished there had been no intervention at all or liked that it occurred up to a point but wants it to not usurp the opposition's agenda much less plunge the country into interminable occupation and conflict, is actually moot. The universal bottom line now, regardless of one's views about what has happened up until now, would be, even with just this level of agreement, to bring pressure to bear to prevent a widening violent approach by the U.S., Britain, France, et. al., so that Libyans will determine the future of Libya. Disagreements about the past could then take a very distant back seat to unity against wider war in the future.
What are the Principles in Which our Agreement is Grounded?
By Ji, Swaraj at Mar 28, 2011 13:37 PM
That agreement, however, pertains only to the undesirability of a very specific outcome. The question I would raise is whether our common ground regarding intervention is entirely pragmatic, or whether it involves matters of principle inherent in our understanding of, and support for, what is called "self-determination."
Specifically, is it possible, even if an intervention were to have the best of intentions, for an order that arises with determining support (through intervention) from outside a nation to be representative of the people of that nation? Or is a change that originates internally the only way that a nation can evolve toward greater representation and integrity?
The waters of such a discussion are muddied by the already-substantial presence of outside influence in regimes such as that of Kadafi. If outside forces are being brought to bear, one must always ask whether these are new forces that further violate the integrity of a nation's internal decisionmaking, or whether these forces merely offset other, pre-existing, external influences, thereby creating more freedom within which the intrinsic constituencies of the nation can work out their differences and evolve a new vision among themselves.
Certainly we saw that kind of process at work while the Soviet Union existed as a counterpole to the influence of the U.S., allowing developing nations to use that rivalry to attain a greater degree of independence. Can that be argued with Libya, where the U.S. is now operating within an increasingly multi-polar world that, at least in theory, limits the degree to which it can act unilaterially?
Those of us who are citizens of the US must also ask, what of the integrity and self-governance (both of which are aspects of self-determination) of the United States as a naton, if we can even dare to dream of such a thing? Certainly, if we are participating as activitsts in an internal US political dialogue, we must believe in at least the possibility of such integrity. And we know that intervention builds the power and influence of a fifth column of militaristic industrialism here that is dissolving the economy and moral content of this nation. Control over others thus leads to a loss of self-control. The nation that fastens a chain around the ankle of another nation now finds the other end around its own neck. Should we encourage such a process, even for "good ends" within Libya?
For me, then, the key to this article lies in its section on values. That part of the article stresses the underlyiing principles (perhaps the very principles that underlie our agreement on outcomes) that might place our agreement on more fundamental grounds--even as we agree to disagree regarding tactics.
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Re: What are the Principles in Which our Agreement is Grounded?
By Albert, Michael at Mar 28, 2011 13:56 PM
I think these are perfectly reasonable and insightful obervations and questions arising from the current situations. I am thinking about them, as obviously you are, and others are. I am hoping to write a piece that covers these matters, and others - though as you no doubt know, it will be tough, not least in the cimate of hostility from all sides that exists now. If I manage it, I will be very interested in your reactions.
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Re: What are the Principles in Which our Agreement is Grounded?
By Ji, Swaraj at Mar 29, 2011 12:14 PM
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Re: Re: What are the Principles in Which our Agreement is Grounded?
By Albert, Michael at Mar 29, 2011 13:07 PM
As to the rest, I generally agree.
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Re: What are the Principles in Which our Agreement is Grounded?
By Ji, Swaraj at Mar 30, 2011 11:28 AM
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More Elementary Thoughts on Libya
By Peterson, David at Mar 24, 2011 18:26 PM
Michael:
I believe that your " Very Elementary Thoughts on Thinking about Now" (March 22) had already been overtaken by events before you ever posted the piece.
UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted on the evening of March 17 with no fewer than five abstentions, each by major states, two of which, as permanent members of the Council, were in positions to veto the resolution, and should have: Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia.
In less than two days of 1973's adoption,Libya was under military attack by the United States China and Russia express their concerns about this military attack exceeding what they understood 1973 to authorize, the UN Secretary-General reprimands them, rather than the states attacking Libya Tunis , Tunisia
As Marjorie Cohn warned on the same day that you posted your thoughts ("Stop Bombing Libya," March 22):
The military action in
Although the "precedent" here is a fact long-recorded in the annals of American Power (as you point out with great clarity), nevertheless, something like this scenario really is being executed against Libya through the armed insurgency that was organized in the eastern part of Libya and used to attack the Qadhafi regime from the middle of February onward. As Qadhadi's forces started to score victories over this armed insurgency (or, perhaps, as this armed insurgency simply pulled-back after its early offensive), the political leadership in the states now attacking Libya began to scream "crimes against humanity" and violations of "international humanitarian law" -- and, with the establishment media repeating the charge, referred the forces loyal to Qadhafi to the International Criminal Court, while exempting themselves from the jurisdiction of the ICC. (See S/RES/1970, para. 4-8; esp. para. 6, Feb. 26.) This showed clearly that the government of Libya, the side in this armed struggle opposed by the Western states, would not only be denied the right to defend itself against armed attack, but would have its conduct treated uniquely as crimes.
In your "Conclusion?," you plead: "[C]an't we then all also agree that at most limited protection of the opposition should occur and that as little as possible beyond that will be better than escalating intervention, and that in any event actions widening the assault into an interventionist war would be horrific for countless reasons?"As the person making this plea, why doesn't it dawn on you to ask instead whether the issue is not upholding the UN Charter's protections for the government of Libya and the people of Libya from the great military powers attacking this government and this country?
(By the way, a similar rewriting of a question needs to be put to Richard Falk. -- If, as Falk writes, Qadhafi long ago "forfeited the legitimacy of his rule, creating the political conditions for an appropriate revolutionary challenge" ("Gaddafi, Moral Interventionism, Libya, and the Arab Revolutionary Moment," March 21), then at what stage or time in the past did the United States forfeit its right to act beyond its borders? And why are we arguing about the legitimacy of Qadhafi's rule inside
David Peterson
Chicago,
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Re: More Elementary Thoughts on Libya
By Albert, Michael at Mar 24, 2011 19:30 PM
David
You write "I believe that your "Very Elementary Thoughts on Thinking about Now" (March 22) had already been overtaken by events before you ever posted the piece."
Perhaps, but I doubt it...let's see.
You first offer some evidence that one might have used to decide to oppose the resolution, etc. You point out that some people did oppose it and quote one, who we have published on ZNet. Fine, but this is not even a response to what I wrote, much less overtaking it in some way. What I wrote didn't even take sides about the resolution, instead only saying that one could be on either side for quite legitimate reasons, and that both sides should be mutually respectful, and that the real issue, in any event, is uniting to prevent enlargement, etc.
If you disagree with that, then we have something to discuss - if not, then I am not sure what we would be discussing.that bears on what I actually wrote
As to broader matters which were not broached in the blog post I wrote, we will just have to disagree about the likelihood that the insurgency in Libya was fomented from without - which is what I think you may have been implying - to then use attacks on it as a pretext to invade. Yes, this can happen. Yes, the U.S. could conceivably do this at some future date, in Venezuela, for example. It could aid, bolster, prod, provoke, and promise to sustain an anti Chavez insurgency, goading it into fighting, and then watch it getting beaten, and then intervene ostensibly out of concern for this opposition but, in fact, merely to deal with Venezuela, their purpose throughout.
But the fact that something could occur somewhere, sometime, doesn't mean that every time anything remotely similar happens, it is that thing... I would agree that it means we should be highly alert to the possibility - sure. But we have to look. And when I look, and many others, in this case, we find this view of things unconvincing and see something else. So we disagree about that, and perhaps more, I don't know.
But that is completely beside the point of the blog I posted... which is instead about how to handle disagreements once they exist.
You write to me: "In your "Conclusion?," you plead: "[C]an't we then all also agree that at most limited protection of the opposition should occur and that as little as possible beyond that will be better than escalating intervention, and that in any event actions widening the assault into an interventionist war would be horrific for countless reasons?"
And then you add: "As the person making this plea, why doesn't it dawn on you to ask instead whether the issue is not upholding the UN Charter's protections for the government of Libya and the people of Libya from the great military powers attacking this government and this country? "
I don't see much difference except that I don't think a movement on the streets in the U.S. or elsewhere in the world is very likely to march behind such a banner - but rather one simply saying, stop the carnage, or cease U.S. violence, or whatever...
You add: "(By the way, a similar rewriting of a question needs to be put to Richard Falk. -- If, as Falk writes, Qadhafi long ago "forfeited the legitimacy of his rule, creating the political conditions for an appropriate revolutionary challenge" ("Gaddafi, Moral Interventionism, Libya, and the Arab Revolutionary Moment," March 21), then at what stage or time in the past did the United States forfeit its right to act beyond its borders? And why are we arguing about the legitimacy of Qadhafi's rule inside Libya, rather than about the lack of legitimacy of the states that in this case have marshaled the organs of the United Nations to launch their attack on Libya?)"
The U.S. forfeited its claim to minimal humanity - as a government - ages ago, of course... much less the lesser forfeiture you mention. So? We discuss that all the time, as do people around the world, and rightly so.
If the states in question have used the UN - and in some sense they have - and have vile motives - and they certainly do - having to do with worrying about immigration, possible trends in the area and salvaging the best results they can, etc. etc., that does not mean, inexorably, that there cannot be a good effect as well as bad ones.
One issue is U.S. and western control over what they should not control - and attacks on what they should not attack. Fine. we agree on that being an issue. Of course.
Another issue is the survival of an internal opposition in Libya against a powerful state willing to unleash pretty much, in their own words, unlimited repression. I am not sure we agree on that being a second central issue.
So the question, if we agree on both, becomes does one support some policy - a no fly zone with attendant hopefully very limited attacks - or not.
Well, those who think it was the only hope for the insurgents to survive, much less win - despite that the people making the assessment were and are supremely anti u.s. imperialism - decided to support the no fly option - and then hopefully also fight against its further elaboration into something horrific.
Those who expected something horrific as nearly inevitable, presumably worried on about the insurgents, but nonetheless, opted against the no fly option feeling it was even worse than Qaddafi being free to repress without limit.
Okay, that is an honest disagreement. The reality is, both formulations have merit. Neither formulation says the U.S. is a noble defender of justice. They just weigh the dangers of not having a no fly zone and of having a no fly zone differently.
Now you seem to be a bit off from the more typical position - seemingly additionally saying, although maybe I am hearing this wrong, that the opposition isn't a real and worthy opposition so that concern about its well being wasn't and isn't warranted. I hope you aren't saying that, but if so, okay that's another thing we can agree to disagree about.
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A valuable article
By Khan, Nasir at Mar 24, 2011 12:10 PM
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Tortuous
By Jones, David at Mar 24, 2011 05:45 AM
Being someone who supports the no-fly zone and knows full well the imperialist nature of Wetern foreign policy, I appreciate Michaels attempt at raaprochment. The basic argument here is : avoid dogma, avoid "the party line" and respect your opponent unless you have certain knowlege their motivations are dishonest.
In the spirit of moving forward I won't spell out my reasons for a pro intervention position. Suffice it to say it is complex and well thought out as a situation with so many contingent factors should be. Though I harbor no illusions the revolutionaries are Jeffersonian democrats ( much less Pareconistas) I still want to see them succeed along with the Yemen people , Bahranian people, and all people infused with a desire to throw out the old order. It sucked.
And I truly hope the spirit of REAL resistance ( preferably not but yes, even violent if necessary) finds it's way to the shores of the Empire. And if we face violent attacks from our government, I hope somebody steps in to save us. I won't refuse it because their motives might not be pure. I will fight them later if I have to but I can only do so if I live through the day.
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Libya - What Now?
By Vincent, John at Mar 23, 2011 23:20 PM
It may be worth stating that in my opinion the issue was not whether a no fly zone should or should not have been implemented, but rather what were the alternatives and what would have been the likely consequences if no military action was taken? Would economic sanctions, diplomatic efforts, or some other non-military efforts have prevented Gaddafi and his supporters from advancing their tanks and heavy equipment against those in Benghazi? If not, should the international community recommend a measured military intervention to prevent the killing of civilians in Benghazi or accept that corrupt imperial motives make any military intervention unacceptable not matter what the potential loss of life may be? This is what makes the issue difficult for me.
I think answers to these questions are necessary to understand what future actions should be taken to prevent a widening violent approach by the U.S., Britain and France.
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Re: Libya - What Now?
By Albert, Michael at Mar 24, 2011 00:18 AM
Beyond that, saying there is a high burden of proof says we already know about motives and past experiences enough to know that there really has to be a good reason to support some kind of intervention - and I think we can probably all agree on that.
I think we can also all agree, or I hope so, that in this case reasonable people could have felt either way. If so, then there is really nothing beyond that regarding the past of the case - I think - given the need to focus on preventing worse outcomes now, which agenda should be shared by all, those who opposed or those who supported a no fly zone.
People seem to want to discuss reasons they were for or against the no fly zone or intervention - as if to have been on one side, or the other, marks one as somehow responsible, or wise, or truely radical, etc. Well, rather than make a case for one position or the other - the response that feeling might warrant to this blog post would be claiming the post was wrong-headed because we should in fact be fighting about this, we should not be accepting one another's different views were well meaning and reasoned, and so on. I doubt anyone really thinks that - and I am not myself at all interested, honestly, as must be clear by now, in making a case for either stance...or judging anyone else's case for either stance.
If someone wants to rebut this blog post, it would mean making a case not that one view was better than the other, or vice versa, but that it is really important which side of that each of us is on - which to me seems utterly unimportant.
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Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Wesley, William at Mar 23, 2011 13:20 PM
Worse, a settlement was possible, perhaps likely. Reuters and others report that Gaddafi was looking for a way out. The opposition has confirmed these reports, even if the strongman has not. These reports are worth pursuing.
The case for war is not logical, its Pavolian. People are selectively shown suffering, denied context, lied to and told that war led by the flawed but "fundamentally good" west is the only way to save the day. The natural human instinct is to salivate for war.
But we must resist this instinct. We rejected Saddam's offers of exile while his crimes (mostly committed on our payroll) were repackaged into a humanitarian case for invasion. How many dead, how many exiled as a result?
In Bosnia, the US scuppered a power sharing settlement agreed to by all sides, making war more likely, if not inevitable. We know the result.
And we continue to buy the same lies and ideologically underwrite the same suffering in the name of preventing suffering.
I apologize Mr. Albert (and I say this in the spirit of humility and respect as I admire you) but I can't agree to disagree given the facts. I would need a magnifying glass to find common ground. And I can't look "forward not backward" - as one person suggested - with platitudes of limiting violence, because the past keeps repeating itself and we repeatedly adopt positions, handed to us from above, that make suffering more likely.
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Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 23, 2011 13:50 PM
I am not sure what you think you can't agree to disagree about - with me - or others? Certainly not the motives of the U.S. I would imagine we agree about that. If it is something in the past - what is it, and what does not agreeing to disagree mean? I ask that sincerely - you clearly are not hurling epithets at me, or perhaps at anyone, and that is precisely agreeing to disagree...
The only issue going into the future that is consequential beyond mere opinion, is demonstrating against continuing and especially enlarging intervention and opposition - or not.
I assumed all readers on Z would basically agree on that, each having their own additional views, of course, but all able to support an effort to curtail bombing, prevent further escalation, and especially prevent any kind of invasion and occupation, etc. etc.
So - where is our disagreement that we cannot agree to be civil and to listen, about...?
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Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By D, Martin at Mar 23, 2011 16:28 PM
So Michael would you not agree that in addition to your suggestions for what we can do going forward calling a spade a spade is indeed a "consequential" response?
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Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Administrator, Site at Mar 23, 2011 16:58 PM
Whether this action will be cited as precedent for others depends on whether it winds up a debacle. But also, who needs precedents? I don't think anyone argued one in this case... I think in all such situations the only way past actions come up, typically, is to make a claim that the new one will be different and better.
I don't see how one could be any clearer about calling U.S. behavior vile and imperially motivated than I already was. But I suspect pretty much anyone reading any of this would agree with that. It just doesn't get us very far in any specific case. Some will still say, in this case, knowing that about U.S. policy, that they did and would again support a plan for a no fly zone, and perhaps even for some violence toward ground forces, etc. because whatever the aims of the U.S. were, it would avert catastrophe. Others would say, no, even knowing U.S. motives - and indeed due to knowing them - they did and would again in the same situation oppose a no fly zone, etc. in the expectation it would do way more harm than good. Okay - that's a disagreement. Both sides can agree about U.S. motives, yet disagree about whether the specific policy occuring is desirable as compared to all other options, or not. They can also agree on the need to prevent the policy from enlarging into war, etc.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By D, Martin at Mar 23, 2011 18:18 PM
I heard a lot of people citing the precedent of Bosnia/Kosovo. Juan Cole whose value as an analyst has plunged in my opinion actually says we should look to Kosovo as a model! I asked him to tell us what we should name the Libyan version of Camp Bondsteel but the moderator declined to post my comment. Also as Herman calls the "standard narrative" of us standing idly by in Rwanda was constantly invoked by the "humanitarian interventionists." There is unconfirmed reports that it was indeed Samantha Powers and Susan Rice (Holbrooke protege) who convinced Obama of this action so I don't know what you were reading or hearing in the run up to this attack. There was the spinning of past actions or inactions galore. I happen to think that anyone arguing for US/European intervention in the hope it will be narrow and restrained is a dangerous proposition built on sand. Everyone reading this surely agrees the historical record is appalling and to expect something different this time based on the nature of power --and everything else Michael has outlined-- borders on the delusional.
Of course it's true that the issue of using this action as a future precedent will depend on its level of perceived "success" spun by the western political establishment (we call it a debacle, they call it success) but surely we should all be loudly calling this action extremely dangerous, unproductive etc. as we go forward with trying to limit the damage. Decent people wanting to limit the prospects of carnage supported this action. But the greater the "success" achieved now in Libya by this action the greater the chances of slaughter in the future. Bosnia/Kosovo greased the wheels for roughly a million dead in Iraq and AfPak.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 23, 2011 18:41 PM
I have to go on the site as administrator to do various functions, and as me to comment, etc. Sometimes, sadly, I confuse the two and post something while on as admin - even though I think I am on as me. That's what happened here.
It is in fact not delusional to think that a no fly zone and modest other acts could save lives of dissidents, perhaps preserving their possibility of ousting Qaddafi - while having no such actions might have meant their calamitous massacre. Calling that view delusional lumps a whole lot of people you probably don't want to lose into candidates for therapy.
This action resulting in good outcomes, due to it failing to yield the un and especially us intended results - is not a bad thing, even if the u.s. and un then tout it as a success.
Of course, preventing the actions from escalating and persisting turning into a calamity themselves, is a priority for everyone, in any event.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By D, Martin at Mar 23, 2011 19:09 PM
But we seem to be going round and round here. It seems to me William's points are valid and backed up by overwhelming evidence. Your point about what to do now is also valid. So I would argue we need to keep two things in mind. First, reject the arguments in support of this action (now and in the future) for all the reasons already mentioned and two, do as you suggest and focus our efforts on restraining the beast now that it's been unleashed.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 23, 2011 19:32 PM
Honestly, to feel that the only way one could have favored or hoped for a no fly zone is if one no longer thought the u.s. pursues imperial agendas, is simply wrong. It is making assumptions like that that causes one to then conclude those on another side of the issue are, as well, adopting completely changed values, etc.
I don't think GM, if it raises wages hoping to buy off dissent, or for other reasons they think in their profit interests, has changed its spots - but I can still think the higher wages will be helpful, and if dissent isn't decreased, that the results will be still better.
In this case a no fly zone... that will, in the eyes of u.s. and european elites, hopefully put a lid on how far dissent goes and prevent them from being boxed out of events, and diminish immigration they will face, etc. etc., could also, in the eyes of folks thinking on balance it should happen, save the opposition from calamity and thus preserve the possibility of opposition success.
To keep claiming that the u.s. is imperialist - etc. - is simply beside the point. The dispute or difference - one that should take second place, by far, to agreeing on fighting against further pursuit of escalation, etc. - is not over that, but over whether a specific policy would, on balance, be better to pursue, or to not pursue. There are arguments on both sides - perfectly sensible ones.
Rejecting arguments for a no fly zone - looking into the past - to be serious - must say, I think that a no fly zone seriously risks x, y, z, that are bad - and has a low probability of preventing opposition deaths and loss - and that the former concerns outweigh the latter hopes. To say the u.s. motives are bad is simply beside the point - that's a given.
Now, my own view - I am trying to mediate, yes, but I am also right in the middle, I guess - which is perhaps why it made sense to me to mediate. That is, I of course really do understand u.s. motives, etc. But I also could see that a calamity was brewing, and a limited un and arab league sanctioned action could potentially avert it, and could also potentially be curtailed before getting out of hand.
I did not feel I could decide confidently that one view was right and the other wrong...for or against. Were there other better options I would have preferred? Yes - but no realistic ones that could occur in time to have an impact, if at all.
But again, the idea that we need closure - we need to say someone was right and someone was wrong about the policy - leftists that is - makes no sense to me. The only thing about this situation that is important is putting a lid on the intervention. The prior issue of no fly zone, or not, was not a matter of principle. It wasn't even a matter of people's understanding of U.S. policy making, etc. It was not a matter - for serious leftists, that is - of anything but assessment of very fluid and barely known data...which was why I didn't feel very strongly either way.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By D, Martin at Mar 23, 2011 21:51 PM
Michael as Noam has said with his usual concision (paraphrasing) “Do good things come from war? Sure, WWII put an end to the barbarity of European colonialism. Should we be glad Hitler invaded Poland?” I throw that in only partially in jest. As I don’t need to tell you, there is a very heavy burden of proof upon those who are calling for extreme violence and the inevitable loss of human life it engenders. I don’t see under these circumstances with the players involved, (putting motives aside) the very low probability of desirable effects meeting that burden.
Honestly, to feel that the only way one could have favored or hoped for a no fly zone is if one no longer thought the u.s. pursues imperial agendas, is simply wrong. It is making assumptions like that that causes one to then conclude those on another side of the issue are, as well, adopting completely changed values, etc.
Forgive me for not taking up more space in my earlier posts. I was, I guess misleading in that I didn’t raise the long list of other reasons why I think the intervention was dangerous and counterproductive with the odds of it making things much worse overwhelmingly high. You listed many of them yourself. I was merely discussing one narrow aspect of this issue with you. I find it disconcerting that I am engaged in what, a debate? with you over this. Sure there are possible good outcomes in this scenario. It just seems like the probability is extremely low especially when weighed against the much greater odds of worse outcomes (and costs) based on the historical record and looking at the landscape. I would add based on what I know of your life's work and the principles and reasoning you are known to employ, I am mystified at your not finding your way to this conclusion. I say that with deep respect.
I don't think GM, if it raises wages hoping to buy off dissent, or for other reasons they think in their profit interests, has changed its spots - but I can still think the higher wages will be helpful, and if dissent isn't decreased, that the results will be still better.
In this case a no fly zone... that will, in the eyes of u.s. and european elites, hopefully put a lid on how far dissent goes and prevent them from being boxed out of events, and diminish immigration they will face, etc. etc., could also, in the eyes of folks thinking on balance it should happen, save the opposition from calamity and thus preserve the possibility of opposition success.
To keep claiming that the u.s. is imperialist - etc. - is simply beside the point. The dispute or difference - one that should take second place, by far, to agreeing on fighting against further pursuit of escalation, etc. - is not over that, but over whether a specific policy would, on balance, be better to pursue, or to not pursue. There are arguments on both sides - perfectly sensible ones.
The imperialist factor as I said above is only one of many parts in a whirlpool of conflicting agendas, muddled objectives, jaw dropping hypocrisy, disregard for millions of Libyans and other Africans surely not being spoken for by the dubious Transitional National Council, incompetence and the simple physics of wars spinning out of control.
Rejecting arguments for a no fly zone - looking into the past - to be serious - must say, I think that a no fly zone seriously risks x, y, z, that are bad - and has a low probability of preventing opposition deaths and loss - and that the former concerns outweigh the latter hopes. To say the u.s. motives are bad is simply beside the point - that's a given.
See above.
Now, my own view - I am trying to mediate, yes, but I am also right in the middle, I guess - which is perhaps why it made sense to me to mediate. That is, I of course really do understand u.s. motives, etc. But I also could see that a calamity was brewing, and a limited un and arab league sanctioned action could potentially avert it, and could also potentially be curtailed before getting out of hand.
I did not feel I could decide confidently that one view was right and the other wrong...for or against. Were there other better options I would have preferred? Yes - but no realistic ones that could occur in time to have an impact, if at all.
But again, the idea that we need closure - we need to say someone was right and someone was wrong about the policy - leftists that is - makes no sense to me. The only thing about this situation that is important is putting a lid on the intervention. The prior issue of no fly zone, or not, was not a matter of principle. It wasn't even a matter of people's understanding of U.S. policy making, etc. It was not a matter - for serious leftists, that is - of anything but assessment of very fluid and barely known data...which was why I didn't feel very strongly either way.
Your assessment of very fluid and barely known data I presume refers specifically to the situation on the ground which in my opinion reinforces the argument against introduction of imperial forces. I am convinced you were ignoring reams of data to allow you not to feel strongly either way.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By D, Martin at Mar 23, 2011 21:53 PM
This was lost in the posting.
I hope you can decipher it as is.
Martin
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 24, 2011 00:58 AM
I hope I don't misconstrue anything you have said in this reply... I am going to put my view on this as clear as I can, and then perhaps I won't write on it again, unless something quite new surfaces...
You note: "I find it disconcerting that I am engaged in what, a debate? with you over this."
Me too.
I wrote a blog urging that we ought to be respecting folks on both sides of this question and moving on to issues that now matter. A number of folks have wanted to not move on, but to make a case for one side or the other. To me, honestly, that desire is a bit of a non sequitor to the original blog post. I guess wanting to do that would imply a reply to the blog post that says, no, one side is so obviously right and the other side is so obviously wrong - and this difference is so important - that we need to stick with it, decide the right and wrong of it, hold people accountable - or whatever, and so on.
I am not sure you feel that way - but that would be a reply rejecting the claim of my blog post.
When you say "It just seems like the probability (of a good outcome) is extremely low especially when weighed against the much greater odds of worse outcomes (and costs) based on the historical record and looking at the landscape" you are saying which view you had. Fair enough. But my point originally, and later, was and remains if you say this is your view as though any other view is simply impossible - that would contradict by example, I guess, my message in the blog. If you are just reporting your view, okay, but I am not sure why.
So I took what you wrote to imply the former, and I have tried to clarify why I think not that your view on the no fly zone is bad - I think it is a perfectly reasonable view - but that the idea that only one view had enough merit to be held responsibly - sort of like only one view of genocide or dictatorship or rape has enough merit to be held responsibly - is wrong and harmful.
You write: "I would add based on what I know of your life's work and the principles and reasoning you are known to employ, I am mystified at your not finding your way to this conclusion. I say that with deep respect."
Thank you, but I am afraid I have to be a little critical now. If what you describe above happens, if you feel someone with values you like and who reasons clearly most often is differing from you on something that seems to you utterly obvious, what is the wise presumption about why?
1. That you are right and no other view could be reasonable so the usually sensible person has either lost their values or passed judgement without thinking or investigation, etc.?
Or 2. that while you believe you are right, another view, or views, could also be reasonable, and perhaps even right in place of yours?
It is our tendency when we feel strongly - I include myself by all means - to lose track of the possibility that someone may have a contrary view for reasons we don't get, or because they see the same things as us, but weigh their likely implications differently - or see things we don't see - and indeed they may be not only reasonable in doing so, but even correct - and we instead assume that they must have gotten derailed or something. That is not a good jump to make.
You write: "Your assessment of very fluid and barely known data I presume refers specifically to the situation on the ground which in my opinion reinforces the argument against introduction of imperial forces. I am convinced you were ignoring reams of data to allow you not to feel strongly either way."
What can I say? I recommend you consider why you feel that way. And if being open to the possibility that another view could be ethical and reasoned, and perhaps even right, wouldn't be a better way to feel.
You certainly opposed the no fly zone. Which is fine.
I said I was rather agnostic about it, seeing arguments for it, and arguments against it, and not enough information to be sure of what course would most likely yield better results. Which I think was also fine - in fact, I even think it was the slightly better stance, which is why I had it and not some other.
You feel it must be the case that I have simply ignored reality (presumably about u.s. motives which would be incredibly odd for me to ignore, since data about unfolding events in libya were and remain quite muddy, to say the least) - rather than assuming I have, for example, lost my values, or something like that. But why?
In a sense in this conclusion about my choice not being sensible you are displaying a refined and gentle version of what I was arguing against in the essay: that is, being so sure that a position one holds is correct, and that no one could honestly and legitimately think otherwise that one concludes others could only do so for bad motives or due to profound ignorance. I think we need to avoid that cul de sac as often as we can.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By D, Martin at Mar 24, 2011 03:34 AM
Since my original post was to say I appreciated your thoughts on the situation and it was that post that actually caused me to take a breath on the issue of right or wrong of the intervention I guess I should now come full circle back to that position.
I'd like to think I'm not so skewed in my outlook that in any given discussion I could or would believe myself to be indisputably right and those who disagree with me categorically wrong. I think in this case because I respect you so much I felt the need to push you further into explaining why you felt the reasoning in support of intervention held equal value to that in opposition (if that's what you're saying). You seem to single out US motivation in my argument. I have repeatedly named other factors I feel are equal to or greater than US motivations in shaping my view of it and yet I respectfully think you have only addressed those issues in a cursory manner. And yet you seem to be chiding me for not seeing the parity between each side of the "debate." This has been the frustrating part of this discusson for me. I most certainly do not think you have lost your values or believe your motives are bad. I guess however in the case of yet another military invasion by the US I am troubled by you taking pride in your agnosticism.
Onward.
Martin
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 24, 2011 15:03 PM
You write, "And yet you seem to be chiding me for not seeing the parity between each side of the "debate." "
Okay, we have a failure to communicate - on my part, it seems. This may be the hard part of what I am saying.
I am not asking you to be agnostic about two contending views. In this case or in others. I am saying we all need to be able to believe in a contending view - think it is correct and the other is wrong - and yet still hold in our minds unless there is really awfully good evidence to the contrary - that the people with the other view have not lost their minds, lost their values, changed their spots, etc. etc. Indeed, even as we believe x - we have to remain open to the possibility we are wrong and y is true. And certainly to the possibility that people arguing y are not on that account alone somehow renouncing their whole prior lives...
Does this apply to every x and y? No. But, honestly, in conditions of relative ignorance, and especially when x and y are not themselves basic tenets of the left, but, instead, their application to policy or tactics, etc., this holds.
Of course if an advocate of y gives as their reason completely contrary values or basic views - then that's different. But when advocates of x and y profess to each have the same overarching aims and values and analysis - at least largely - but differ in what it means in some setting - then this respect the opposition attitude needs to hold sway.
I would go even further, in other situations - imagine a debate about some tactic - two sides line up in opposition. Typically, they may well hurl epithets and split. That is also, in most instances, absurd. What should happen is debate and such, perhaps following one course but also keeping in mind the possible efficacy of the other, holding it in reserve, or even experimenting with it. And everyone, on both sides, should have an interest in succeeding, not merely in being right. So not only do both sides admit the possibility that the other side could be right, but both sides hope that whatever tactic is enacted - is better, even if it is not the one they favored.
In this case, Libya, I am therefore saying sure, joe can and should if it was his conclusion, favor no fly, say - before it happened. And Jill should oppose it, if that was her conclusion. Of course, if they were voting, it would matter a bit more. Joe should respect that Jill can think as she does without it meaning she has lost her values, or analysis, or whatever - and vice versa, and each should be open to the possibility that in fact, the other is more right. They have their views, but also respect and flexibility. That is what is needed in addressing almost all matters, but certainly matters of policy, tactics, and even strategy.
Yes, if Joe or Jill has a history of support for imperialism and favors something horrible - okay, then that's likely the reason in this case too. But that is not what I am addressing...which is Joe and Jill seeing themselves as being similar, and then at odds, based simply on differing over no fly and fly.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 24, 2011 14:48 PM
Calling on UN intervention, largely U.S., and thinking it might save lives of dissidents and preserve the possibility of ousting Qaddafi is not only not delusional, but plausible. I even think it is true. It does not say much...
This doesn't mean the intervention couldn't do that much - and then more, that is horrible and even outweighs the good. Nor does it mean it might fail to do that much, and do horrible. It means one believes it has a good chance of doing that much which would be good - whereas in the absence the opposition would be routed and Qaddafi entrenched - and that there is also a good chance that popular resistance around the world, and other constraints operating on the U.S. and west, and in Libya and the whole area, could prevent the enlargement into a horror.
You don't have to agree with the above viewpoint to recognize that one's thinking the above does not make one delusional, or mean one has grown soft on u.s. imperialism, etc. You can instead decide that it is a complex situation in which reasonable people with essentially the same hopes and desires for the area can disagree about what might allow those hopes to reach fruition or even a fraction of fruition.
We need to keep not two things, but one thing in mind - stopping enlargement. However, trying to demonstrate that only one view was reasonable and the other simply and transparently wrong - about a no fly zone - would be counter productive and a waste of time - in my view. Okay, I guess we can perhaps agree to disagree about that..
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Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Wesley, William at Mar 23, 2011 18:11 PM
I can't agree with the humanitarian premise of the attack - namely that the so-called no fly zone is to protect Libyans or prevent a massacre. For the reasons discussed above, this premise is false.
I can listen to the falsehood. I can understand its origins in media control. But I can't respect it.
You say we should support efforts to prevent further escalation Sure, but a no-fly zone incentives and almost guarantees the opposite result. And any act of war lacks legitimacy when real alternatives exist.
The long con is obvious because it's not new. A crisis emerges involving Dictator X, who is deemed not sufficiently deferential (or hostile) to US interest. The US brushes aside peaceful options to solve the crisis and repackages the dictator's past or continuing crimes into a case for "humanitarian" intervention that predictably escalates the bloodbath, which can only be solved through the benevolence of the flawed but "fundamentally good" west.
I can't pretend that the no-fly zone means anything else. I can listen to opposing views, be civil, etc. But if they lack merit they lack merit.
Respectfully,
William
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Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 23, 2011 18:57 PM
However, the desire to prevent various kinds of worse outcomes for themselves, and to channel outcomes favorably to themselves, that the un and u.s. have - doesn't mean that something they do with those desires in a very limited context where they are under lots of pressures cannot have positive results, even results contrary to their hopes.
The thing for you to respect in these disputes is that there are many people who believe - arguably correctly - that the absence of a no fly zone, etc., would have spelled massacre for the opposition, and its presence creates - however unintended - a possibility for far reaching successes. Will it happen - well that largely depends on efforts to restrict the u.s. rule, which ought to be people's focus.
Discussing how one feels about what happened so far is largely academic compared to discussing what needs to happen next and acting on the insights that emerge.
When you believe x and someone else believes y - you naturally think the y belief is wrong, otherwise, why would you believe x instead. The issue isn't just to hear that others believe y, and to be civil toward them, but unless it is simply impossible, to respect that in fact they are very likely equally as well motivated as you and, more, may be right and you may be wrong.
Is that impossible in this case? It shouldn't be. People with impeccable and very long records of anti imperial clarity think something you don't think. Others agree with you, and still others don't. To be sure you MUST be correct and they MUST be wrong and even delusional, is a problem.
I am always amused and saddened when someone swears by the integrity and insights of someone else, until they disagree with the other person, and then they promptly essentially discount the other person as idiotic. Can this be the case? Sure. Is it likely the case? No.
The article I wrote was trying to head off - before it happens - the mutual denigration that often arises in cases like this.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Wesley, William at Mar 23, 2011 19:21 PM
I never said anyone was stupid, delusional, etc. Its sad you stoop to ignoring my words while cramming other words down my throat to win points with the crowd with your "analysis". And then you lecture on civility. Wow. Maybe I was the fool for expecting something more focused.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 24, 2011 00:06 AM
The only offer on the table was Venezuela's offer to try to mediate. This was rejected by the opposition, though Qaddafi remporarily accepted it. I believe this was quite predictable - actually, predicted.
For the opposition, to negotiate with Qaddafi implied to them, is my guess, accepting that he would stay on. So they wouldn't do that. I guess Qaddafi interpreted it similarly, at least for a time, which is why he would do it.
People can disagree though. You might have felt that that offer was a real and plausible option that could occur rapidly enough to affect the unfolding conflict. Others felt that it wasn't. This doesn't mean they ignored it - it means they disagreed with you and vice versa.
I continue to feel that time spent going over that is really not going to achieve anything, for anyone... I just don't see how it would. In a complex unlikely to be repeated setting different people had different expectations for likely results of differents options...differences based on that can't be resolved now, I suspect. And I don't see any point to it, anyhow.
The issue is, I keep repeating - avoiding time trying to be right or show others wrong about that - and, instead, trying to affect the future outcomes, what minimally we can.
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Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 25, 2011 14:05 PM
That any U.S. intervention is aimed at diverse vile things rather than the well being of a distant population is of course true. That a by product of an intervention carried out under extreme pressures can have positive implications, especially if restrained by and in part responding to popular movements, is also true. It is a judgement call, in context, what one prefers, in a given case.
> Worse, a settlement was possible, perhaps likely. Reuters and others report that Gaddafi was looking for a way out. The opposition has confirmed these reports, even if the strongman has not. These reports are worth pursuing.
See Achcar's recent piece among many others...
> The case for war is not logical, its Pavolian. People are selectively shown suffering, denied context, lied to and told that war led by the flawed but "fundamentally good" west is the only way to save the day. The natural human instinct is to salivate for war.
The ease with people disparage whole sectors of other people is distrubing. That said - I think you are mixing up different observations...
> But we must resist this instinct. We rejected Saddam's offers of exile while his crimes (mostly committed on our payroll) were repackaged into a humanitarian case for invasion. How many dead, how many exiled as a result?
Not only are the cases quite different, so is the context...but as I have been saying all along, arguing about no fly has virtually nothing to do with whether people give time and energy to preventing occupation, which is the real task at hand. On the other hand, if those inclined to give that time and energy occupy themselves mainly - or almost even at all - with trying to undermine or denigrate their allies in a futile search for who had the right position - the effort will lag.
> I apologize Mr. Albert (and I say this in the spirit of humility and respect as I admire you) but I can't agree to disagree given the facts. I would need a magnifying glass to find common ground. And I can't look "forward not backward" - as one person suggested - with platitudes of limiting violence, because the past keeps repeating itself and we repeatedly adopt positions, handed to us from above, that make suffering more likely.
Well, you have to proceed with your actions as you see fit, of course. I would say, however, that if you can't find common ground with folks like Achcar, as but one of countless examples of people from whom, I would wager, directly or indirectly, you have gotten a great deal in the past - that would be a horrible shame.
I didn't expect my blog to convince everyone that taking shots at each other, dividing for the moment over wanting to proclaim or argue others were not just wrong in one's view, but irretreivably so and without reason and values would be both pointless and destructive - but hopefully it has had some mitigating effect on such prospects.
To those who think they are anti imperialist, sincere, committed, or caring or whatever, because they were and are for no fly while others are not anti imperialist are insincere, not committed, uncaring, or whatever because they were against no fly - or vice versa - I can only say you are taking a reasonable stance about a policy choice and elanorating it into a very unreasonable and destructive view of your natural and real allies. I am sure that in time, that will become more and move obvious.
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Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Wesley, William at Mar 30, 2011 16:55 PM
Otherwise, we've traveled in many circles. Your arguments about the effects of a "limited" attack on Libya (if there is such a thing) assumes the legitimacy and necessity of the attack.
Then, you say the other side could be right, respect them. Don't call them stupid or insincere or whatever. Sure. But I haven't called them that. Can we stop hitting this strawman?
Respect but don't worship. This talk about the west and "rebels" wanting to prevent a massacre is deeply flawed if they brush aside offers to negotiate settlement, especially if the basis if such settlement is Gaddafi's exit.
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Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 30, 2011 19:36 PM
In any event, my post was about how the two sides relate to one another, not about which is right and which is wrong. So for me that isn't a sidebar and also isn't a straw man. It is a real issue - and it is certainly out there - such as some people calling other people war mongers, etc. Honestly, the non sequitors, at least in reacting to my blog, were, if anything, all the posts arguing one side or the other....
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Wesley, William at Mar 30, 2011 22:36 PM
I had sort of assumed that any further efforts on my part would be best directed elsewhere. I even let you have what I assumed was the last word on March 24th, only replying to your further, longer reply on March 25.
For the record, the Reuters release was about Gaddafi's exit, which was mentioned before, but clearly this conversation is for another place. Achcar does not mention this, I believe, and his analysis suffers as a result.
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Libya and the Pavolian instinct...
By Albert, Michael at Mar 30, 2011 23:40 PM
I deal with perhaps a hundred emails a day...ball park....and then there are comments, plus work, of course. For me in a way it all mixes up - and I can't retain memory of prior exchanges with any one person, but can only answer each new message as I see it. I try to answer them all, and to address whatever people bring up even if it seems to be going off my purpose in writing in the first place. I also can't back track - I just couldn't possibly manage the time to do that. So this means I answer folks, message by message, without a lot of prior context - or even having what others have said interfere with a correct context for the person I am answering. Thus I sometimes repeat or make other errors. Sorry., I do what I can manage.
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Valuable contribution
By D, Martin at Mar 23, 2011 01:56 AM
I think you've made the case for "looking forward not backward" better than Obama has!
Seriously, I have been passionately against the intervention on many or all of the grounds you mention here. But your point that it's now time to focus our energies on limiting the violence going forward is valid and I for one will dedicate myself to moving the discussion in that direction.
M. Donovan
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good post
By Grinder, Matt at Mar 22, 2011 19:35 PM
Though it's rapidly becoming a moot point, my own thought was (before it happened) that the "no fly zone" would up the probability that Libyans can get out of this with less loss of life and with some possibility of social progress. Without it, I see way less possibility. Quadaffi will very likely massacre many people if he wins, and they will be left with a dictatorship. The fact that the west is implementing the zone makes the probability fall to a pretty low level that there will be a good outcome for Libyans.
Does that mean I "support it"? I reject the question based on its ambiguity. If it means I support the objectives of the west, no, of course not. If it means that I think it *might* lead to a better outcome than would be possible without it, then, I "support it" in that sense.
While I don't see a better, realisitic alternative to a no fly zone to protect life, there is an alternative way to implement it, or a few. Suppose the US donated a hundred of those reaper drones to a UN comittee or some structure. They would be piloted by some pilots froma neutral country, like some south american country, and given orders by a UN comitee, staffed by people of the rebels choosing. That would be a better way to implement it, probably. Realistic? No.
In the end, your last paragraph is dead on, we must do what we can to pressure our governments to keep out of it, and let Libyans decide.
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