Who Benefits, Who Suffers?

George and Edvino, ages 12 and 13, have been hired as farm workers in Sao Jose dos Pinhais, a town in the state of Parana located in Southern Brazil. This week they are applying pesticides. Edvino, wearing a dusty Yankees baseball cap and Lee Jeans, nervously giggles as George explains how the hand-held pesticide sprayer broke yesterday. It leaked on their skin while they were applying the pesticide Folidol, made by the German chemical corporation, Bayer. From the rows of vegetables we are standing in we can hear the chickens clucking in the shed near the house. As we walk down the dusty rows, Biologist Maria Eugenia Lopata asks George and Edvino if they know that Folidol is banned in other countries because of its health and environmental effects. George and Edvino stop, look up in amazement, and shake their heads no.

Lopata, who teaches at the Catholic University of Parana, has been working with the farming community of Sao Jose dos Pinhais for over ten years. She is originally from Brazil but has lived in the U.S. She speaks with the frustration of someone who knows the problems of this area intimately: "In most cases, none of these hired farm workers know anything about the chemicals they are using or the precautions they need to take. They sometimes work with faulty and outdated equipment."

Several incidences prompted Professor Lopata to start organizing pesticide education projects designed by and for farmers. One such incident was an investigation carried out in another region of the state by the Superintendent of Water Resources and the Environment when large numbers of dead fish appeared after the pesticide, Tordon (a DowElanco--formally Dow Chemical-product), had been sprayed for in the area for three days. The worker applying the product, Adilson Alves Goncalves, was badly affected on his legs. Photographs taken six months after his second contact with Tordon show his legs still covered with sores and a rash. Goncalves had no training and wore no protective equipment. He received no help in seeking medical assistance.

Also, tests of drinking water carried out by the Santa Catarina Secretary of Agriculture indicated high levels of polluted drinking water due to pesticides. Professor Heitor Segundo Guiherme Medina of the Federal University of Parana, carried out a study of fish in the state of Mato Grosso and Parana. Fish in this area, which are a source of food, had been poisoned by the pesticide Tordon and were disfigured and diseased.

The state of Parana is one of the main agricultural regions and applies the highest amount of pesticides in all of Brazil. In Parana approximately 19,000 tons of pesticides were applied in 1989, according to Reinaldo Onofre Skalisz, who has researched pesticide policy in Parana since 1980. In comparison to Parana, the agricultural state of Minas Gerais used 3,916 tons and the cocoa producing state of Bahia used 2,255 tons. Parana is also Brazil's biggest producer of cotton, beans, corn, and wheat. According to a 1994 report released by the development Bank of Parana, 25% of Brazil's agricultural grains are produced in Parana.

At the next farm we will meet Luis Negoseki. As we drive along, the hot summer sun of January beats down on the araucaria trees, a symbol of Parana, marking the subtropical agricultural landscape. Through the clouds, off in the distance, we can see the faint outline of the coastal mountain range Serra do Mar. Professor Lopata informs me as we drive up to the farm that the Negosekis stopped growing tomatoes, even though they bring in a larger profit than other vegetables, because the pesticide they needed to use on the tomatoes was making the family dizzy and nauseous. When we ask what pesticide he is now applying to the crops Luis Negoseki wipes the sweat off his forehead with the back of his hand and replies, "Aldrin and Folidol."

Aldrin, made by Shell Corporation, has only recently been restricted by law to specific crops in Brazil. However, it is still used by farmers on both the restricted crops and the unrestricted crops. After scientists commonly accepted that aldrin is a carcinogen in the 1970s, countries such as the United States, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Israel, Spain, Finland, Argentina, Belgium, and France gradually started to ban aldrin.

Lopata asks Luis Negoseki if he knows if any of the pesticides he is using are authorized only for certain crops. Luiz Negoseki pauses for a moment. A tractor can be heard off in the distance as he puts his hoe into the dirt and replies, "Sometimes the agronomist I buy the pesticides from tells me how to use it, but if I don't buy the pesticides from an agronomist then I am not given this information." Lopata tells me later this is a common response.

On other farms where land owners hire workers to apply the pesticides, land owners clandestinely buy chemicals for non-specified crops. They believe that the stronger chemical will produce a higher crop yield. This happens often in Brazil, Lopata explains, if the health of the land owner, who buys the pesticide and does not apply it, is not directly affected. In cases in which farm laborers are considered disposable, not unlike migrant farm workers in the United States, the land owners' only concern is crop yields.

The other pesticide that Luiz Negoseki mentioned, folidol, also known as methyl parathion, is an organo-phosphate insecticide that affects the nervous systems of organisms. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) parathion registration document states: "Methyl parathion causes poisonings among all categories of workers who use or come into direct contact with the pesticide. The risk extends not only to mixer/loaders and applicators, but to field workers and bystanders as well. In addition, these poisonings occur under the most stringent protective conditions and during use when in accordance with label directions. Little or no margin of safety exists for parathion use." Parathion's use is prohibited in Japan, South Africa, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Ireland, and Jamaica. It is severely restricted in Columbia, Belgium and Switzerland. Brazilian Agronomist, Jose Pedro Coelho Santiago, says that methyl parathion is authorized for use in Brazil on cereals, fruits, potatoes, beans, sugar cane, coffee, and other products.

Joao Teixeira da Cruz, who works with Lopata and with the Sao Jose Department of Agriculture, has some concerns about aerial spraying in Parana. Although pesticides are commonly applied by aircraft in Parana State, standards of aerial spraying have only been inspected in the state since July 1991. Farmers have been under no requirement to observe marker flags, wind direction, and the dangers of pesticides falling outside the target area. A number of workers remain in the field holding marker flags during the actual aerial spraying. An article on aerial spraying in Agrotecnica, a publication of the Swiss chemical corporation, Ciba-Geigy, shows a photograph of aerial spraying depicting a worker holding a flag and houses nearby.

Brazil is the major user of pesticides in Latin America and also produces and exports pesticides to other Latin American countries. One comparison drawn by researchers Burton and Philogene showed that Brazil's expenditure on pesticides of $1,993 million in 1990 was half as much as all other users in Latin America combined. This puts Brazil among the world's largest pesticide consumers.

According to projections by toxicologist, Dr. Flavio Zambroni, from the poison control center in Campinas, Sao Paulo, at least 280,000 Brazilians, 2% of the population, are contaminated by pesticides each year. Zambroni estimates that for each case registered in hospitals or clinics, there are 250 unreported cases, due mainly to the lack of doctors' knowledge. Doctors commonly mistake pesticide poisonings for food poisoning or other illnesses.

In 1989, researcher W. Carvalho analyzed occupational exposure to two highly toxic pesticides, BHC and DDT (banned in the U.S.), in the cocoa-growing State of Bahia. All workers returned immediately to work on the crop after the application of pesticides. Most workers did not use gloves, aprons, masks, or goggles. All workers used the same clothes for days or even weeks.

Rural workers often complain of constant headaches, stomach aches, dizziness, insomnia, and other symptoms during the periods when they are applying pesticides in the Novo Friburgo region of Rio de Janeiro, where a small percentage of farmers have died from pesticide poisonings, according to Greenpeace researcher David Hathaway. They often feel too weak to work and know the cause, but are unaware of alternative pest control methods.

Health and safety issues are exacerbated by a general lack of hazard awareness, lack of basic health care in rural areas, and the lack of protective clothing, or difficulty of wearing protective clothing in tropical climates. There are also shortages of facilities for washing after pesticide application, or in case of accidents. Many times used pesticide containers are re-used for storage and drinking. Illiteracy, reading complex labels, misleading information, lack of regulatory authorities, and lack of enforcement all contribute to health hazards related to pesticides. Also, labor is abundant in most developing countries resulting in a disregard for workers' health.

When pesticides clearly have affected agricultural laborer's health, and unemployment is high, some employers adopt the cynical position of reducing individual health risks by not guaranteeing work.

Neither George or Edvino were informed about safety precautions to take before applying pesticides. When asked if they had read the label they George replied, "I couldn't understand all of those words. I don't think we are supposed to read that stuff anyway." George recalls his older brother telling him to not to act sick if the pesticides start to make him ill. "I don't want to get fired," he commented.

Chemical pesticides are also responsible for water pollution, soil degradation, insect resistance and resurgence and the destruction of native flora and fauna. Pesticides kill insects as well as their natural predators; and over time, many of the parasites build up a resistance to the chemicals. As a result, the continued and increasing use of pesticides becomes necessary. According to World Watch researcher Gary Gardner, more than 900 species are presently resistant to at least one pesticide- up from 182 in 1965.

The "Green" Revolution's Influence on Brazil

The Green Revolution is commonly defined as the widespread movement to ease chronic food shortages in developing countries through the development of seeds that have been bio-engineered to produce higher crop yields. The Green Revolution was developed in the 1940s under Rockefeller and Ford Foundation and supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which are all based in Northern industrialized countries. These higher-yielding varieties of seeds are highly dependent on irrigation, fertilizers, and pesticides. Corporations that produce these biologically engineered seeds, pesticides and fertilizers have a lot to gain from this manufactured dependence of developing countries on their products. For example, in response to greater pesticide use in Brazil, Monsanto Chemical Corporation, based in St. Louis, Missouri, is stepping up efforts to introduce Roundup Ready soybeans, genetically engineered soybeans that are designed to work with their pesticide Roundup.

The Green Revolution, according to Vandana Shiva, director of the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy India, was a techno-political strategy to create abundance in agricultural societies and reduce the threat of communist insurgency and agrarian conflict. "Development" then became a strategy to "combat scarcity" and generate material abundance. However, the connection between agricultural inputs and food security, particularly food for the poor, is tenuous. Distribution is a greater problem than production, as access to food is limited by poverty, not the quantity of food produced annually. The Green Revolution does not recognize that most of the food targeted for large scale pesticide use does not feed the Third World population but is destined for export to wealthier countries. The Green Revolution in fact encourages and perpetuates export agriculture economies.

The ideology of the Green Revolution often spread to the governments of developing countries. These governments then often pushed their own development projects based on the agricultural theories of the Green Revolution. Brazil's First National Development Plan in 1972 laid down a policy of increasing agricultural productivity, and reducing pesticide imports by developing the Brazilian pesticide industry. Pesticide promotion intensified, and thousands of sales representatives were employed. The plan, as Brazilian Agronomist Reinaldo Onofre Skalisz illustrated in a 1991 survey of pesticide use and policy, encouraged agricultural concentration on soy, wheat, and cotton, crops which require large quantities of pesticides.

The Brazilian government actively promoted pesticide use. Following the First National Development Plan, the Bank of Brazil began to make rural credit dependent on farmers applying 15% of the sum granted to pesticides. Advertising in newspapers, magazines, leaflets, and television, companies promoted the idea that pesticides were indispensable to agricultural productivity and better quality foods while being harmless to people and the environment. Pesticide imports into Brazil remain high and the scale of use makes Brazil an attractive market for exporters.

Public concern in Brazil started to rise after journalists revealed that tomatoes were being treated with mercury compounds. Mercury is a poison that effects the nervous system. A large percentage of the workers in sugar cane fields in the state of Rio de Janeiro were poisoned by mercury. As Brazilian activist, Jose Lutzenberger, revealed in the 1981 public television broadcast Pesticides and Pills: For Export Only, "the big international outfits that produce and sell these products know what's happening and they sell it even if it is prohibited for use in the exporting country."

U.S. Pesticide Exports

Professor Lopata and I ride along a dirt road to the Farmer's Cooperative in town where most of the farmers in this area buy their pesticides. We must roll up our windows in the sweltering heat as other cars and trucks pass because the dust from the road makes it hard to breath. At the Cooperative, we examine the dusty containers of pesticides on the shelves. "So many of these are made in other countries but prohibited to be used where they are made," Lopata comments in a cool, matter-of-fact manner. Then her eyes change and she looks at the agronomist behind the counter and whispers to herself, "Why are we a dumping ground?"

It is increasingly accepted by public health professionals and environmentalists that products which are banned or severely restricted in industrial countries should not be exported to developing countries, yet no country prohibits the export of pesticides banned in their own country. In spite of the health and environmental risks illustrated by researchers and advocates, pesticide sales to parts of the Southern hemisphere, particularly the richer countries in Latin America, are growing. Trade liberalization, such as GATT and NAFTA, and monetary policies developed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund structural adjustment policies which encourage cash crops for exports, will tend to increase pesticide sales in agriculture exporting countries, according to British Agrochemical's 1992 Annual Report.

The pesticides market is dominated by a small number of transnational corporations: the top 10 companies control 73% of the world market, and 20 companies control 93%, according to the 1990 edition of Agrow World Crop Protection News . The top 15 are all based in Western Europe or the United States, led by Ciba-Geigy (Swiss), ICI (UK), Bayer (German) and Phone Poulenc (French).

Pesticides are big business. The sales of the top 25 companies amounted to approximately $23.5 billion in 1990 and $29 billion in 1995 according to reports in Agrow World Crop Protection News. In 1994, pesticide sales in Brazil were US$1.4 billion which shows an increase from about US$l billion in 1993. Many companies see Latin America as a target area for their products.

A Worldwatch report paper published in 1987 revealed that between 1972 and 1985, imports in pesticides in Latin America increased by 48%.

The top pesticide companies all recorded increases in dollar sales in 1995. Global agrochemical sales rose by 11.9%, according to Agrow's report in 1996. More than 334 million pounds of pesticides were exported from US ports between 1992 and 1994, according to a March 1996 report by the Foundation for Advancements in Science and Education (FASE). The report, based on the analysis of US Customs shipping records, found that exports of "hazardous pesticides" increased 26% between 1992 and 1994, growing from 100 million pounds in 1992 to 126 million pounds in 1994. These estimates, FASE stresses, must be viewed as extremely conservative since 74% of all pesticides exported left the US with product names omitted from shipping records. The majority of hazardous exports went to destinations in the developing countries.

FASE defines hazardous pesticides as those that are banned, severely restricted or considered "restricted use" pesticides in the US; those that are known or suspected of causing cancer, genetic mutation or reproductive damage; or those that the US Environmental Protection Agency classifies as "highly toxic." According to this FASE report, in 1994, US companies exported more than three million pounds of pesticides designated by the United Nations Environment Program as "likely to cause problems under conditions of use in developing countries." These include the pesticide mentioned earlier: methyl parathion. Brazil was one of the countries that received the greatest quantities of pesticides between 1992 and 1994 from the us.

The data used in the FASE report is based on US Customs shipping records the most complete source of information on exports in the public

record. However, the great majority of pesticides exported are not specifically named in these records and nearly half of all pesticides were exported anonymously, the result of companies obtaining permission from the US Treasury Department to mask their names on shipping documents available to the public. FASE was able to identify exporters for approximately 60% of the pesticides exported between 1992 and 1994. The principle companies responsible for exporting unidentified pesticides in 1994 included Rhone Poulenc (France), Zeneca (UK), and American Cyanamid. More than 150 million pounds of unidentified pesticides were exported in 1994 by anonymous manufacturers.

The chemical companies argue that there are compelling reasons to export pesticides overseas such as to sustain agricultural yields. Instances of starvation and increasing population in developing countries are frequently cited to justify this approach. However, investigations show that up to 70 percent of all the pesticides used in developing countries are not applied to food for local consumption. "At least 50 percent and up to 70 percent are instead applied to export crops," reports David Weir in Circle of Poison. "Pesticides are applied to food that people eat in the US, not people in the Third World. It is applied to cocoa, to coffee, to bananas, tapioca, all sorts of luxury crops, to non-food items like cotton." Furthermore, distribution of food is a greater problem than production of food, as access to food is limited by poverty, not the quantity of food produced annually.

One reason pesticide use is so much more intense on export crops than on subsistence food crops is that the multinational corporations which control the production and marketing of exports demand a blemish-free product. Nothing less, they say, will meet the discriminating standards of the consumers in Europe, North America, or Japan. Researcher David Pimental reported in Bio-Science that in the United States it is estimated that 10 to 20 percent of pesticides used on fruits and vegetables serve only to improve their appearance.

Circle of Poison

After we visit a few farms, Professor Lopata and I rest in the limited shade of some araucaria trees and eat our lunch. From this elevated part of Sao Jose dos Pinhais we have a view of many of the farms we just visited. As I notice the sweet smell of freshly turned earth on our shoes Lopata inspects her sandwich. "I wonder what kind of chemicals I'm subjecting my body to as I eat this ... you know in the United States you're still affected by the pesticides you have banned," she says firmly.

Many consumers in the United states have fought to have pesticides banned or severely restricted in their own countries, only to find residues returning in imported food. The FDA estimates, through spot checks, that 10 percent of our imported food is contaminated with illegal residues of banned pesticides. However, Weir challenges this figure as being too low, claiming that "the FDA's most commonly used analytical method does not even check for 70 percent of the almost 900 food tolerances for cancer-causing pesticides." (A tolerance is defined as the amount of a pesticide allowed in any particular food product.) Also, in 1986, the US General Accounting Office reported that the FDA tests almost no domestically grown food for pesticides and does not prevent the sale of the contaminated food it does find.

Few studies of pesticide residues are carried out in Brazil, but the information available does give rise to concern. In 1969, meat exported to the US from Brazil was found to be contaminated by pesticide residue. Also, cheese exported from Brazil was rejected by Canada and soy exported to Japan was rejected because of high residues of pesticides. The Brazilian Minister of Agriculture responded by creating a laboratory (LARA) to examine exported products. In 1985 LARA published a study showing that 80% of all meat destined for consumption in other countries was contaminated with DDT and BHC. 15% of this exceeded levels of contamination deemed acceptable by the World Health Organization.

Multinational corporations defend the trade of banned chemicals to developing countries by claiming that each country is competent and responsible for determining its own policies on the export and import of products. They argue that if the government of Brazil wishes to subject its people to a pesticide the US considers dangerous, then the manufacturer should not feel constrained because a Western country has banned the pesticide.

This raises an interesting question: "Why does Brazil have hardly any regulations?" As criminologist John Braithwaite observes, one must question the liberal democratic ideal of national sovereignty "when one is talking about countries who ... make their decisions about the chemical industry on the strength of bribes." Indeed, due to corruption and other pressures from multinationals, most third world countries have been unable to stop the flow of dangerous products. Jose Lutzenberger, Brazilian environmentalist, comments that "Unfortunately, the multinational corporations, whether from the US or Europe, are so strong that they manage to transform the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture into a true subsidiary of them."

Parana State Fights Back Against the Brazilian Federal Government's Lax Pesticide Legislation

The seriousness of the health and environmental impacts of pesticides in Brazil and the apparent indifference of the federal government prompted several Brazilian states to pass their own laws. In June 1982, pesticide residue polluted the waters of Rio Guiaba which supplies water to the city Porto Alegre in the State of Rio Grande do Sul. Rio Grande do Sul passed the first law followed by the state of Parana in the same month.

This step provoked a violent reaction from the pesticides industry, which argued in the Supreme Court of Brazil that the state laws were unconstitutional. The German Federation of Pesticide Manufacturers demanded that the federal government over-rule the state laws. A conglomeration of European pesticide industries wrote to the Brazilian government warning about the serious repercussions the situation could have on the industry, and shortly afterwards asked the then Minister of Agriculture, Nestor Jost, to use his influence to modify the situation in favor of industry.

Some aspects of the state laws were ruled unconstitutional: specifically the articles referring to environment and toxicological data, which were said to be only within the jurisdiction of the Brazilian environmental authorities and the Brazilian Department of Health.

Since this law came into force, the authorities in the state of Parana have found that the Ministry of Agriculture lacked information about various products. The major pesticide manufacturers have all tried to address labeling shortcomings, however, pesticides are still used by illiterate agricultural workers or are too complex. Parana is concerned that labels do not indicate symptoms of poisoning. A survey carried out by the Secretary of Agriculture for the state of Parana, in 1987, found that 40% of products sold omitted this information and 60% did not indicate how poisonings should be treated. Examples of contradictory, misleading, or wrong information on pesticide product labels include:

• Cobra 21 (lactofen), made by the German Corporation Hoechst, says that no fatty materials should be taken in the event of poisoning by the product. On the next line it says that a large quantity of milk should be drunk in the event of poisoning. A correction sticker has been placed over these instructions.
• The US corporation Monsanto published a technical leaflet saying that their product Roundup (glyphosphate) is less toxic than kitchen salt, aspirin or vitamin A.
• A leaflet on Verdict, made by DowElanco (a corporation based in the U.S.), which is registered only for use on soy in Brazil, carries recommendations for use on 13 other crops, such as cotton, coffee, citrus, eucalyptus, and tomatoes.

Now, products sold in the state of Parana must have special labels to show they conform to the restriction imposed.

There is presently a great deal of indifference from the Brazilian federal government. In December 1990, registration of 116 pesticide products was up for renewal, and the President extended the date form six months. At the end of this period all of these products were refused registration, either because the manufacturer had not provided sufficient product data, or the relevant ministry did not have the resources to carry out the work necessary for registration. In spite of this decision, three Ministries (Health, Agriculture, and Environment) met in July 1991 and agreed to extend the registration of the products. The State of Parana has to date ignored the extension and begun to ban their sale.

However, as illustrated in the State of Parana's report on pesticides, Pesticides: A Reality of Parana, bans often fail to actually control sales. In 1987, agronomists of Parana's Secretary of Agriculture carried out a survey of the 265 best-selling pesticides in the state to see whether the manufacturers had presented to the Ministry of Agriculture the correct data: there was no information at all for 120 products (45%), partial information on 142 (54%) and only three (1%) presented all the information including the pesticide, crop, and symptoms.

Individual states commonly have difficulties banning a pesticide if it is allowed in the rest of the country. The pesticide commonly referred to as BHC was banned in January 1981 by Parana State. But the regulation allowed sales to continue until the end of 1983, to enable companies to get rid of their stocks. Without any facilities for collection of out-of-date or banned pesticides, they often remain easily accessible and stored under hazardous conditions. Parana's Secretary of Agriculture confiscated 300 tons of BHC products, and storage continues to be a environmental and health problem. In 1991, three tons of BHC were found buried in the town of Apucarana.

With the aim of getting a better picture of the effects on pesticides on exposed workers, the Secretary of Agriculture began work in collaboration with the state's hospitals, agricultural workers and the general public to research the incidence of poisonings. From 1984, the Secretary of Health began joint work with the Toxicological Information Center and health clinics throughout the state to document the health and environmental impact of pesticides. Doctors are asked to complete standard forms indicating personal details, the product responsible, the relevant crop and symptoms. Parana hopes to acquire a clearer picture of the extent of the problem and the regions most affected.

However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on trends from figures revealed through these sources. Agronomist Reinaldo Skalisz reports that poisoning figures fell after 1984 largely because the system for collecting information became less rigorous. In 1990, the Secretary of Health tightened procedures and the number increased again. The forms are often poorly completed. Common omissions include the product, active ingredient, and the crop.

Prior Informed Consent and GATT

Important policy advances have been made in regard to health and environmental hazards associated with pesticide trade. In 1985, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) introduced an International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides (the FAO code), and in 1989 it incorporated a mechanism, known as Prior Informed Consent (PIC), which enables governments to stop imports of a number of named pesticides. Pesticides will be placed in the PIC process if they are a chemical that is banned for health or environmental reasons in at least one country or if they cause health or environmental problems under the conditions of use in "developing countries." PIC provisions not only make it easier for the Brazilian Federal Government to reject hazardous imports, but also act as a means of transferring information and providing a structure for the work of health and environmental advocacy groups in so-called developing countries. But as a trade-based mechanism, there are limits to what it can achieve.

There is no provision through UN agencies or governments for monitoring or enforcing the FAO Code. For pesticides not in the PIC process, but banned or severely restricted for any reason in an exporting country, the exporting country is required to notify the importing country that a shipment should be expected. Few governments have set up schemes to notify of such exports, and many banned or severely restricted products are exported without notif ication.

GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, puts a whole new spin on provisions to limit pesticide trade. Under the terms of GATT or the World Trade Organization (WTO), as it is now called since the Uruguay Round, Prior Informed Consent could be seen as a non-tariff barrier to trade, which the World Trade Organization seeks to eliminate. The PIC provisions require that decisions to ban or severely restrict a pesticide are 'not used inconsistently with the provisions of GATT.' It does not prevent the production and export of pesticides banned domestically.

In theory, the treaty that emerged from the GATT Uruguay Round should allow more access to so-called Developing Countries to the markets of industrialized countries for their processed products but, in turn, will further open the markets of Third World economies to multinational corporations. The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, formed after the Uruguay Round, is currently debating the issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods and will present a decision in December 1996 at the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Singapore.

What Is Our Responsibility?

Professor Lopata has talked with farmers at several community meetings about organizing projects to educate about the safe use of pesticides and how to decrease the use of pesticides. Information about the use of pesticides in the area is currently being gathered. However, lack of resources and funds continue to hamper these projects from progressing at a quick pace. "It takes a lot of work to put projects like this together that involve the whole community. The farmers work so much that it's hard to schedule meetings. It's hard for the farmers to resist pesticides when they are bombarded with advertisements or dependent on pesticides for a certain brand of seed they are buying."

Yet a few farmers throughout Brazil have resisted by introducing other methods of farming such as biological controls, inter-cropping, crop rotation and others in place of pesticides. In a recent study of several hundred organic farms (farms that do not use pesticides) spread over 14 countries and four continents, published by the United Nations Development Program, it was concluded that "organic agriculture is a feasible option for environmentally and economically sustainable production strategies in developing countries." Yet, the pressure to adopt industrialized agricultural methods has been hard to resist. It began with the demand for land in developing countries to supply crops to the northern industrialized countries, and was later reinforced with economics strategies, promoted by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other money lending institutions, for development based on the export of cash crops.

A few days after Lopata gave me a tour of the farming community, I accompanied agronomist Joao Teixeira da Cruz to a Health Department meeting which discussed pesticides and workers safety. The buzzing fluorescent lighting and the pungent smell of the freshly cleaned and deodorized tiles of the Health Department floor were a direct contrast to the lifestyle of the farmers I was just immersed in.

I was introduced to everyone in the room and I described how many of the Brazilian farm workers that I had recently met did not know that many of the pesticides they were using were banned in other countries for health and environmental reasons. The room became silent except for the humming of the fluorescent light over our heads. A member of the Health Department turned to me and asked, "Well, do the people of the United States know what their companies are doing to us in Brazil?"

What is our responsibility in the United States? Or rather, what is our ability to respond? There are a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOS) throughout the United States that are educating the public, lobbying the government and monitoring corporations and researching issues around the international trade and use of pesticides. Some NGOs are organizing boycotts of produce that have pesticide residues in the hope that corporations will get the message that some customers do not agree with their actions.

For example, the Pesticide Action Network has made a list of twelve pesticides, the "dirty dozen," which are banned in many countries but still internationally exported. This list has been used to lobby governments and educate the public about the international pesticide trade. Also, the Foundation for the Advancement in Science and Education is currently demanding that the EPA and other government agencies enforce proper labeling, ensure that comprehensible information about safe use is available, and include information about less-toxic alternatives with pesticide shipments to developing countries. However, for the most part, NGOs do not have the resources to compete with and challenge the chemical corporations. What about corporate responsibility and ethics?

Corporations and their executives, accustomed to getting away with exporting domestically banned pesticides and causing detrimental health and environmental effects in developing countries, will change only if the costs of this activity outweigh the benefits. Multi-national corporations have the power to co-opt Third World governments, and only strong a strong international code which is well enforced and costly to disobey as proposed by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization can prevent these types of

unethical practices. Those injured by hazardous pesticides will not be protected from an alliance of corporations seeking to continue exporting domestically banned pesticides in the name of free trade unless citizens organize and demand that the World Trade Organization not allow corporations to export domestically banned pesticides as prohibited by the PIC agreement of the FAO. The fight for corporate responsibility will not be a topdown fight but a bottom-up fight.