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  <description>Noam Chomsky

&amp;nbsp;


    Part of the reason why I write about
    the media is because I am interested in the whole
    intellectual culture, and the part of it that is easiest to
    study is the media. It comes out every day. You can do a
    systematic investigation. You can compare yesterday&amp;#146;s
    version to today&amp;#146;s version. There is a lot of evidence
    about what&amp;#146;s played up and what isn&amp;#146;t and the way
    things are structured.
    My impression is the media aren&amp;#146;t
    very different from scholarship or from, say, journals of
    intellectual opinion&amp;#151;there are some extra
    constraints&amp;#151;but it&amp;#146;s not radically different. They
    interact, which is why people go up and back quite easily
    among them.
    You look at the media, or at any
    institution you want to understand. You ask questions about
    its internal institutional structure. You want to know
    something about their setting in the broader society. How do
    they relate to other systems of power and authority? If
    you&amp;#146;re lucky, there is an internal record from leading
    people in the information system which tells you what they
    are up to (it is sort of a doctrinal system). That
    doesn&amp;#146;t mean the public relations handouts but what they
    say to each other about what they are up to. There is quite a
    lot of interesting documentation.
    Those are three major sources of
    information about the nature of the media. You want to study
    them the way, say, a scientist would study some complex
    molecule or something. You take a look at the structure and
    then make some hypothesis based on the structure as to what
    the media product is likely to look like. Then you
    investigate the media product and see how well it conforms to
    the hypotheses. Virtually all work in media analysis is this
    last part&amp;#151;trying to study carefully just what the media
    product is and whether it conforms to obvious assumptions
    about the nature and structure of the media. 
    Well, what do you find? First of all,
    you find that there are different media which do different
    things, like the entertainment/Hollywood, soap operas, and so
    on, or even most of the newspapers in the country (the
    overwhelming majority of them). They are directing the mass
    audience. 
    There is another sector of the media,
    the elite media, sometimes called the agenda-setting media
    because they are the ones with the big resources, they set
    the framework in which everyone else operates. The New
    York Times and CBS, that kind of thing. Their audience is
    mostly privileged people. The people who read the New York
    Times&amp;#151;people who are wealthy or part of what is
    sometimes called the political class&amp;#151;they are actually
    involved in the political system in an ongoing fashion. They
    are basically managers of one sort or another. They can be
    political managers, business managers (like corporate
    executives or that sort of thing), doctoral managers (like
    university professors), or other journalists who are involved
    in organizing the way people think and look at things. 
    The elite media set a framework within
    which others operate. If you are watching the Associated
    Press, who grind out a constant flow of news, in the
    mid-afternoon it breaks and there is something that comes
    along every day that says &amp;quot;Notice to Editors:
    Tomorrow&amp;#146;s New York Times is going to have the
    following stories on the front page.&amp;quot; The point of that
    is, if you&amp;#146;re an editor of a newspaper in Dayton, Ohio
    and you don&amp;#146;t have the resources to figure out what the
    news is, or you don&amp;#146;t want to think about it anyway,
    this tells you what the news is. These are the stories for
    the quarter page that you are going to devote to something
    other than local affairs or diverting your audience. These
    are the stories that you put there because that&amp;#146;s what
    the New York Times tells us is what you&amp;#146;re
    supposed to care about tomorrow. If you are an editor in
    Dayton, Ohio, you would sort of have to do that, because you
    don&amp;#146;t have much else in the way of resources. If you get
    off line, if you&amp;#146;re producing stories that the big press
    doesn&amp;#146;t like, you&amp;#146;ll hear about it pretty soon. In
    fact, what just happened at San Jose Mercury News is a
    dramatic example of this. So there are a lot of ways in which
    power plays can drive you right back into line if you move
    out. If you try to break the mold, you&amp;#146;re not going to
    last long. That framework works pretty well, and it is
    understandable that it is just a reflection of obvious power
    structures.
    The real mass media are basically
    trying to divert people. Let them do something else, but
    don&amp;#146;t bother us (us being the people who run the show).
    Let them get interested in professional sports, for example.
    Let everybody be crazed about professional sports or sex
    scandals or the personalities and their problems or something
    like that. Anything, as long as it isn&amp;#146;t serious. Of
    course, the serious stuff is for the big guys. &amp;quot;We&amp;quot;
    take care of that. 
    What are the elite media, the
    agenda-setting ones? The New York Times and CBS, for
    example. Well, first of all, they are major, very profitable,
    corporations. Furthermore, most of them are either linked to,
    or outright owned by, much bigger corporations, like General
    Electric, Westinghouse, and so on. They are way up at the top
    of the power structure of the private economy which is a very
    tyrannical structure. Corporations are basically tyrannies,
    hierarchic, controled from above. If you don&amp;#146;t like what
    they are doing you get out. The major media are just part of
    that system.
    What about their institutional setting?
    Well, that&amp;#146;s more or less the same. What they interact
    with and relate to is other major power centers&amp;#151;the
    government, other corporations, or the universities. Because
    the media are a doctrinal system they interact closely with
    the universities. Say you are a reporter writing a story on
    Southeast Asia or Africa, or something like that. You&amp;#146;re
    supposed to go over to the big university and find an expert
    who will tell you what to write, or else go to one of the
    foundations, like Brookings Institute or American Enterprise
    Institute and they will give you the words to say. These
    outside institutions are very similar to the media. 
    The universities, for example, are not
    independent institutions. There may be independent people
    scattered around in them but that is true of the media as
    well. And it&amp;#146;s generally true of corporations. It&amp;#146;s
    true of Fascist states, for that matter. But the institution
    itself is parasitic. It&amp;#146;s dependent on outside sources
    of support and those sources of support, such as private
    wealth, big corporations with grants, and the government
    (which is so closely interlinked with corporate power you can
    barely distinguish them), they are essentially what the
    universities are in the middle of. People within them, who
    don&amp;#146;t adjust to that structure, who don&amp;#146;t accept it
    and internalize it (you can&amp;#146;t really work with it unless
    you internalize it, and believe it); people who don&amp;#146;t do
    that are likely to be weeded out along the way, starting from
    kindergarten, all the way up. There are all sorts of
    filtering devices to get rid of people who are a pain in the
    neck and think independently. Those of you who have been
    through college know that the educational system is very
    highly geared to rewarding conformity and obedience; if you
    don&amp;#146;t do that, you are a troublemaker. So, it is kind of
    a filtering device which ends up with people who really
    honestly (they aren&amp;#146;t lying) internalize the framework
    of belief and attitudes of the surrounding power system in
    the society. The elite institutions like, say, Harvard and
    Princeton and the small upscale colleges, for example, are
    very much geared to socialization. If you go through a place
    like Harvard, most of what goes on there is teaching manners;
    how to behave like a member of the upper classes, how to
    think the right thoughts, and so on. 
    If you&amp;#146;ve read George
    Orwell&amp;#146;s Animal Farm which he wrote in the
    mid-1940s, it was a satire on the Soviet Union, a
    totalitarian state. It was a big hit. Everybody loved it.
    Turns out he wrote an introduction to Animal Farm
    which was suppressed. It only appeared 30 years later.
    Someone had found it in his papers. The introduction to Animal
    Farm was about &amp;quot;Literary Censorship in England&amp;quot;
    and what it says is that obviously this book is ridiculing
    the Soviet Union and its totalitarian structure. But he said
    England is not all that different. We don&amp;#146;t have the KGB
    on our neck, but the end result comes out pretty much the
    same. People who have independent ideas or who think the
    wrong kind of thoughts are cut out.
    He talks a little, only two sentences,
    about the institutional structure. He asks, why does this
    happen? Well, one, because the press is owned by wealthy
    people who only want certain things to reach the public. The
    other thing he says is that when you go through the elite
    education system, when you go through the proper schools in
    Oxford, you learn that there are certain things it&amp;#146;s not
    proper to say and there are certain thoughts that are not
    proper to have. That is the socialization role of elite
    institutions and if you don&amp;#146;t adapt to that, you&amp;#146;re
    usually out. Those two sentences more or less tell the story.
    
    When you critique the media and you
    say, look, here is what Anthony Lewis or somebody else is
    writing, they get very angry. They say, quite correctly,
    &amp;quot;nobody ever tells me what to write. I write anything I
    like. All this business about pressures and constraints is
    nonsense because I&amp;#146;m never under any pressure.&amp;quot;
    Which is completely true, but the point is that they
    wouldn&amp;#146;t be there unless they had already demonstrated
    that nobody has to tell them what to write because they are
    going say the right thing. If they had started off at the
    Metro desk, or something, and had pursued the wrong kind of
    stories, they never would have made it to the positions where
    they can now say anything they like. The same is mostly true
    of university faculty in the more ideological disciplines.
    They have been through the socialization system.
    Okay, you look at the structure of that
    whole system. What do you expect the news to be like? Well,
    it&amp;#146;s pretty obvious. Take the New York Times.
    It&amp;#146;s a corporation and sells a product. The product is
    audiences. They don&amp;#146;t make money when you buy the
    newspaper. They are happy to put it on the worldwide web for
    free. They actually lose money when you buy the newspaper.
    But the audience is the product. The product is privileged
    people, just like the people who are writing the newspapers,
    you know, top-level decision-making people in society. You
    have to sell a product to a market, and the market is, of
    course, advertisers (that is, other businesses). Whether it
    is television or newspapers, or whatever, they are selling
    audiences. Corporations sell audiences to other corporations.
    In the case of the elite media, it&amp;#146;s big businesses. 
    Well, what do you expect to happen?
    What would you predict about the nature of the media product,
    given that set of circumstances? What would be the null
    hypothesis, the kind of conjecture that you&amp;#146;d make
    assuming nothing further. The obvious assumption is that the
    product of the media, what appears, what doesn&amp;#146;t appear,
    the way it is slanted, will reflect the interest of the
    buyers and sellers, the institutions, and the power systems
    that are around them. If that wouldn&amp;#146;t happen, it would
    be kind of a miracle. 
    Okay, then comes the hard work. You
    ask, does it work the way you predict? Well, you can judge
    for yourselves. There&amp;#146;s lots of material on this obvious
    hypothesis, which has been subjected to the hardest tests
    anybody can think of, and still stands up remarkably well.
    You virtually never find anything in the social sciences that
    so strongly supports any conclusion, which is not a big
    surprise, because it would be miraculous if it didn&amp;#146;t
    hold up given the way the forces are operating. 
    The next thing you discover is that
    this whole topic is completely taboo. If you go to the
    Kennedy School of Government or Stanford, or somewhere, and
    you study journalism and communications or academic political
    science, and so on, these questions are not likely to appear.
    That is, the hypothesis that anyone would come across without
    even knowing anything that is not allowed to be expressed,
    and the evidence bearing on it cannot be discussed. Well, you
    predict that too. If you look at the institutional structure,
    you would say, yeah, sure, that&amp;#146;s got to happen because
    why should these guys want to be exposed? Why should they
    allow critical analysis of what they are up to take place?
    The answer is, there is no reason why they should allow that
    and, in fact, they don&amp;#146;t. Again, it is not purposeful
    censorship. It is just that you don&amp;#146;t make it to those
    positions. That includes the left (what is called the left),
    as well as the right. Unless you have been adequately
    socialized and trained so that there are some thoughts you
    just don&amp;#146;t have, because if you did have them, you
    wouldn&amp;#146;t be there. So you have a second order of
    prediction which is that the first order of prediction is not
    allowed into the discussion. 
    The last thing to look at is the
    doctrinal framework in which this proceeds. Do people at high
    levels in the information system, including the media and
    advertising and academic political science and so on, do
    these people have a picture of what ought to happen when they
    are writing for each other (not when they are making
    graduation speeches)? When you make a commencement speech, it
    is pretty words and stuff. But when they are writing for one
    another, what do people say about it? 
    There are basically three currents to
    look at. One is the public relations industry, you know, the
    main business propaganda industry. So what are the leaders of
    the PR industry saying? Second place to look is at what are
    called public intellectuals, big thinkers, people who write
    the &amp;quot;op eds&amp;quot; and that sort of thing. What do they
    say? The people who write impressive books about the nature
    of democracy and that sort of business. The third thing you
    look at is the academic stream, particularly that part of
    political science which is concerned with communications and
    information and that stuff which has been a branch of
    political science for the last 70 or 80 years. 
    So, look at those three things and see
    what they say, and look at the leading figures who have
    written about this. They all say (I&amp;#146;m partly quoting),
    the general population is &amp;quot;ignorant and meddlesome
    outsiders.&amp;quot; We have to keep them out of the public arena
    because they are too stupid and if they get involved they
    will just make trouble. Their job is to be
    &amp;quot;spectators,&amp;quot; not &amp;quot;participants.&amp;quot;
    They are allowed to vote every once in
    a while, pick out one of us smart guys. But then they are
    supposed to go home and do something else like watch football
    or whatever it may be. But the &amp;quot;ignorant and meddlesome
    outsiders&amp;quot; have to be observers not participants. The
    participants are what are called the &amp;quot;responsible
    men&amp;quot; and, of course, the writer is always one of them.
    You never ask the question, why am I a &amp;quot;responsible
    man&amp;quot; and somebody else is in jail? The answer is pretty
    obvious. It&amp;#146;s because you are obedient and subordinate
    to power and that other person may be independent, and so on.
    But you don&amp;#146;t ask, of course. So there are the smart
    guys who are supposed to run the show and the rest of them
    are supposed to be out, and we should not succumb to
    (I&amp;#146;m quoting from an academic article) &amp;quot;democratic
    dogmatisms about men being the best judges of their own
    interest.&amp;quot; They are not. They are terrible judges of
    their own interests so we have do it for them for their own
    benefit. 
    Actually, it is very similar to
    Leninism. We do things for you and we are doing it in the
    interest of everyone, and so on. I suspect that&amp;#146;s part
    of the reason why it&amp;#146;s been so easy historically for
    people to shift up and back from being, sort of enthusiastic
    Stalinists to being big supporters of U.S. power. People
    switch very quickly from one position to the other, and my
    suspicion is that it&amp;#146;s because basically it is the same
    position. You&amp;#146;re not making much of a switch.
    You&amp;#146;re just making a different estimate of where power
    lies. One point you think it&amp;#146;s here, another point you
    think it&amp;#146;s there. You take the same position. 
    @PAR SUB = How did all this evolve? It
    has an interesting history. A lot of it comes out of the
    first World War, which is a big turning point. It changed the
    position of the United States in the world considerably. In
    the 18th century the U.S. was already the richest place in
    the world. The quality of life, health, and longevity was not
    achieved by the upper classes in Britain until the early 20th
    century, let alone anybody else in the world. The U.S. was
    extraordinarily wealthy, with huge advantages, and, by the
    end of the 19th century, it had by far the biggest economy in
    the world. But it was not a big player on the world scene.
    U.S. power extended to the Caribbean Islands, parts of the
    Pacific, but not much farther.
    During the first World War, the
    relations changed. And they changed more dramatically during
    the second World War. After the second World War the U.S.
    more or less took over the world. But after first World War
    there was already a change and the U.S. shifted from being a
    debtor to a creditor nation. It wasn&amp;#146;t huge, like
    Britain, but it became a substantial actor in the world for
    the first time. That was one change, but there were other
    changes. 
    The first World War was the first time
    there was highly organized state propaganda. The British had
    a Ministry of Information, and they really needed it because
    they had to get the U.S. into the war or else they were in
    bad trouble. The Ministry of Information was mainly geared to
    sending propaganda, including huge fabrications about
    &amp;quot;Hun&amp;quot; atrocities, and so on. They were targeting
    American intellectuals on the reasonable assumption that
    these are the people who are most gullible and most likely to
    believe propaganda. They are also the ones that disseminate
    it through their own system. So it was mostly geared to
    American intellectuals and it worked very well. The British
    Ministry of Information documents (a lot have been released)
    show their goal was, as they put it, to control the thought
    of the entire world, a minor goal, but mainly the U.S. They
    didn&amp;#146;t care much what people thought in India. This
    Ministry of Information was extremely successful in deluding
    hot shot American intellectuals into accepting British
    propaganda fabrications. They were very proud of that.
    Properly so, it saved their lives. They would have lost the
    first World War otherwise.
    In the U.S., there was a counterpart.
    Woodrow Wilson was elected in 1916 on an anti-war platform.
    The U.S. was a very pacifist country. It has always been.
    People don&amp;#146;t want to go fight foreign wars. The country
    was very much opposed to the first World War and Wilson was,
    in fact, elected on an anti-war position. &amp;quot;Peace without
    victory&amp;quot; was the slogan. But he was intending to go to
    war. So the question was, how do you get the pacifist
    population to become raving anti-German lunatics so they want
    to go kill all the Germans? That requires propaganda. So they
    set up the first and really only major state propaganda
    agency in U.S. history. The Committee on Public Information
    it was called (nice Orwellian title), called also the Creel
    Commission. The guy who ran it was named Creel. The task of
    this commission was to propagandize the population into a
    jingoist hysteria. It worked incredibly well. Within a few
    months there was a raving war hysteria and the U.S. was able
    to go to war.
    A lot of people were impressed by these
    achievements. One person impressed, and this had some
    implications for the future, was Hitler. If you read Mein
    Kampf, he concludes, with some justification, that
    Germany lost the first World War because it lost the
    propaganda battle. They could not begin to compete with
    British and American propaganda which absolutely overwhelmed
    them. He pledges that next time around they&amp;#146;ll have
    their own propaganda system, which they did during the second
    World War. More important for us, the American business
    community was also very impressed with the propaganda effort.
    They had a problem at that time. The country was becoming
    formally more democratic. A lot more people were able to vote
    and that sort of thing. The country was becoming wealthier
    and more people could participate and a lot of new immigrants
    were coming in, and so on. 
    So what do you do? It&amp;#146;s going to
    be harder to run things as a private club. Therefore,
    obviously, you have to control what people think. There had
    been public relation specialists but there was never a public
    relations industry. There was a guy hired to make
    Rockefeller&amp;#146;s image look prettier and that sort of
    thing. But this huge public relations industry, which is a
    U.S. invention and a monstrous industry, came out of the
    first World War. The leading figures were people in the Creel
    Commission. In fact, the main one, Edward Bernays, comes
    right out of the Creel Commission. He has a book that came
    out right afterwards called Propaganda. The term
    &amp;quot;propaganda,&amp;quot; incidentally, did not have negative
    connotations in those days. It was during the second World
    War that the term became taboo because it was connected with
    Germany, and all those bad things. But in this period, the
    term propaganda just meant information or something like
    that. So he wrote a book called Propaganda around
    1925, and it starts off by saying he is applying the lessons
    of the first World War. The propaganda system of the first
    World War and this commission that he was part of showed, he
    says, it is possible to &amp;quot;regiment the public mind every
    bit as much as an army regiments their bodies.&amp;quot; These
    new techniques of regimentation of minds, he said, had to be
    used by the intelligent minorities in order to make sure that
    the slobs stay on the right course. We can do it now because
    we have these new techniques.
    This is the main manual of the public
    relations industry. Bernays is kind of the guru. He was an
    authentic Roosevelt/Kennedy liberal. He also engineered the
    public relations effort behind the U.S.-backed coup which
    overthrew the democratic government of Guatemala. 
    His major coup, the one that really
    propelled him into fame in the late 1920s, was getting women
    to smoke. Women didn&amp;#146;t smoke in those days and he ran
    huge campaigns for Chesterfield. You know all the
    techniques&amp;#151;models and movie stars with cigarettes coming
    out of their mouths and that kind of thing. He got enormous
    praise for that. So he became a leading figure of the
    industry, and his book was the real manual.
    &amp;nbsp;
    Another member of the Creel Commission
    was Walter Lippmann, the most respected figure in American
    journalism for about half a century (I mean serious American
    journalism, serious think pieces). He also wrote what are
    called progressive essays on democracy, regarded as
    progressive back in the 1920s. He was, again, applying the
    lessons of the work on propaganda very explicitly. He says
    there is a new art in democracy called manufacture of
    consent. That is his phrase. Edward Herman and I borrowed it
    for our book, but it comes from Lippmann. So, he says, there
    is this new art in the method of democracy, &amp;quot;manufacture
    of consent.&amp;quot; By manufacturing consent, you can overcome
    the fact that formally a lot of people have the right to
    vote. We can make it irrelevant because we can manufacture
    consent and make sure that their choices and attitudes will
    be structured in such a way that they will always do what we
    tell them, even if they have a formal way to participate. So
    we&amp;#146;ll have a real democracy. It will work properly.
    That&amp;#146;s applying the lessons of the propaganda agency. 
    Academic social science and political
    science comes out of the same thing. The founder of
    what&amp;#146;s called communications and academic political
    science is Harold Glasswell. His main achievement was a book,
    a study of propaganda. He says, very frankly, the things I
    was quoting before&amp;#151;those things about not succumbing to
    democratic dogmatism, that comes from academic political
    science (Lasswell and others). Again, drawing the lessons
    from the war time experience, political parties drew the same
    lessons, especially the conservative party in England. Their
    early documents, just being released, show they also
    recognized the achievements of the British Ministry of
    Information. They recognized that the country was getting
    more democratized and it wouldn&amp;#146;t be a private
    men&amp;#146;s club. So the conclusion was, as they put it,
    politics has to become political warfare, applying the
    mechanisms of propaganda that worked so brilliantly during
    the first World War towards controlling people&amp;#146;s
    thoughts. 
    That&amp;#146;s the doctrinal side and it
    coincides with the institutional structure. It strengthens
    the predictions about the way the thing should work. And the
    predictions are well confirmed. But these conclusions, also,
    are not allowed to be discussed. This is all now part of
    mainstream literature but it is only for people on the
    inside. When you go to college, you don&amp;#146;t read the
    classics about how to control peoples minds.
    Just like you don&amp;#146;t read what
    James Madison said during the constitutional convention about
    how the main goal of the new system has to be &amp;quot;to
    protect the minority of the opulent against the
    majority,&amp;quot; and has to be designed so that it achieves
    that end. This is the founding of the constitutional system,
    so nobody studies it. You can&amp;#146;t even find it in the
    academic scholarship unless you really look hard.
    That is roughly the picture, as I see
    it, of the way the system is institutionally, the doctrines
    that lie behind it, the way it comes out. There is another
    part &amp;nbsp;directed to the &amp;quot;ignorant meddlesome&amp;quot;
    outsiders. That is mainly using diversion of one kind or
    another. From that, I think, you can predict what you would
    expect to find.</description>
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